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Annex: Research Project 
/Introduction 
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Introduction 
The CEPAL secretariat is working on a research project entitled 
"Latin American Development: Appraisal and Long-Term Prospects". 
The central concerns about Latin American development which guided the 
definition of the nature and scope of this project were: 
(a) the appraisal of the economic and social process in the 
post-war period; 
(b) the study of the potential and limits of economic growth; 
(c) the preparation of projections and the study of the prospects 
of economic growth in the long term in national and regional 
plans, on the basis of different scenarios for the next 
decade, with a longer frame of reference extending to the 
year 2000«, 
The work programme prepared early last year, which appears in 
the annex, contains an ambitious research programme which attempts to 
link up the retrospective and prospective aspects of the Latin 
American development process. 
The retrospective study covers the nature of the economic and 
social processes which the countries of the region have been undergoing, 
and of the external relations of Latin America in the context of the 
changes occuring at the world level. The aim is in this way to shed 
more light on the precise nature of the institutional and policy 
changes, and the magnitude of the economic and social transformations 
implied by the scenarios under consideration. This will facilitate a 
more intelligent and enlightening discussion in the determination of 
future scenarios and their implications for institutions, strategies 
and policies. There is another very important reason why it is 
desirable to review past developments in relation to prospects. The 
current discussions about a new international economic order can by 
no means be divorced from the study of the strategies, policies and 
institutions and the organization of national societies; i.e., from 
the consideration of a new national economic order. 
/The prospective 
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The prospective study attempts to present scenarios serving 
to illustrate the main problems facing Latin American economic and 
social development. These scenarios are designed to articulate 
projections which reflect the outlook in such important areas as 
population growth, increasing urbanization, economic growth and its 
social consequences, trade and external financing, the transformation 
of production and its pressure on resources, and the outlook for 
productive occupation and unemployment. Particular attention is 
paid to economic co-operation and the growth of trade among Latin 
American countries and with other non-traditional areas. 
This study is linked, as ie natural, with the provisions of 
the General Assembly resolutions on a new international economic 
order (3201 (S-VI) and 336?. (S-VII)) ar.d in particular with 
resolution 3508 (XXX) on trends and projections of regional 
development, which establishes the responsibilities falling to the 
regional economic commissions in their contribution to the 
corresponding studies and proposals. It should also be recalled that 
consideration is now being given to the co-ordination of this research 
project with the "Project 2000: 5?he State of the World Economys " 
Problems and Prospects" being prepared at Headquarters. 
CEPAL has been engaged over the last year in the preparation 
and execution of this project. Chapter I of the present document 
provides an initial synthesis of the main features of Latin American 
economic and social development in the last ?5 years. The overview is 
based on. a group of global and sectoral studies being prepared in the 
framework of the work programme * Work has also began on the 
prospective studiest although naturally these are at a preliminary 
stage. Currently, a set o f interrelated submodels is being prepared 
with a view to constructing, whan the progress of work so justifies, 
an integrated model which can bs used to analyse with suitable cohesion 
the scenarios which have been proposed, and any other approaches 
considered desirable. 
/Chapter II. 
- v i i -
Chapter II presents a summary of the content of the development 
plans formulated by the Latin American countries in the 1970s« The 
main objectives, goals and guiding principles of the economic 
policy contained in the plans are reviewed there, and criteria that 
will help to clarify the objectives and guiding principles which t.;e 
Latin American Governments propose to establish for their development 
policies, at least for the short and the medium term, are also 
included. 
Despite the inevitably provisional nature of the present 
projections, it is felt that it might be useful to anticipate, even 
if only in a global manner, some conclusions stemming from part of 
the programme of work under way, in order to illustrate the discussion 
on questions of the utmost importance in the development process. 
Chapter III presents quite detailed demographic projections, and 
global macroeconomic projections for the non-oil-exporting countries, 
on a preliminary basis. Finally, there are some brief comments 




SALIENT FEATURES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE PAST 25 YEARS & 
1. Summarized overall appraisal 
(a) Dynamism and social change: image of development in the 
1950s and the actual changes 
An appraisal of Latin America's economic and social development 
in the post-war period shows that the global conception of the 
interrelationship between economic dynamism and social change prevailing 
two decades ago was invalidated by events in an unexpected way. 
Economic dynamism reached levels considered then to be highly ambitious 
and was closely associated with social changes which fell far short of 
the greater degree of consensus and more equitable goals assumed by 
the development ideologies of the beginning of the period to be inherent 
in the high rates of economic growth. 
By the early 1950s, a concept of development compatible with the 
conditions then prevailing had been evolved. It conveyed an image of 
continuous progress based on industrial development which, combined with 
certain economic and social reforms, would lead to a higher degree of 
social consensus. The upholding of this image by the governments and 
predominating social groups was explained by the attempts to form 
national societies which would avoid a repetition of certain traumatic 
experiences that had affected their economic and social structures. 
At the same time, the successful results which the industrial development 
policies were having in many countries underscored the image of a 
replica of the industrial countries' models. Side by side with the boom 
and social stability of the centred economies in the 1950s, the effects 
of the Marshall Plan and United States hegemony in the cold war period 
gave strength to the idea that growth was associated with well-being. 
•&/ This chapter, which also appears as chapter I in document E/CEPAL/ 
1024 of 15 March 1977, presents a summary of the retrospective 
appraisal of the Latin American economic and social process carried 
out in line with Part I of the secretariat research project which 
is included in the annex. In addition, this document on long-term 
economic and social development trends and projections has been 
submitted to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs in connexion with the tasks allotted in General Assembly 
resolution 3508 (XXX). 
/The development 
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The development process 1/ has shown a persistent situation inhere 
a relatively high economic growth ra;e has been accompanied by a 
distribution of income and property -/nich failed to develop favourably for 
the less privileged groups representing at least half the population. 
This persistent feature ever so long s: period has shown itself to be a 
characteristic of the prevailing style of development. Any attempt to 
give priority to redistribution objectives or merely to equate them witty 
other aims has led to crises that hs.ve seriously affected the system's 
operation. 
On the other hand, the latin American economies have shown great 
powers of adaptation to changing conditions created by the actual process 
of transformation of production and by external variables. 
In its economic aspects, the ¡system has been adapted to the needs 
of relatively advanced stages of industrial development and to an 
external context which has from time to time altered the trends of trade 
and financing. On the political side, it absorbed a large proportion of 
the middle strata that emerged as a result of urbanization, the 
educational system and the industrial development process. The absorption 
of these groups widened the political base of the system, which lost its 
pre-war character of a system with an extremely minority base, 
(b) Extent and depth of the production changes 
Vigorous economic growth radically changed the production structure. 
The region almost quadrupled its product between 1950 and 1975> it 
increased its manufacturing output five-fold, its production' of cement 
six-fold, of energy eight-fold, of machinery and equipment nine-fold and 
its steel output fifteen-fold. These important changes in scale were 
linked with substantial modifications in the structure of supply. 
The region becam® industrialized and was able, with an increasing 
degree of independencet to supply the transport, communications and 
construction sectors and a structure of consumption comprising non-
durable manufactured goods and important lines of durables. Certain 
sectors of basic inputs such as steel and petrochemical products, symbols 
of the first stages of heavy industry, are already operating in m&ny 
countries of the region. 
1/ The review contained in this chapter refers to the economic style 
prevailing in Latin America, not in Cuba which of course adopted a 
different econotric and social system from that of the rest of the 
countries in the region. /Consumer expectations 
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Consumer expectations, however, exacerbated by modern 
information media, are reaching extensive population groups. The 
capital formation required to satisfy this demand lies far beyond 
the region's capacity. Accordingly, if the industrial structure is 
considered in relation to the sophisticated levels of demand aspired 
to by the high- and middle-income groups and by those other social 
strata which are endeavouring to attain them, it will be realized 
that the terms of the imbalance between expectations and actual 
possibilities which have so influenced the political attitude of the 
middle-income groups and the growth of demand are still fully valid. 
At the same time, the volume of production, which in absolute 
terms is appreciable, loses some of its value compared with the 
volume that would be necessary to solve the problems of critical 
poverty affecting large sectors of the population. Hence, while the 
progress achieved is magnified if considered in the context of the 
population in the modern sectors, it diminishes in relation to the 
whole population. 
The production changes also altered the scale, composition and 
relative importance of foreign trade. Growth in the first 15 years 
was essentially based on import substitution at the national level, 
so that the region played no part in the world's dynamic trade 
in manufactures. It also lost ground in world trade in important 
agricultural and mining products. The combination of these two factors 
brought the region's share in world trade down from 9 per cent in 
1950 to 5 per cent in 1970. It should be noted, however, that now 
in the 1970s the Latin American countries are striving to open their 
economies to foreign trade and diversify their exports, placing the 
industrial development process in a wider context than the domestic 
market. 
The composition and volume of imports also changes as a result 
of the changes in domestic production. The region became an important 
buyer of industrial intermediate and capital goods from many countries. 
This represents a negotiating potential of which the region has not 
yet made full use, while it also creates a potential of the utmost 
importance for substitution and expansion in intra-regional trade. 
/Whatever the 
Whatever the context in which..the situation is analysed, there 
is no doubt that the State and the transnational corporation were 
the most dynamic production agents and showed a capacity for 
mobilizing resources in large-scale activities and projects which 
should be noted as one of the most significant developments in the 
period. In particular, governments and public enterprises in key 
infrastructure and basic resources sectors achieved impressive 
results. State management capacity today is far superior to what 
it has been in the past. A technocracy capable of directing policies 
that mobilize high proportions of the economy's resources has 
gradually been formed. The biggest public enterprises in some 
countries attained a scale which nakes them competitive-at a world 
level. 
(c) jnflexibil_ity_and ji-ji the^ distribution of property 
and income 
The growth and transformation of production have been 
permanently accompanied by the process of unequal income distribution. 
This situation has persisted both in boom periods when any solution 
has been deferred pending the benefits deriving from growth, and 
in periods of recession when a large part of the burden of the 
adjustments has fallen on the groups with least economic and 
political power. 
The unequal distribution of benefits is found not only in 
the distribution of the ownership of the means of production but 
also in the concentration of technical progress in modernization 
characterizing the various production sectors. 
The unequal distribution of the ownership of natural resources 
existing at the beginning of the 1950s was a matter of great 
political concern, but in practice it was not substantially altered 
in favour of the under-privileged sectors. It. was the agricultural 
sector in the early 1950s where it seemed possible to achieve a 
fairer distribution of property and where the economies of scale 
did not seem to entail properties of too large a size. It also 
seemed suitable for experiments in co-operative forms of production 
/or property. 
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or property. Available figures for the end of the 1960s show that in 
those respects neither agrarian reform nor any other type of.measure 
attempted in this sense achieved any significant progress. Quite 
the contrary, it seems to have increased the number of rural wage-
earners without access to the ownership or use of land, even of the 
limited size required for family subsistence. 
Simultaneously with these changes, another very important 
process was taking place. This was the formation of a new class 
of rural entrepreneur who, taking full advantage of the technical and 
infrastructure services instituted by the government, responded with 
considerable dynamism to the stimulus of demand. The development 
of the modern agricultural enterprise undoubtedly has an important 
impact in terms of increasing production and incorporating technological 
progress, but it is also a factor of the expulsion of agricultural 
manpower, and if presented as a solution to the problems of 
agricultural supply it actually discourages agrarian reform decisions 
and the implementation of programmes in this field. 
In the mining and energy resources sector the natural trend 
towards concentration owing to the technical nature of production 
activities has been confirmed by increasing ownership by public 
enterprises. When for political reasons these and other public 
enterprises have increased employment beyond strictly necessary 
limits or have reduced the prices of products consumed by the mass 
of the population, this has had a redistributive effect at least 
in the medium and short term both for the groups obtaining 
employment and for the consumers. 
Manufacturing has grown more vigorously than any other 
sector, even though in most countries it started from relatively 
low levels, so that a large part of its structure has been created 
in the past 25 years. In many sectors the economies of scale 
require large-scale plants which, added to their monopolistic 
character, leads to a strong concentration of ownership. In many 
countries the transnational corporations and the public enterprise 
were the most important agents in the. more dynamic sectors and 
industrial ownership was increasingly concentrated in their hands. 
/The trend 
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The trend towards concentration seems to have extended even 
to sectors which were traditionally spread out, such as the retail 
trade«. It is also significant that foreign capital is not only 
concentrated in dynamic and technologically complex sectors of 
industry but it also reaches sectors like commerce where its 
volume is necessarily of lesser or scant importance to the countries 
concerned.. 
The concentration of ownership in economic activities has 
favoured the expansion of middle- e.nd high-income groups*. The 
increasing size of the middle strata which generally originated in 
the lower-income groups and worked in sectors with lower levels of 
productivity is in itself a sign of the positive effect of.the 
expansion of this form of ownership«. The implications for urban 
wage-earners in these sectors were on the whole also positive. 
For the marginal groups, however, the relative situation meant 
that the highly inequitable distribution of income prevailing 
at the beginning of the period was maintained for more than half 
the population. Of course, even in this group some sub-groups may 
be identified which enjoyed some not insignificant absolute 
improvements; however, compared with the consumer expectations 
encouraged by the system itself, these appear totally inadequate. 
To palliate the inadequate distribution of income, in the 
first two decades the State implemented a public expenditure policy 
aimed at covering minimum needs, particularly in the services sector. 
State action in the fields of education and health were the most 
successful forms of action. The Marked decline in illiteracy and 
the increasing percentages of the population which had access to 
primary, secondary and university education undoubtedly represent 
inestimable forms of redistribution of services; however, they have 
not always benefited those most seriously affected by the distribution 
of income, and the relevance of their content in satisfying 
development needs left much to be deéired. The increase in the 
population largely achieved by the decline in mortality rates speaks 
for itself of the successful results achieved in the health sector. 
/If the 
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If the indicators of the social groups are considered in relative 
terms, however, once again the impressive improvements of some 
strata leave the marginal groups in an even worse situation. Thus 
the middle groups* successful efforts to gain access to secondary 
and higher education, health services and other benefits deriving 
from State action push the indexes of the most neglected groups, 
particularly the rural poor, even farther from the countries' average 
values than they were in the past. 
The redistributive effects of these policies gradually lost 
some of their importance as the demands of economic growth led to 
a shift in emphasis i'n public expenditure to investment in material 
production sectors at the, expense of those services. 
Available figures for I960 and 1970 show that the distribution 
of income did not change significantly during the decade. In both 
those years the poorer half of the population obtained about 14 per 
cent of total income, the next 20 per cent about the same proportion, 
and the top 30 per cent received the remaining 72 per cent. 
The figures in table 1, besides reflecting the persistence of 
the unsatisfactory.distribution of income, show the vigorous growth 
of demand of the middle- and.high-income groups. These groups, in 
obtaining the lion's share of income, in fact mainly oriented the 
structure of supply and created a market of attractive dimensions 
for the large-scale enterprise, particularly the transnational 
corporation. 
The figures available for a group of countries at the beginning 
of the 1970s show that, although unequal income distribution is a 
feature common to all of them, it has certain shades both between 
the countries themselves and between the urban and the rural area. 
It is clear from these figures than in some countries the situation 
of the poorest 20 per cent is extremely serious and appears to be 
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Socio-eoonon&o strata 
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2C0 poorest 3.1 2»5 53 55 3.8 ' 2 107.6 
30^ following :.o„3 118 167 41.5 >9 3 919 15A 
50$ poorest 13.9 $2- 1 2 2 32.6 30 - k 025 15.8 
200 fol ioving 13.9 ' 2^ 3 . 306 2 5 . 9 63 3 359 ' 1 3 . 2 
20?» before the highest 1C0 28.0 616 45.3 192 10 237 U0.3 
100 highest >+7.9 4^,2 1 <&3 . • 1 9U5 17.7 232 7 785 3 0.7 
5'¡q highest 33.4 25,?. 2 3 0 5 2 630 14.1 3 2 5 k 332 17.1 
Total 1 0 0 . 0 JÜ5 Wo 2M 21 2 5 4o6 100.0 
Source: CEPAL estimates, on the basis of national sur'/uva. 
Notes The average distribution in La\in America in 197° has baen estimated on the basis of infos-nation provided 
by Argentina, Brazil , Chile, Ccloabia, Uaxieo, Paraguay, Honduras and Venezuela. 
a / Corresponds to the concept of personal ¡por capita tosome. 
/Table 7 
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Tab!© 2 
LATIN AMERICA: INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES 
(Percentage of total Income represented by eaoh stratum of the population) 
Individual recipients Households 
Argen-
tina Brazil 
Socio-Economic Strata Metro- Na-
politani tional 



























































20$ poorest 5.3 1.9 2.8 4.3 3.7 2.5- 1,6 2,6 2.9 3.6 2.3 3.4 
30;S following 17.7 9.0 12,3 15.I 14.8 11.3 10.1 11.5 13.3 15.8 8.5 12,3 
5<$ poorest 23.0 10.9 15.1 19.4 18.5 13.8 11.7 14.1 16.2 19.4 10.8 15.7 
20$ following 1G.0 12.2 15.0 15.6. 15.8 1-3.5 16.5 ' 16.3 18.3 17.I 10.9 14.8 
20$ before the 10$ highest 27.8 24.2 25.2 24,4 26,4 25.7 28.7 25.6 29.8 27.I 28,3 27.5 
10$ highest 3 l . 3 k / 52.8b/ 44.6b/ 4o,6 39.2b/ 46,8 43,1 44,0 35.7b/ 36.4 50.0 42.1b/ 
Total loo.o • l o o . o ' 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 jO loo.o 
Coefficient of Gini v 
concentration o.4ob/ 0.63b/ 0.53b/ 0,48 0.49b/ 0.56 0.56 0,54 0.49 0.47 0,62 o.53b/ 
Sources: (1) National Institute of Statistics and Census, Survey on employment and unemployment, 197°. 
(2) IBGEE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics): Incomes Survey, {NAD (National households survey by sampling) - 2, 4 ^ quarter 
1972. 
(3) DANE (National administrative department of statistics), Households Survey 197°. 
(4) Central Office of Census, 7 t h Households Survey 1971, Urban Areas. 
(5) Central Office of Census, Continual survey of labour, November 19^7,-February 1968, 
(6) National Institute of Planning and Co-ordination, Households survey in the urban area, 1968. 
(7) Statistics and Census Office, Speoial survey on incomes through households, 1970. 
(8) Central Office of Employment, Households Survey, 1970, 
(9) University of the Republic, The distribution of income in Uruguay, 1967» 
(10) Central OCfice of Statistics and National Census, Households Survey, 1971« 
(11) Central Office of Statistics and Census, Survey on family income and expenditure, 1967-1968. 
(12) Bank of Mexico, Survey on family income and expenditure, 1968. 
a/ Active recipients. 
b/ In the adjustments made by underestimation the Oini coeffioients and the share of the last decile In income were, respectively, the following: „ .. 





(d) The structural problem of enployment 
The productive system has clearly shown that it cannot generate 
sufficient productive employment for the increasing labour force 
of the region, and particularly for the big contingents of urban 
manpower. 
Progress in the internal mobilization of productive resources 
and the growth of investment have been insufficient in comparison 
with the supply of labour swollen by the high population growth-
rate. The.agricultural sector has been losing labour through 
migration from rural to urban areas. In addition, investment has 
mainly been devoted to the development of highly capital-intensive 
industrial, and infrastructure activities, so that its effect on 
employment has been partially eliminated. These factors, among 
others, directly affect the problems of open unemployment faced by 
the countries of the region. Open unemployment in a group of 
1? countries of the region was estimated'at roughly 5»8 per cent 
Of the;- economically active population towards 1970, i.e*, 
approximately..k million.persons.J/ . , . : ' 
- Open unemployment, however, is neither the only employment 
problem in Latin America, nor even the main one in quantitative 
terms. 
Studies on the subject indicate that "the predominant form 
in which labour force under-utilization occurs in the less developed 
countries is underemployment, and particularly invisible 
underemployment".5/ While the definition and measurement of the 
different forms of underemployment is a subject of much discussion, 
it is nonetheless an easily verified fact that much of the urban 
and rural population of Latin America is employed in activities of 
very low productivity, or their working potential is sporadically 
2/ See PEEALC (ILO)t The employment problem in Latin America 
'and the Caribbean; facts, i>utlaoks and policies - Santiago, 
November 197*5? table 1-2.*""" 
Ibid., Chapter I. 
/devoted to 
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devoted to temporary work or, ultimately, remunerated at income 
levels which .are openly below subsistence levels, if the latter 
are defined according to any social criterion» Estimates made by 
PREALC to establish the order of magnitude of the employment problem 
appear in table 3° They indicate that for a group of countries 
of the region which account for about 75 per cent, of the population 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, the total under-employment of 
labour, including open unemployment,and agricultural and non-
agricultural underemployment, represented in 1970 the equivalent of 
28 per cent of the labour force; i.e., the productive potential of 
one in every k active persons was not used« Almost 20 per cent of 
the total underemployment of labour would be accounted for by open 
unemployment, the remaining 80 per cent being attributable equally 
to forms of rural and urban underemployment, It is also noted that 
generalizatiôns about these orders of magnitude of the situation 
cannot be made for all the countries considered nor for all the 
forms of underemployment of labour. 
This vast underemployment of labour is linked with a number 
of features of the productive structure of the Latin American 
economy and, in particular, with the marked differences in the 
technological level of the productive units within the different 
branches of production. As a counterpart to the high concentration 
of capital, a dominant feature of the majority of productive units 
of the economy is a chronic shortage of capital and backward 
technologies corresponding to incipient stages of development. 
The productive processes are thus highly heterogeneous, 
which results in very uneven productivity and incomes. It is 
estimated that towards 1970, for the region as a whole, the 
"modern" sector mainly based in manufacturing industries and mining, 
and to a lesser extent agriculture, absorbed only 12 per cent of the 
labour force while accounting for 50 per cent of the production of 
goods; while the "primitve" sector, heavily agricultural, absorbed 
one-third of employment and contributed only 5 per cent of 
the product, the. remainder of employment and the product being 
distributed among the intermediate sectors.(See table 4.) 
/Table 3 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL CINDER-UTILIZATION OP LABOUR IM AROUND 1 9 7 0 
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« M r i r5 t* 
tote 
d 
Arganiigta 8 823 1 3I8 7 505 168 1.9 132 10 2 C86 27.8 901 12.0 1 201 13.6 
Brasil 28 oW 11 965 16 079 1 935 6.9 H 180 35 M «¡„S 3 505 9 628 
Colombia 6 395 2 686 3 709 473 7.4 672 *5 1 ^ 39.2 749 20e2 1 891+ 29C6 
Chile 2 721 665 2 056 130 5.0 133 20 779 37 ®9 356 3-7 «3 619 22.8 
Msxiso 12 473 5 293 7 180 k'/k 3.8 2 322 IfO — n n c « SU'? w U l'c» 3 61*3 29.2 
Venezuela 3 015 71k 2 301 - CM. 4,0/ t n. <->»£ 136 le» *" s 90/ itó.,5 472 20«5 10K * ss 
¿11 une oeuafe-S.eH lìstad 61 471 22 64:i 38 830 3 367 5.5 7 583 34 14 303 36.8 6 O30 17.6 ' 17 780 2 8 ^ 
Percentage of under-utilization 18.9 42.7 38.4 lOOsO 
Source: PHEALC (ILO) - The problem of employment in Latin America and .the Caribbean: situation, prespeots and pelioies* Santiago, November 1975° 
For the sources and methodology of the calculation sea tables 1-1 to 1-8 ef the siucfer mentioned, 
a/ The rates refer to the relevant economically active population. 
b/ The total under-utilisation has been oaloulated on the basis of the percentage difference between supply and demand of labour, thus including 
open unemployment. The methodologies used are not always the same, partly baoauaa of leeal features, so that the figures should not be taken 
at their absolute value; they only serve to estimate orders of magnitude, 
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Latin America Central America 
* " " * marito F ° m e r T o t a l * « • > Total Current 3 W Total 
Argentina 
12.4 47.7 34 .3 loo 8.1 35.« • 55 .0 loo 21.3 65.3 
53 .3 41 .6 5.1 100 42.6 48.0 9.4 100 58.6 4 o , 5 
47.5 
5 . 3 100 
0.9 100 
6.8 27.7 ¿5.5 loo 5.0' 15.0 80.0 100 3.0 57.0 18.0 100 
33.2 19.3 lco 43.9 20.6 - 25.5 100 ® . i 2t6 100 
17.5 64.9 17.6 100 14.0 5 7 , 4 20.6 100 25.6 70.6 3,8 loo 
62.5 36.0 1.5 100 63,6 30,4. 3.3 10Ó 62.1 37.5 0.4 100 
35.0 ^.2 27,8 100 20,0 60.0 20.0 100 50,0 40.0 ' 10.0 100 
91.5 7.5 1.0 100 57,2 40.0 . 2.8 . 100 77,8 21.6 0,6 100 
S S 3 £ S f C 2 P A L ' T h a " " — 1 0 develonment cf Latin Africa i n recent yaars, 2/CU.l2/h.l. 
/The significance 
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The significance of the primitive sector from the standpoint of 
employment would certainly increase if the vast services sector 
were taken into account« The primitive sector of production thus 
holds a large proportion of the working population in conditions 
of low productivity and very lo*>r incomes which constitutes the main 
source of the underemployment of labour. As may be seen in table k, 
the technological differences vary among branches and among countries. 
To illustrate these differences, the table shows the extreme cases 
in the region. 
Unemployment and underemployment of labour, combined with 
distributive problems, are responsible for the fact that large 
sectors of the Latin American population currently live in conditions 
of extreme poverty. The extent of this poverty can be seen from 
recent estimates which are summarized in tables 5 and 6. Table 5 
is taken from an ILO study,k-f and indicates that about bj> per cent 
of the Latin American population in 1972 live in conditions of 
"serious poverty", i.e., more than 110 million persons, of whom 
70 million (i.e., 27 per cent of the population) may be said to be 
"destitute". Table 6 summarizes the information for various countries 
of the region on the basis of a minimum balanced diet according to 
national nutritional patterns. It establishes a proportion of the 
population of each country with incomes below the cost of that diet; 
it appears that the incomes of about 35 per cent of the total population 
of these countries are beloitf the cost of that diet, although with 
great differences in the situation of each country. Overlooking 
the difficulties inherent in the delimitation and measurement of 
the "poverty line" and the definition of the problem itself, it 
is clear that widespread poverty is a serious problem facing the 
region, which is in clear contrast with the potential which could 
be derived from the expansion of production and the rates of 
economic growth. 




















Asia 1 19 6 653 71 493 42 
Africa 239 69 134 33 
Latin Amerio a 274 118 43 73 27 
Total y 1 S15 1 23.0 §L M 21 
Source: ILO, Employment, growth and essential needs, Geneva 197^, P» 23» 
a/ The state of "extreme poverty" arises-inthe oaso of annual incomes of less than 
US$500 for Western Europe; US$180 fcr Latin ¿nerica} US$115 Africa and US$100 
for Asia, 
b/ The state of "indigence" arises in the case of inoooes of less -than US$250 in 
Western Europe; US$90 in Latin Aaerioaj US$59 Afrisa and US$50 in Asia. 
9/ Excluding the developing countries of Europe and Oceania with populations of 
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Source: Raoul Nelson» 
e/ Cost of food calculated on the basis af the ¡aost reoent income and expenditure 
surveys of each country. As is shewn by soma national alimentary patterns 
uhich reveal an esaass in the consumption of ai''tides of low nutritional value 
and a deficit of o-thers of ai0h va-'.ue, -the oamal cost of the average balanced 
diet could be lover if tha food habits and taboos observable in the various 
countries of the arsa rare charged., 




(e) CJianges^ productivecommercial^ and ^ financ^ial ^ela^i^ns 
with the exterior 
The relations between the changes in the economic and social 
process and the evolution of the international context are further 
significant features of developments over the last 25 years-
In production, the links with the exterior changed significantly. 
Direct foreign investment was directed to different sectors than in 
the past. Investment in natural resources lost ground in comparison 
with investment in the more dynamic branches of the industrial 
sector. The nationalization of mines and petroleum heightened this 
trend over the last 5 years. 
Foreign investment in agriculture and mining was, in general, 
of little significance, except in the case of oil in Venezuela in 
the 1950s, Likewise, investment in mining was occasionally important 
during relatively short periods in medium and small countries, but 
this investment is of little consequence for the region as a whole. 
On the contrary, and particularly in the late 1960s, direct 
foreign investment rose considerably in the more dynamic branches 
of industry, and for large countries like Brazil and Mexico it became 
a dominant economic force in key products in such sectors as metal-
working and chemicals. Furthermore, the foreign companies became 
transnational, and thus their operations became more complex. Thus, 
for example, their relations with their mother companies had 
important effects on the balance of payments, since the flows of 
imports and exports were determined by the interests of the 
corporations rather than by clear national policies. Again, these 
companies' ownership of technological innovations, access to private 
and public international credit, attraction of domestic credit and 
use of national and imported basic inputs, make it difficult for 
the countries to work out suitabl'e control or orientation policies. 
In international trade, the countries greatly changed the 
composition of exports and imports. Exports tended to become 
diversified, both through the growth of the commodities characteristic 
of each country, and through the increasing incorporation of 
/semimanufactured and 
- 18 
semimanufactured and manufactured products. This caused many 
countries to cease to be dependent on the foreign market for a 
single product, which represents an appreciable step forward for 
the management of the balance of payments. 
Imports changed in line with the process of internal 
transformation of production and, particularly, the progress of 
industrialization. The structure of imports today is more complex, 
and specialized intermediate inputs have increasingly taken the 
place of consumer goods, which has caused greater rigidity at the 
qualitative level. There are no striking differences between the 
import/product ratio at the beginning and the end of the period, 
but today the goods imported are certainly of greater technological 
complexity than in the past, as befits a new stage in Latin 
American development. 
The adjustment of the structure and amount of external 
financing to the new conditions in international financial markets 
in the second half of the 1960s is another important change in the 
last ten years. During much of the 1950s and particularly in the 
middle of the 1960s the region received small amounts of external 
financing, and most loans came from official sources* Subsequently, 
this situation changed significantly. Funds became abundant and an 
increasing amount of the financing tended to stem from private 
international banks. The region's capacity to tap this financing, 
and its role in economic growth, became fundamental features of 
recent years. In particular, the large countries became closely 
linked with the international financial market, establishing a 
system of relations which is radically different from past practice 
The flexibility and rapidity of operations, the criteria for loan 
analysis, the shorter loans and higher interest rates differ from 
the conditions of official loans. The governments have had to 
develop a new system of relations and negotiation which is in 
many respects intimately linked with the transnational corporations 
/The region 
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The region's indebtedness as a result of this system of 
financing creates a different balance-of-payments position than 
at the beginning of. the period, since the amount of debt service 
absorbs much of current export earnings. The region must therefore 
strongly promote exports, once again adjust the productive structure 
to reduce imports, and thus find new openings in world trade and 
in the world economy. Trade of. manufactures with the developed 
countries and within the region is presently at the take-off stage 
and will represent a new stage in tha foreign relations of the 
region. 
2. SoCjL_al _cjiange 
(a) The_ per^i stance p^_d^st_ributive_problems 
< 
As indicated at the outset, economic growth was accompanied 
by serious problems and contradictions. These are related to the 
basic social and political structure, and therefore an overall 
appraisal must include a study of the social transformation which 
accompanied economic growth« 
Social change was in many respects greater than, but did not 
conform to, the forecasts stemming from the concept of development. 
It was thought that unless socio-economic reforms were carried out 
and capital formation efforts supported by external assistance, 
it would be difficult to maintain simultaneously stable governments 
and democratic values. The wretched plight of large groups of the 
population gave grounds for believing that social and political 
tensions would increase dangerously, particularly in the case of 
the great agricultural masses: hence the acceptance by some 
leadership groups of reform plans which could lead to a national 
society based on greater social consensus. During the last 25 years 
no substantial changes have occurred., in most countries, in access 
to property or to income on the part of the mass of the population; 
nor have fundamental changes occurred which would give the 
underpriviledged groups a significantly more equalitarian share. , 
/ ( b ) 
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(b) Population tren.ci.o_ and jirbanizatior 
Social change was strong influenced by two unrelenting 
and quantitatively highly important phenomena: population growth 
and migration from the countryside to urban areas. 
During the period the average rate of population growth was 
2.8 per cent, and the region's population grew from 160 to 
315 million persons between 1950 ar.d 1975» The population of 
cities with less than 20,000 inhabitants represented three-quarters 
of the population in 1950, and about half in 1975° This striking 
change caused the population explosion in the large cities. In 1950 
Latin America had 6 or 7 cities v/ith over one million inhabitants; 
in I960 it will have 25« At present it already has one city with 
over.10 million inhabitants (Mexico City) and three more which 
are close to that mark (Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo). 
The countries continue to differ greatly in population 
patterns and trends. Four countries with approximately 15 per cent 
of the population of the region have already undergone the demographic 
transition to moderate growth rates. In three of these countries, 
60 per cent or more of the population was urban in 1970, the rural 
population was constant and its contribution to urban growth will 
be moderate. Five large or medium-sized countries with about 
68 per cent of the regional population have rates as high as or 
higher than the Latin American average. They all have reasonable 
expectations that these rates will begin to fall at the end of the 
1970s. They also have high rates of urbanization and the rural 
population growth rate is relatively low (about 1.5 per cent annually). 
The remaining countries - which account for approximately 16 per 
cent of the population - are in general small and rural, with high 
population growth rates which will not fall in the short-run since 
they still have high, mortality rates which can be brought down. 




(c) Occupational structure. Growth of the middle strata 
The great urban expansion brought with it heavy demands on 
society, as was foreseen in the post-war period. It was then 
supposed that industrialization and the expansion of services 
would provide the occupational answer to rural/urban migration. 
Urban planning would enable these explosive urban settlements 
to be controlled and organized. 
Judged in absolute terms the occupational achievements of 
industrialization and the public services may be considered 
satisfactory. Against a 5 per cent growth of the urban population, 
hov/ever, they are inadequate. The job deficits were made good by 
the activities of the so-called informal sectors. These succeeded 
in becoming stable and adapted to the urban societies, and have 
come to form a system which generates its own forms of supply and 
demand. 
In the context of the functioning of the modern and informal 
sectors new population strata were generated. The groups in the 
so-called ,;higher" or "middle" occupation J5/ have increased their 
share in the occupation strata, which shows the urban economy's 
capacity to promote the formation of high and middle-level social 
strata (see table 7)« Contrary to what was supposed in the 1960s, 
low-skilled jobs in the tertiaty sector,6/ did not increase unduly, 
and the percentages tended to remain much the same. Naturally, 
the absolute number of jobs of this kind rose considerably, with 
a great impact on the distributive problem. In sum, the occupational 
structure did not create great problems of open employment. 
¿/ In general, non-manual occupations ranging from employers 
and professionals to salaried employees and sales persons. 
6/ Salaried employees in services or own account workers and 
unpaid family members employed in services. 
/Table 7 
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On the other hand., it established a clear difference between these 
strata which nanaged to incorporate themselves in the more dynamic 
and "modern11 production and service sectors and those which 
remained outside them, 
(d) Economic and political problems of urbanization 
These problems were unquestionably too great for the capacity 
of urban planning to deal with them. The response of the State 
to the challenges of urban growth was concentrated in housing 
policy. It v/as the middle strata, however, which had the greatest 
access to the benefits of government action, thus incidentally 
showing their capacity for political mobilization. 
Government urban policy was unable to avert a growing split 
within the large cities. On the one hand, there were the modern 
districts, far from the centres, based on the widespread use of 
automobiles, and on the other, there remained the unsatisfactory 
human settlements spontaneously created by rural-urban migration. 
Government policy on these settlements ended up as State assistance 
in view of the amount of resources necessary for a modern housing 
or urbanization programme. 
The issue of political tension originating in these large 
urban groups has come to occupy a central position. The problem 
is to avoid a social and economic breakdown in an urban economy 
with unfair income distribution and access to employment and services 
and with obvious contrasts in consumption levels and life-styles. 
It seems that the combination of a small but effective percentage 
of real opportunities, moderate increases in consumption, hopes 
of progress, minimum welfare policies and authoritarian regimes 
has kept the situation under control. 
/(e) Rigidity 
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(e) Rigidity and changes in tlie rural sector 
The rural situation today continues to be worse than the 
urban situation» The absolute poverty of large strata and the 
bad distribution of property and pcwer were and still are 
characteristic of rural areas» In the 1950s and at the beginning 
of the 1960s it was thought that agricultural reform was not only 
a solution to rural problems but also a measure which was in step 
with the process of industrialization» .It was assumed that the 
State, the industrial entrepreneurs, the middle classes and urban 
wage-earners and the rural masses had common interests in a policy 
which would lead to a more efficient use of the land and rural 
labour, and higher production and incomes which would furnish new 
markets for ..manufactured goods and open the way for rural democracy 
and the organization of groups which would break the power of the 
landowning sectors opposed to development«, 
The high costs of agricultural reform, its slow maturation 
and above all the evident fact that the groups involved could 
reach most of their goals at the expense of the rural masses whose 
political pressure was weaker than had been supposed, took the 
wind out of the sails of reform, leaving a high percentage of the 
potential beneficiaries in an under-privileged situation.. 
The slow or tortuous progress of agrarian reform led to a 
large number of proposals usually suggested as complementary but 
v/hich were in fact alternatives. The most important were colonization 
and the relocation of poor rural groups through the expansion 
of the agricultural frontier, agricultural extension in the form 
of supplying rural areas with public services, the creation of 
agricultural unions and basic organizations and "community 




As a result of the economic development of the system and the 
slight impact of'most of these policies, the problems of the 
past have tended to persist to a large extent in rural areas. 
At the same time, however, there are a number of important changes. 
In the first place, a modern commercial agricultural economy 
has emerged primarily among the large and medium-scale landowners 
who have made better use than any other group of the State 
infrastructure projects and of agricultural extension in the 
form of technology. Secondly, agrarian reform did free some of 
the beneficiary groups from extreme poverty. Others managed to 
enter the commercial economy or acquire non-agricultural sources 
of income in transport, trade and artisanal or other activities. 
These successful groups widened the gap between themselves and 
those left behind, in the eyes of the latter. These became a 
scattered, landless v/age-earning mass depending on seasonal labour 
and vrithout political power. Finally, important progress \ias 
made in education and health; however, as in so many other areas 
the rural/urban gap tended to remain or even increase, so that 
such successes are once again relative. These transformations 
improved the situation of some groups and also created in the 
rural sector a more complex stratification than in the 1950s, 
in which the more underprivileged groups were, unable to improve 
their relative position or solve their more serious problems. 
/3„ Economic 
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3. Economic_qynanism and change 
(a) The development strategies and external- conditions. Stages of 
the growth process 
The rate of economic growth and the orientation of the changes 
in production were determined by the combination of internal 
development policies and potential and.external factors at the 
national level. 
The influence of the external factors was particularly marked 
in the fluctuations of the rate of growth. The size of the economies 
and, in general, the internal development conditions largely 
determined the trends and orientation cf the changes in production. 
The various forms which these factors took gave rise to marked 
differences between countries and different stages in the economic 
growth of the last 25 years. The evolution of the external variables, 
in relation to exports and financing for example, was similar for 
many countries. However the disparity in.the supply of natural 
resources, the size of internal markets, salary levels, the socio-
political organization and the capacity, of defining and implementing 
development policies led tc economic processes with varying dynamism 
and structure. 
Two stages can be distinguished, in this long-term analysis of 
the economic development of the region, if the evolution of these 
internal and external factors is considered in the countries which 
have the highest percentages of population. The first covers the 
decade of the 1950s and the first five years of the 1960s. The 
second covers the rest of the decade of the 1960s and the 1970s. 
This division into two stages in the middle of the last decade 
naturally constitutes an analytic simplification. It does not 
necessarily have precise application for each of the countries because 
of the particular features already mentioned, and the selection of the 
year 1965 as a dividing line mainly serves the purposes of statistical 
simplification. Nevertheless, significant and characteristic features 
prevail in each period which justify this global approach. 
/The first 
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The first stage (1950-1965) is characterized by an external 
situation which after the boom in Korea developed unfavourably for 
the region. After an initial period in which the prices in the 
international market rose rapidly and the volumes exported increased, 
there was a slackening in the external markets which lasted until 
the mid-1960s. Exports grew slowly and the terms of trade 
deteriorated. At the same time the borrowing capacity and 
availability of external financing were relatively low. Substitutive 
industrialization was accentuated and imports grew slowly in many 
large and medium-sized countries. The imports coefficient fell, and 
this phenomenon reached significant proportions in some countries 
and particularly in Brazil. It should be stressed, however, that the 
external situation was not unfavourable for all the countries, 
particularly for most of the Central American countries. 
The slackening in the. rate of the capacity of external buying 
already described stimulated in most countries, although to varying 
degrees, the trends towards the substitutive industrialization of 
imports which had emerged during the 1950s and after the Second World 
War. The countries in which the imports capacity suffered the 
greatest restrictions, such as the countries of the southern cone, 
Brazil and in some years Mexico, had to make major internal efforts 
to implement their industrialization strategy. These countries 
experienced a decline in the speed of the process at the end of the 
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, of varying intensity and 
fluctuations in the different cases. Through their greater efforts 
these countries, particularly Brazil and Mexico, advanced more rapidly 
in the stages of industrialization, but the restrictions of imports 
led them to force the substitutive process to levels which were not 
always compatible with the desirable requirements of efficiency and 
which passed on the excessive costs to the consumers and other 
production sectors. 
Other countries of lesser economic and demographic size, such 
as the Central American countries, did not suffer similar restrictions 
in their external conditions and towards the end of the period a first 
/and fruitful 
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and fruitful stage of su.bregional integration began to materialize. 
This enabled them to secure an advance in industrialization which 
would not have been easy to attain in restrictive external conditions 
because of the small siae of the markets«, 
The second stage, which lasted fron the middle of the 1960s up 
to the 1970s, is characterised by t. gradual improvement in the 
external conditions which reached a peak in the biennium 1972-1973« 
Exports increased in dynamisn and diversification and the 
ratios of the terms of trade tended to improve, as well as the 
availability of external financing, particularly during the 1970s. 
At this second stage there were marked disparities in the 
capacity of the countries to adapt to the new international context. 
The differing conditions of the Latin American countries for 
securing external financing, embarking on new targets of change in 
internal production and diversifying exports created marked diversity 
in dynamism and the national economic processes« 
The countries which took, greatest advantage of *the: external 
situation v?ere those which combined an active policy of internal 
change with dynamic incorporation into the external commercial and 
financial market. > • / •••• 
In general the Latin American economies carried out major 
changes in the institutional structure of their economies. The 
governments gradually progressed in planning their activities in both 
the long and the short tern« Although they did not alt/ays succeed in 
including the action within the framework of a formal plan,. public 
activity in practice gained in coherence and clarity of objectives. 
The increasing level of training of the public technocracies and 
bureaucracies contributed greatly to this improvement. In many 
countries they showed a capacity to carry out major investments, both 
in infrastructure and in industrial sectors, and to smoothly operate 
economic policies which made it possible to carry out long-term 
strategies and adapt to the changing external conditions. 
Progress \i?as also made, although more unevenly, in tax, 
administrative and agrarian reforms. These reforms naturally provoked 
/greater reactions 
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greater reactions than the rest of the public action and, particularly 
in-the agrarian sphere, the advances are far from satisfactory in 
most cases. 
The financial markets were organized by promoting major 
processes of accumulation and a greater incorporation into the 
international framework. Inflationary adjustments were progressively 
introduced into these markets so that the distorsions registered in 
the capital and investment markets were eliminated. 
The improved institutional organization of the public sector 
made it possible to carry out an economic policy which, while in 
general maintaining the objectives of industrialization, adapted the 
instruments to the new conditions. 
The economic policy incorporated the growing concern about 
inflation in an organic way. Inflation, which in the first stage was 
limited to a few countries, ended up by becoming a widespread 
phenomenon during the 1970s in the context of the world, inflationary 
process and because of the varied action of external and internal 
factors in the countries of the region, as is explained in chapter IV. 
The efforts to harmonize growth, inflation and employment show that 
many countries are introducing more elaborate forms of economic.policy. 
The new international conditions and the rigidity created in 
many countries by imports substitution determined or facilitated 
changes in economic policy. In general, the countries tried to 
insert their industrialization process in broader markets so as to 
be able to realize new stages and remedy some of the distorsions of 
the past. For this they combined a policy of export promòtion with 
greater liberalization of imports through measures affecting tariffs, 
exchange urates and tax subsidies. 
The requirements of the accumulation process, together with the 
concern to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy in thè operation 
of key sectors, also led to a reconsideration of the attitude towards 
foreign capital. In respect of natural resources there was a 
widespread attitude in favour of their nationalization v/hich enabled 
the countries to maintain or recover control of their mining and 
/energy activities. 
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energy activities. In the other sectors of the economy, however'^ an 
attitude more favourable to foreign capital prevailed which in many 
cases was reflected in a major influence of transnational enterprises 
in the more dynamic sectors of demand« 
Accelerated economic dynamism and major changes in production 
developed under the new external conditions, encouraged by the 
national policies. In these circumstances the most favoured 
countries were those of large market size and other small countries 
which began to exploit resources with gcod international prices which 
proved to have an appreciable marginal effect on the economy. Among 
the first group, the countries which were particularly favoured were 
those which, relying on the industrial base already created by the 
mid-1960s, offered attractive political and salary conditions for 
foreign capital, secured appreciable proportions of the financing 
and technology and carried out a decisive industrialization strategy. 
Among the second, those which gained most were those which, taking 
advantage of the balance-of-payments situation created by the • 
expansion of exports, secured external financing and on this basis 
embarked on the first stages of industrialisation. 
On the other hand, there were the medium-sized and small 
countries which had already carried out the first stage of the 
substitutive process cr which did not have adequate natural resources 
to substantially increase the income of their exports. These 
countries were faced with a double problem;.they neither possessed a 
market with capacity to advance in the industrial process and sepure 
external financing, nor were capable of satisfying a more sophisticated 
demand by means of external trade. The subregional integration 
schemes then appeared as a suitable solution for a major group of 
countries. 
In many countries the improvement in the purchasing power of 
exports and the abundant external financing reversed the trend of the 
previous period towards decline in the imports coefficient. The 
economies functioned during the period with a greater availability of 
imports. Although the flexibility of supply deriving from this 
/circumstance should 
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circumstance should be noted as one of the factors which made possible 
a high level of dynamism, it is equally true that the system 
functioned with increasing foreign borrowing which became accentuated 
from 197^ onwards when the external conditions deteriorated because 
of the effects and repercussions of economic recession in the 
industrial countries and the deterioration of the terms of trade 
aggravated by the rise in petroleum prices for the importer countries. 
The external debt services and repayments of direct foreign investment 
steadily increased in magnitude and towards the end of the period 
constituted one of the major causes of the deficit in the balance of 
payments on the current account. Furthermore, a considerable 
proportion of the debt had been contracted with the private foreign 
bank which operated with more onerous and risky time limits, interest 
and conditions than those prevailing in multilateral official financing. 
The serious external bottleneck which is revealed by the high 
deficits on the current account of the balance of payments in the non-
petroleum exporting countries, which began in 197^, affected the 
drastic fall in the rate of economic growth in 1975 and this problem 
prevails in spite of a certain improvement recorded last year. 
A new stage in the economic development of the Latin American 
countries, offering varying prospects according to the particular 
conditions which affect them, finally seems to be emerging. The 
petroleum-exporting countries, and especially Venezuela, have favourable 
prospects for accelerating their development and can appreciably 
influence the economic dynamism of other countries of the region if 
reciprocal trade is expanded and economic and financial co-operation 
strengthened. The other countries, however, will have to confront the 
solution of their acute problems of external payments in an 
international situation which will be less favourable than in the 
years before the recession, particularly if the recovery of the growth 
rate in the industrial countries continues to be delayed. 
For this second group of countries the development of their 
internal markets, a new stage of industrialization in intermediate 
essential products and capital goods, which will undoubtedly vary in 
/nature and 
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nature' and .dynamism from ore country to another, and also the 
broadening and diversification of regional trade and trade with other . 
non-traditional areas will be the decisive factors, in some more 
urgent aspects than in recent years, in promoting their subsequent 
economic development. 
(b) Acceleration and differentiation of economic growth between 
countries 
Throughout this period the rate of economic growth of the region 
as a whole tended to accelerate, i.'he average annual growth rate rose 
from around 5 per cent during the T.950s to about 5*5 per cent in the 
1960S and 6.3 per cent in the first half of the 1970s. Over the 
twenty-five years this is equivalent to an average of 5*5 per cent a 
year, which exceeds the rate of the developed countries with market 
economies by nearly one per cent. This did not occur in the case of 
the per capita product because while demographic growth reached rates 
of nearly 3 per cent, the region did not succeed in doubling its per 
capita product or in improving its relative position in relation to 
the developed countries. (See tables 8 and 9«) 
The greater dynaaism covered the great majority of countries 
despite the differences in rhythm which can be distinguished between 
them. During the 1950s only three countries exceeded 6 per cent, 
while in the first half of the 1970s seven attained that rate,. 
including Brazil and Mexico which account for about 50 per cent of 
the population. Similarly in the 3.950s seven countries did not attain 
k per cent, while in the first half of the 1970s only four failed to 
reach this rate. 
As has already been pointei out, the differences between 
countries in respect of the size of national markets, conditions, and 
internal potential and policies, in tha end led to differences in 
the rate and structure of their growth, especially in the last stage 
considered. The less favoured countries were those which encountered 
difficulties or limitations in pursuing their industrialization process 
/Table 10 
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The most favoured, on the other hand, were those which were able to 
add to the level and dynamism of internal and external demand a balance 
of payments capable of sustaining the flow of imported goods involved 
in changes in production. 
On the basis of these differences, it is possible to distinguish 
three groups of countries: 
(a) Those which because of their greater market size and capacity 
of securing external financing obtained high growth and clear advance in 
industrial sectors by incorporating consumer durable goods and 
improving the technical efficiency of the industrial infrastructure 
with adequate scales in steel, petroleum refining, energy generation, 
etc., and which advanced in the first stages of the capital goods 
industry and the chemical industries. These countries grew and secured 
a better articulated industrial structure and created markets which 
are now attractive in many sectors at the world level. 
(b) The small countries and some medium-sized countries which 
progressed in the first stages of industrial development. 
(c) The countries which grew less, as is the case of the countries 
of the southern cone which, after pioneering the process of changes in 
production, subsequently, because of various factors, encountered 
difficulties in attaining growth rates similar to the regional 
averages, thus losing influence in their share in the generation of 
the regional project, although the marked differences among them of 
an economic and industrial nature are obvious. 
{c) Progress in industrialization. Transformation of the sectoral 
i structure 
The process of industrialization in the last 25 years profoundly 
cjianged the productive structure of the region. (See table 10.) 
• The share of manufacturing industry rose from l8 per cent in 
1950 to 25 per cent in 1975» The countries of greater economic and 
demographic weight already had a high degree of industrialization in 
1950, which they maintained throughout the period (20.4- per cent in 
1950 and 26.6 per cent in 1975)» The medium and small countries had 
lower levels in 1950 and made considerably less progress, passing from 




LATIN M&aCAt SLu'ìE OF TK2 AOBICULTURiL Ai ID l^HTPACTttHIO S2CT0R lì! TH3 PUDBOCI 
(Per cent ago 3 of the ^o.ts^dojpa'-.le product at 197° prices) 
Country Agricultural sacrtor a / 
Manufacturing industry 
1950 i960 1970 1975 1950 I960 1970 1975 
Argentina 16.7 3.^ 01 12.0 23.2 26.3 30.2 32.2 
Bolivia 25.4 16.9 15.8 12.4 11.6 12.9 13.6 
Brazil 20„6 lóo5 14.3 12.2 17.9 22.3 24.8 $ . 6 
Colombia # . 2 33®° 26.0 13.7 1Ó.4 17.5 18.8 
Costa Bica b/ 38.4 29.3 25 »0 23.2 U . 5 12.4 15.1 17.2 
Cuba o* <B - - » . m 
Olile 11» 2 9,0 7»9 8.3 23.I ¿J-.9 27.2 23.8 
Ecuador 4o»3 SO.l 29» 2 22»1 17.1 17.0 19.0 20.3 
El Salvador 4 i c o 35»7 20.1 12.9 13.8 17.6 18,1 
Guatemala 35 «3 32.6 3C.1 30.1 10.7 11.7 14.6 14.5 
Haiti 52» 8 >48.8 30.G 45.2 S«3 8.8 9.0 11,7 
Honduras 4 5 . 2 32»7 4u6 31.7 9 .2 15.2 i 4 . o 16.C 
lie;d.co 18,2 r.6.1 ll.fi 9.7 18.6 19 .2 23,4 24,1 
Nicsrasua 33^1 20,4 So, 3 26.9 10,0 11.9 17.5 17.8 
Panama 3U5 251>7 20,7 13.8 7*9 11,6 15.8 13.9 
Paraguay 45 «S 39.5 33 ,0 17.8 15.2 17.3 17.5 
Peru 25.3 24» 6 -S.8 15.3 10.9 13.3 I608 18.7 
Dominican Rspublic 3--«7 33,8 25» 8 19.1 12.5 14.6 160 7 37.5 
Uruguay b/ 13.4 11,0 :L2»6 11. Ó 23«0 ¿U3 24®2 25,4 
Venezuela 7 »7 7®3 7.5 ,. 7 .4 6.9 9 .2 i l , 4 13.4 
Latin Jtaerioa (19 countries) 2P»1 18.2 14.5 ; I3.2 17.9 20. 3 23.0 23.9 
af Cozprisos: igricultui'e, forestry, hunting end fishtag. 
h/ The manufacturing industry includes sines and quai'rios. 
/reflect, particularly 
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reflect, particularly in. more recent years, the varying capacity of' 
countries to cover more advanced rubrics of the industrial process. 
The larger countries are advancing in the substitution of intermediate 
and capital goods while the others are already encountering 
difficulties in some consumer durable lines. Chile and Uruguay, which 
made an early start in industrialization, are good examples of these 
difficulties, since although they have a high degree of 
industrialization they were unable to advance at the same rate as the 
larger countries during the period. 
In the agricultural sector the opposite occurred. While it is 
true that with a rising income level there is normally a displacement 
of demand, in many Latin American countries the decline in the share 
of agriculture has gone further than the structure of demand would 
suggest. 
The adjustment mechanism between demand and production has been 
the external sector. Particularly in more recent years (1970-197^) 
imports have grown at a significantly higher rate than exports (10 per 
cent and one per cent respectively). The share of the agricultural 
product in the product of the region has declined from about 20 per 
cent in 1950 to 13 per cent in 1975» In 1950 this proportion was 
above 30 per cent in eleven countries, in 1975 only in three. In 1975 
the three economically and demographically larger countries had ratios 
below this average. Chile and Venezuela continue, as in 1950, to be 
the countries with the smallest share of agriculture in the product 
(about 7 per cent). The rate of growth of production has been falling 
in the sector, from 3.7 per cent in the 1950s to 3.2 in the 1960s and 
below 3 per cent in the 1970s. 
The transformation of the productive structure has led to a 
substantial change in the level and quality of supply. The industrial 
sector has greatly increased the supply of consumer goods, covering 
almost all demand in many countries. Production of intermediate goods 
has also increased, particularly in some basic intermediate industries 
such as steel and petroleum refining. In recent years the chemical 
and petro-chemical industry has tended to grow, but these branches are 
/unevenly distributed 
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unevenly distributed, among the countries,, Capital goods -have 
progressed least, but the serious balance of payments problems are 
strengthening the trend towards a (substitution policy in these branches, 
particularly in countries like Brazil and Mexico« Hence, looking at 
the region as a whole, it may be said that the structure of industrial 
supply is tending to become more coxplete. 
Looking at what happened in the different countries, it may be 
seen that the medium and small countries easily advance in the more 
traditional branches, but run into increasing difficulties as they . 
attempt to advance into the intermediate and capital goods sectors, 
where bigger production scales are necessary. Thus the trends to 
continue the transformation of production are .uneven. On the one,hand, 
the large countries are in a position to progress and join in world 
trade. On the other, the medium and small countries must make a much 
greater effort to continue their transformation of production. Thus 
the growth of regional trade and the success of the integration schemes 
will certainly be important factors for transformation to continue, 
and their failure would represent a blow to the strengthening of the 
regional economy. 
(d) The degree of exploitation of natural resources in relation to 
external conditions 
Prior to industrialization, endowment with natural resources 
was an important factor in the development of the Latin American 
countries. 
The development which has taken place in the last 25 years has 
called for the use of considerable and increasing quantities of natural 
resources. The region as a whole has abundant natural resources, but 
their exploitation often involves solving institutional problems or 
carrying out significant investments which are not easily divisible 
into small units. On the other hand, exports of natural resources 
continue to be a key element in the growth of the capacity to import, 
even if they are no longer the dynamic factor in demand as in the past. 
Over the last 25 years the region has not increased the 
exploitation of its resources in the proportions called for by the 
/growth of 
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growth-of'''domestic'and external demand.: To fill the gap it resorted 
to foreign trade, particularly in the «ore favourable years in the 
period 1965-1973. By means of this expedient it was. able to avoid more 
radical reforms in such Sectors as agriculture or large-scale 
investment in the energy and mining sectors. ' 
In the case of agriculture, many factors combined to cause 
production to grow at a lower rate than demand. On the internal side, 
the structure of land ownership, the unattractive level of domestic 
and external prices, and the high amounts of investment and technology 
needed for qualitative progress in the sector; On the external side, 
supply .was often accompanied by extremely, attractive financial 
conditions which made it easier for the developed countries.to place 
their surpluses in the region. Thus the pressure.on the sector for a 
better use of its resources was not strong in this.period. Naturally, 
there were countries where this was not the case,.particularly when 
the harvested area could not easily be extended without high cost and 
the balance-of-payments situation was not favourable. . . . 
The pressure.of demand on mining resources was likewise not 
strong during this period. External demand continued to dominate in 
this sector, and during the 25-year period the importing industrial 
countries opted for a policy of diversification of their supplies. * -" i 
Although exports of some minerals such as iron ore,.where.the. region*s 
participation was very low, increased greatly, in others, ^h^re .il;^.. 
participation was high, there was.a big drop. Foreign capital.directed 
to mining was displaced to other regions of the wo^ld.. Jt,.was. only in 
recent years that the strong industrial development of the larger,,., 
countries of the region caused internal, demand to emerge as.a. potential 
growth factor in the sector, and in some cases increased,the pressure 
on resources. . 
The influence of the external sector in the pressure on.resources 
can be seen most clearly in the .case of -energy resources.. While the 
region continues,to be arnet.exporter ;of energy resources, production 
grew in the period at lower rates than consumption .because the price 
of petroleum was relatively low, particularly in the 1960s. The,deficit 
/countries substituted 
kO 
countries substituted abundant imports from the Middle East for •• 
investment efforts in exploring and adding new energy resources to 
their reserves and production. The higher price of petroleum in 1973 
was once again felt in the balance of payments and this will naturally 
continue to be a strategic field in the next few years. 
Unquestionably, to maintain high rates of economic growth in 
the future will demand more intense exploitation of the region's 
natural resources; investment and technological needs will grow ; 
considerably and there will be a greater need for different forms of 
co-operation and growth of trade among countries of the area. 
( e) The importance and progress of the public sector and the 
transnational enterprises as agents of growth 
The growth of the economies, the inclusion in demand of more 
sophisticated products, the need to achieve bigger production scales 
and the attempts to include industrial products in the pattern of 
exports created organizational, technological and financial needs 
in the 1960S which were very different from those of the 1950s. 
The growth of production was linked with the evolution of a 
consumption structure which followed the patterns of the developed 
countries. This trend was stimulated and made possible by foreign 
capital, i-ihich in many cases came to exploit the domestic market of 
thé Latin American countries,; particularly those of greater economic 
and demographic size. The technology available for the production 
of the goods included in the new consumption structure was created 
in the developed countries for large markets; to a large extent this 
restricted to the larger countries the inflow of capital to produce 
goods with these technological characteristics. In addition, in many 
cases this type of industrial development requires an infrastructure 
of transport, energy and basic inputs which can only be justified for 
large markets. 
The national private sectort which played an important role in 
the first stage of the industrial process, lost ground to the public 
sector and foreign capital, the latter in the form of the 
transnational corporation® In general, the public sector undertook 
/infrastructure projects, 
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infrastructure projects, the exploitation of raining and energy 
resources and projects in some industrial sectors such as steel and 
oil-refining. The transnational corporations participated in a great 
variety of sectors, but their greatest weight was in the more dynamic 
or influential branches of industry, such as the motor-vehicle 
industryi 
This trend towards the concentration of ownership in the hands 
of a small number of public and private enterprises brought the 
social and political changes and led'further and further away from 
the competitive "model proclaimed in the development ideology of the 
post-war period. 
(f ) The region's capital formation and savings capacity 
The acceleration of the region's economic growth was possible 
thanks to the high levels reached by capital -formation. Investment, 
which had grown at an average annual rate of 5°7 per cent in the 
period 1950-1965 stage, has reached rates of around 8.5 per cent since 
the mid-1960s (see table 11). An analysis of the situation by 
countries reveals some cases where the rate of capital formation 
accelerated greatly. Brazil, whose rates were already high, achieved 
an average rate of 11.5 per cent. Those countries which initiated 
the exploitation of new natural resources such as Ecuador and the 
Dominican Republic reached very high rates, i.e., 16.7 and 22.7 per 
cent, respectively. In Brazil, the high rate attained coincided 
with an improvement in the capital-output ratio, which shows how 
efficient the process was. On the whole, there was a close relationship 
between the rates attained by the product and investment. Investment 
played the dual role of increasing the supply capacity and at the 
same time of constituting an important dynamic factor of demand. 
In contrast, there are the cases of Chile and Uruguay, where in the 
period 1950-1973 investment rates increased moderately in keeping 
with the slow growth of the product. 
/Table 11 
"able II. 
LATIN AIERZCAJ EFOMWJCK 0? BOBESTIC INVESTMENT 
Growth rate of 
Groan c'.omeatio Ir /eataex ; as a 
gross domestic perssntrsa o.f the srosa ¿oiestio . Investment 
Country prodt.ot g / (annual rates) 
1350- 1 964- 1971« 1974- 1950- 1965-
1352 1966 1973 1975 1965 1973 
Argentina 15.1 17.6 2l«5 2P.5 6.1 6.0 
Bolivia 10.2 15.6 15.2 20.3 6.6 6.1 
Brasll 23» 2 19«5 23»4 26.2 6.0 11.5 
Colombia 22 »9 22.0 19.5 21.6 3.3 4.1 
Costa Hioa X'4.8 17.4 22.3 24.1 10.5 . 7.8 
Cuba ... ... •«< ««• • • • ... 
Chile 14.6 15.4 12.6 12.6 4 . 6 0.1 
Ecuador l-o.o U . 3 23»9 27.4 6.0 16.7 
El Salvador il»3 17.5 14, 2 15.4 8 .9 2.5 
Guatemala 10.6 12.6 12.4 12.6 5.0 5.1 
Haiti 7.1 5.6 8,0 8.8 0.8 7 .0 
Honduras 15.8 15.5- 16 »4 21.2 5.1 6.3 
Mexico 18.0 20.»:. 21 »3 25.8 7 .5 8.2 
Nicaragua 12.3 19.:! 17«0 22.2 11.9 5.7 
Panama 13»3 19.0 29»0 22.6 7 . 0 13.7 
Paraguay 6®3 14.3 17*3 22.3 9.6 9.4 
Peru i8»3 16.3 13«6 17.2 6.1 2*7 
Dominican Republic 16®5 , 1>7 22 26.6 2.3 22.6 
Uruguay r.3,.4 9.3 11»6 10.1 -2.6 3.1 
Venezuela •- J->2®7 25-7 - :30»o 31.0 4*2 7.1 
Latin America Iff., 8 18,-2 22-L SaZ. & 2 
a/ On the basis of,~av»rag» at :i$70 prieag® 
/Figures for 
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Figures for the region as a whole show a high capacity for¿the . 
mobilization of investment resources.1 The inveptment-product -• 
Coefficients which had declined at the.beginning of the 1960s 
compared with the' beginning of the 1950s (19 and 20 per ceçt, •••• 
respectively) more than regained their former levels in the period 
1971-1973 (about 21.5 per cent) and reached an exceptionally high 
level in the years 1974-1975 (23.7 per cent).: An analysis of the 
countries shows that the situation is somewhat uneven. In the first 
place thère is a group of countries which in the last 25 years have 
maintained levels close to or higher than 20 per cent of the product. 
These are generally large or medium-sized countries: Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. In thé second group are the countries which 
have incréaséd their levels from values of between 10 and. 15 per cent 
at the beginning of the period (1950-1.952) to levels equal- to or 
higher than 20 per cent for the majority of them in the 1970s• , 
• Argentina,: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador,- Panama,. 
Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. Finally, the rest of the 
countries hâve not exceeded 15 per cent in the 1970s and in many cases 
the raté has slowed to very low levels. Special importance shpuld he 
given to what occurred in the period 1974-1975 when, - although,the , 
region was affected by the recession in the developed countries and . 
the growth rate of the product declined, in many cases investment 
maintained its momentum, thus showing the fqrce. of the. trend, toward.s 
long-term growth and the independent attitude adopted by agents such 
as the State and transnational corporations to short-term fluctuations. 
The dynamic performance of investment was accompanied by a 
vigorous.expansion of domestic saving. The region, which for long 
periods had recorded levels of domestic, saving of about l8 per cent 
of the product (l8.5 per cent in,1950-1952 and 18.2 per cent in 
1964-1966) saw its coefficient increase to 19.5.per cent in 1971-1973 
and easily exceed 20 per cent , in 1974-197,5 (21.3 per cent). The 
countries with consistently high.investment coefficients also had 
high and relatively stable savings coefficients. In .the rest of the 
countries they, fluctuated widely ground lower levels. With the 
" 1 1 " /exception of* 
<o if I;, a 
exception of the oil-exporting countries and Argentina, Paraguay and 
the Dominican Republic, the trends are not towards an increase. It 
is especially noteworthy that the coefficients of six countries (Chile, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru and Uruguay) should fluctuate 
around 10 per cent for the 1970s, which is an exceptionally low level 
(see table 12). 
The proportion of investment financed with domestic saving differs 
considerably in the different countries. On the whole, this 
proportion has followed a less favourable course than investment. 
For the countries with high and stable investment levels, domestic 
saving has represented values of between 90 and 100 per cent of 
investment. Countries such as Argentina and Venezuela stand out in 
this respect, having in many periods financed the whole of the amount 
invested and even obtaining a surplus, Venezuela's performance is 
especially notable, owing to the rise in the price of petroleum. On 
the other hand, the countries with lower levels of investment generally 
finance lower percentages with domestic saving, in proportions of. 
less than 90 per cent. It should be noted, however, that there are 
some periods in which a decline in these proportions has its origin 
in recurring balance-cf-payments problems which compel the country 
to contract external loans and which, for one reason or another, 
could lead to a drop in the domestic saving coefficient of the period 
concerned, according to the conventional definitions. 
(g) Changes in the external sector and their relationship with 
economic growth 
The external sector has hac. great influence on the rate of 
growth of the Latin American economies. For the past 25 years, although 
the nature and volume of external indebtedness have changed, the 
region's external links have continued to hold down or accelerate 
the rate of growth. The role of relations such as those which • 
exist between external demand and economic dynamism, between imports 
and import substitution processes, and between foreign capital and 
the financing of imports or investment has changed substantially and 
these relations are sassociated with domestic growth in widely 
differing ways (see tables 13 and /Table IP 
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Tab Ja 12 
LATIN AHSRICAs EVOLUTION OP NATIONAL SAVINGS 
Cross national saytigs as Gross national searings 
as a percarfccge of 
Country domestic .produot a/ gross total investment!/ 
1J50- 19 df- I97I- 1974- 1950- 19&- 1971-
1952 1966 • 1973 1975 1952 1966 1973 
Argentina 13.1 18.4 21.4 19.4 38 105 100 
Bolivia ' 9.9 10.6 11.7 17 .6 97 68 • 76 
Brazil 20.3 19.8 21.0 21.2 86 101 90 
Colombia 23.1 13.0 I6.7 21.0 101 06 • 85 
Costa Rica i4.4 9.3 13*5 13.9 99 58 61 
Cuba - • * » • • • • * • • • • • • • • « • ... 
Chile 14.1 13.8 6.5 9.4 97 90 66 
Ecuador 12.4 9.3 I7.6 126 82 74 El Salvador 14.0 13.5 I2.3 9.2 133 77 91 
Guatemala 11.2 9.9 U.6 1O.0 105 79 94 
Haiti . 6.7 2.5 6.5 5.7 34 43 82 
Honduras 13.3 11; 8 I3.5 11.4 G9 76 83 
Heri oo 17.9 18.4 .18.3 20.1 95 91 . 88 
Nicaragua' 13.7 13.8 I3.4 • 8.8 112 72 80 
Panama 5.9 13.2 21.4 12.0 42 70 74 
Paraguay 8.0 11.3 14.8 19.2 123 77 85 
Peru 16. 6 1>7 12.2 8.0 91 83 90 
Dominican Republio 10.4 8.0 18.2 22.6 116 81 
Uruguay 17.2 11.0 11.0 6.5 94 119 96 
Venezuela Ji4.3 26.9 3I.5 52.9 id+ . 10+ 105 
Latin Ameri ca IS. 2 £ £ 21 21 








Ess? o r i s Exports 
GEP Purehas GIP Purohas «V* 
•Vol«» iqg Volume if® 
pt-ier p w e r 
•¿pgantina 3<-.44 2.9I 2.48 4.03 2.42 5.69 
Bol iv ia 1.7Ö ••1« £ 2.22 5.77 8.97 7.05 
B r a z i l 6» 03 2.51 -0„3 8 . 8 3 11.2 12.71 
Colombia 4*66 4.C4 2» 84 6.13 5.50 6.45 
Costa Rioa 6,93 4.50 3-35 7.25 12.35 10.51 
Cuba .. - » « * ~ Cm 
Chile 4.31 2« £6 3.38 2.88 1.44 2.29 
Ecuador •+.57 3.47 6 .15 1 1 . 0 0 11.74 
El Salvador 5.33 7.(9 5.62 4.55 4 . 0 7 3.91 
Guatemala 4.23 7.«J 4,20 6 , 0 6 3.18 5.01 
H a i t i 1.06 »1.2 2.95 2.42 1.96 
Honduras 4.c8 4.54 3.55 4.17 5.63 3.33 
Mexico 4. ¡35 2.56 6 , 6 0 6.13 7.24 
Nicaragua 6 . 9 0 5.30 8.42 4.14 6^ 35 5 . 2 0 
Panama 5»?6 6 .45 5.38 7.51 7.74 6 .87 
Paraguay 3.53 3.34 2.38 4.79 4.15 6 . 0 2 
Peru 5«69 7.95 6.59 -«27 3.51 
Dominican Republic 4.67 2.83 1.23 9 . 0 0 10.19 12.84 
Uruguay 1 »70 1.24 «2.0 .97 -3.96 2.53 
Venezus l a 7-50 6.07 1.99 4,31 0,80 3.50 
Lat in taariea §¿21 4.2S 2.00 6.24 6.60 
/Table Ik 
Table 14 
LATIil JMKlICA: 2V0LUTI0N OP THE E£T2RiIAL SECTOR 
COEFFICI^HTS III P£SP2CT OP TIC GROSS DOISSTIC PEOCUCT lffO PRICES 
(Per oant ages) 
j 1950-1952 19^-1966 197W973 1974-1975 
Country n 9 f B. JOfS/ a. 
1 e .0 i e & t m . yxSJ a. s f 
Argentina, 12.0 0.3 0.4 1.9 2.0 8.7 0.8 9.1 1.1 -0.7 8.1 1.1 ;7. 5 1.6 0.1 8.7 1.0 6.8 1.8 1.1 
Bolivia 19.5 -0.9 27.1 -8.6 0.3 23.3 0.2 19.0 -1.3 5.0 21.2 1.4 22.9 -3.8 3.5 27.2 1.9 33.4 6,0 2.7 
frazil 15.6 1.6 9.1 5.2 2.9 4.8 0,8 6.0 -0.1 -0.3 8.2 1.0 6.9 - 2.3 10.1 1.4 6.9 -0.4 5.0 
Colombia 19.5 1.7 16.3 5.1 -0.2 15.9 1.7 14.3 0.4 2.9 14.9 2.0 l4.o -0.1 3.0 13.1 1.5 14.2 -0,1 0.5 
Costa Riaa 26.2 C.5 26.9 7.5 29.I 1.4 a . 2 1.7 7.6 33.7 1.9 29.4 -2.6 8.8 32.7 1.9 28.6 -4,2 10,2 
Cuba 
Chile 11.0 2.8 20.4 -6.3 0.5 12.1 £ 3 16.9 -4.0 1.5 14.1 1.3 14.6: -3.4 4.2 l4, 2 2.2 17.6 -4.4 3.2 
Ecuador 12.4 2.2 11.0 5.2 -2.4 14.8 1 .8 15.1 -0,4 1.9 20.9 2.6 19.1 -1.8 6.2 2^.9 3.8 19.1 9.1 2.5 
SI Salvador 25.3 o.S 20; 2 9.4 -3.5 31.9 -O.i 26.9 1.0 3.9 28.2 -0,1 26.8 0.1 1.2 32.3 0.5 27.6 -1.0 6.2 
Juatamala 17.2 -0.2 10.7 6.6 -0.3 21.0 0.7 37 .1 1.9 2.7 16.8 0.5 18.9 -2.5 0,9 1/.5 -0.1 20.7 -5.1 1.8 
Haiti 16.0 2.2 12.6 5.2 o.4 15.6 -0.5 11.0 -0.1 3.4 15.6 -2.5 12.4 -0.7 1.4 13.3 -1.3 10,2 -1.3 3.1 
Honduras ¿1.0 9.5 23.I 8.4 2.0 29.9 2.4 23.9 4.8 3.6 27.8 2.9 28.0 -0.1 2.8 32.3 1.0 tf.O -3.5 9.8 
Mexico l4.4 1.6 11.5 3.5 1 . 0 9.2 1.8 9.5 -0.4 1.9 9.7 2.1 9.1 0.1 2.6 11.2 2.8 8.2 o,8 5.0 
Nicaragua 22.8 3.6 18.4 9.5 -1.5 33.3 1.5 20.3 3.1 5.4 30.3 2.3 58.6 0.4 3.6 36.1 3.1 37.8 -2.1 13.5 
Panama 33.2 3.5 30.4 4.9 7-4 3^. 2 4.0 33.4 1.1 5.7 39*0 3.0 34.7 -0.2 7.5 36.1 6 .3 -5.1 10.5 
Paraguay 15.1 0.6 13.8 3-5 -1.6 17.4 0.6 12.0 1.7 3.5 16.6 1.1 13.5 1.6 2.6 17.5 0.9 12.7 2.6 3.1 
Peru 16.0 1.0 15.7 -0.5 1.8 18.5 2.2 21.7 -3.7 2.7 15.0 1.7 16.3 -1.0 1.4 21.2 1.7 12.0 1.7 9.2 
Oouinioan Rapublio 18.8 5.5 26.0 0.2 -1.9 20,3 0.8 17.2 -l.o 4.9 22.9 0.2 19.1 - 4.0 24.? 1.5 15.3 7.2 3.9 
Uruguay 17.7 0.6 12.4 4.6 1.3 3.2 o.9 12.6 -0.7 -1.8 11.6 0.9 10.1 1.7 11.7 1.4 11.8 -2.4 3.7 
Venezuela 43.8 21.6 34.0 33.0 -1.6 21.0 10.3 tf. 5 4.8 -1.0 20.4 5.6 21.5 5.4 -0.9 24.9 1.8 16,2 28.7 -18.5 
Latin Jlnierioa 
1.8 2.7 (19 countries) 16.7 2.7 13.4 4.7 1.3 10.9 2.0 12.0 o.l 0,8 11.6 1,7 10.9 o,4 2.0 13.3 10.1 2.3 
Note: The sjnbols mexu 
m : imports of soods and servioaa. 
jac : net pajmatrts of p r o f i t s and interes t t o the e x t e r i o r . 
9 : exports of goads and services» 
g : effeot of the share of external t rade , 
f : net external finanolng. 
a / Includes net private donations. 
- ¿+8 
In the first stage covering the period 1950-1965, the region's 
exports grew at a lower rate than the product, and the terms of trade 
deteriorated. As a result, the purchasing power of exports increased 
substantially less than'the product (2 per cent and 5.2 per cent, 
respectively). This situation mar.nly affected the large and medium-
sized countries. In contrast, the small countries, such as those of 
Central America, increased the purchasing power of exports at rates 
similar to those of the product, and in some cases even higher. The 
biggest differences were recorded by Brazil whose export purchasing 
power fell 0*3 per cert, while the product grew by 6 per cent. 
These: drops in the purchasing power of exports were not compensated 
for by external financing and many countries found it impossible to 
maintain rates for the supply of imports similar to those of previous 
periods. Fairly radical changes took place between 1950 and 1965* 
Imports as a percentage of the product fell from 16.7 per cent in the 
period 1950-1952 to 10.9 per cent in 1964-1966. The effects of the 
deterioration in the terms of trsxle were -significant in the case of 
many countries, added to which in some the relative importance of 
net external financing diminished.. For the region as a whole, expressed 
in terms of percentages of the product, trade gains - at 1970 prices -
were 4.7 per cent in 1950-1952 and only 0.1 per cent in 1964-1966, 
while net external financing was 1«,3 per cent and 0.8 per cent in the 
same periods. 
At the level of the individual countries, Brazil recorded the 
most spectacular changes in that it reduced its import coefficient 
from 15.6 to 4.8 per cent, and its external financing coefficient 
from 2.9 to 0.3 per cent, between 1950-1952 and 1964-1966. Similar 
but not such pronounced changes were recorded in Argentina, Colombia, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (this last country radically reduced 
its import coefficient - from 4-3.8 per cent to ,21 per cent - but it 
still remained at fairly high levels)« 
The Central American countries, on the other hand, managed to 
increase both coefficients and thus in most cases were able to 




At this stage, the countries most seriously affected by external 
restrictions made more progress in import substitution industrialization 
than the countries which were able to maintain their supply of external 
goods. By 1965, however, they had reached import levels which could 
hardly be further compressed. Such levels were not compatible with 
new stages of industrial development which required quantities and 
types of capital and intermediate goods that could not be produced 
locally or in which it was not feasible to invest under the 
prevailing conditions. The persistence of the foreign trade trend 
conflicted with long-term growth. In the mid-1960s the countries 
initiated a new stage, introducing gradual adjustments in their 
external relations policies. 
The new stages which began in the mid-1960s was characterized 
by a reactivation of the external markets. Between 1965 and 1973 the 
purchasing power of exports for the whole region grew at a higher 
rate than the product (6.6 per cent and 6.2 per cent, respectively). 
This situation prevailed in most of the countries of Latin America. 
The countries also had increasing access to external credit which 
enhanced their import possibilities. A case worth noting is that 
of Brazil whose import-product coefficient increased from 4.8 per 
cent in 1964-1966 to 8.2 per cent in 1971-1973. On the whole, most 
of the countries maintained their coefficients, halting the decline 
recorded in the previous period. On the other hand, some Central 
American countries which, as noted earlier, had fairly high import 
coefficients, reduced them somewhat although they remained at high 
absolute levels. In broad terms, it may be noted that the import 
coefficients of the large countries are below 10 per cent, those 
of the medium-sized countries are around 15 per cent and those of 
the remaining countries are over 20 per cent* 
The trend towards a more open economy was accentuated in the 
years 1973 and 1974. On the one hand, the major countries like Brazil 
and Mexico obtained large volumes of external financing which made 
their domestic supply even more flexible. On the other hand, the 
oil-exporting countries were able to increase their imports substantially 
thanks to their considerable export earnings. 
/The expansion 
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The expansion of imports was accompanied by changes in their 
composition. This presents considerable differences between the 
countries of the region, mainly determined by their domestic production 
structure and supply of natural resources. 
Import substitution attained its fullest scope in non-durable 
consumer goods and the process has been spreading, in different 
periods and degrees, to many countries of the region, so that the 
share of this type of goods in to;s.l imports has declined. On a lesser 
scale, the same situation is true of durable consumer goods, although 
limited to the countries of largest economic size. The share of 
consumer goods in Latin America'.s imports continued to decline in the 
last decade, from an average of 15*7 per cent in the 1960s (calculated 
on the basis of current values) to 12.1 per cent in 1974, mainly 
because of the drop recorded by the countries with high coefficients. 
In 1974, however, nine countries presented coefficients of over 
20 per cent. In contrast, countries like Argentina and Brazil which 
had made most progress in industrial development and were to a high 
degree self-supporting,in agricultural products, maintained a low and 
unchanging proportion (between 6 .and 8 per cent) during those years, 
which is indicative of the limits they had reached in this respect. 
In others, such as, Mexico and Colombia, the share of consumer goods 
in total imports, mainly agricultural products, has increased in the 
last few years,(see table 15), 
In the major countries of the region, industry has made progress 
in the.substitution of a wide, range of capital goods. This has been 
one of the factors accompanying the sharp decline in the share of 
imported capital goods in total investment (see table 16). In 
1950 these goods represented about 28 per cent 6f investment.in 
Latin Anerica, the proportion dropping sharply to just over 15 per cent 
in 1965. Since then it has remained at around that levelt declining 
to 14.7 per cent in 1971« This trend is mainly attributable to the 
developments in the najor countries- of the region and, to a lesser 
extent, in some- of thè medium-sized countries." .In Argentina and 
Brazil the coefficient, declined fron nearly 24 per cent to' a little 
' ' * • * , . » 
over 10 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, betweèn 19Ì>0 ànd 1965» 
< /Table 15 
- 51 -
<0 t. d «H ri O "O 
01 -p tl 
•3 














H p fc SO tS O O ON ON > W) i-l i-t CJ Cl) 
5 











t, o a, 
i-l O b NO CS o O ON ON > Wl i-l i-i Ö d 
£ ON 





« N N NVO • • • • • 
• CI N CM 
• UN O SO V0 
CM CM tS CO « J- H H 
n O to J ffl M) 
o n -t o ^  in n « ri M H « H (M^ N 
ON CM VO O CM ON 21 
O VO ON « UN C\ ON © O ON ts o O t^ J" NJ-
si ON ON ITS CM NO ON on CM ! J" t CM ON CM ON CM S I un st ON CM UN VO ri os 
ON UN o 
- * • -CO N H « N Jf N 
UN O VO ON VO CO CO CM CM H H J • CO ON ts CM CM St o\ ri CM r4 CM ON UN VO VO UN H cr\ w N s "Us 
N OS Nff\ us 
O ON CM ' CM "ON ON 
' CO N J- N O ON is CO H US rl N • Vj3 CMCO CM OS ON O ON -Cs ON SO .It" CO CM 
CO ON ^  CO UN i N N O O O S N ^ r i O H N J i n r4| CM CO t-v. ON UN »pirtCvCM UN UN ON US CO M tvvi Iii H eol SO CS _3- UN J" Cs5 ä J" « J II\N N ^  Rrf US S1! 
i-l 1-1 J- M ON • • • • • 
PN CO rt UN CM 
SO ON 5 1 UN J3-
. J- CO UN LA ON OO r-f O N VO <N O CO UN 
• rt c^d-tOsoNffsNNeo CM p ON Q J ^ US J J r\ w J- J J- J 
N tv eo * •ON CM .. IA J J-
O VO C\j ^  ^ is CS VO UN St O O UN UN UN ON O SO O ON O VO 0O ON J" 3- J- UN ON J- N vo CM CM «SSO (V H St P) St S* 
J" 
A 
O O J- i-l ON UN UN UN i- J-
• J- UN OD ON CO CM St N « ON UN ts UN o t>l • «I • <N CN (s N so OVCNCNONONCMVOVO Q ONI st st- st st ONJ--S-CM J- n J if 
UN CM m • St i-l N M J-ON O 
CM 
1 St • CM UNONJ- O N r l W O i CO O O St tV| «I ) ns • i n J - u s M A ^ on! i-l i-l i-l rt ON CM ri ON i-ll 
UN ON o ON UN • » » » • in o in o J 
N N rt i so 
* • • • • J- O UN O ON 
Is M OS IS • » • « • N H O J 
• CM CO UN CM 
• • » • m • tS CM O <N O O ts OS 5S us SO UN UN 00 • • • • • • • • • a ON OS SO »-4 O VO UN VO ONO CM CM 3
• O O O -3- OsiSOCOUSNOO UN CM VO VO M r-t VO VO ON rH CO OS w US J" H i-t r-1 
OS O ts rt c^i ON VO i-l <N O St i-l CO US VO H « « SB CM CM ON OS ON fS UN O 
d- os us o • • • • 
UN CM UN UN 
CM • JV O N O H ON 
CM ITS CO i-l CM 
CM ON so CM VO CM 
O VO Jj- VO 
• « m * <SI CM 
ON CO Si- St • • 
o ON r-1 UN CO <N 3 so CMI l-t r-il 
OS i s rt OS CA • VO rtO^tOJ-i-IOsOUSCMOJ-US 
S t OS CO CM SO 
IH iH CM 
OS St" ostv H 
J- Nso us us N mis us Sfl H H M N VO N ri CM CM pH UN OS 1-1 CM Kf a 
so o is o CO 
1-1 CM 
UN VO C>l CM St VO O US CS < S O St 
ts ri OS UN CM ts Ji-H H n «SO O ON ri OS « J - d CM ON CM ri 1 3 
ri «9 
i S 3 1 ji «> ri a ri « u o t, o o Ä W W O O 
/Table 16 
» >*'' ' 
ura AsmxcAt xwats OP «PI»:. 50-3I.S /J® ff SEtónow so gris psbeöct j tóffl IK* ®SS©Í-T 
Sowi'isy stS-.-íí a.ró'j.af' 
fe» 









", icr» •) et'?-i 155c 1565 . • 1573 
Äpgea'ftisj» M 23»5 10t>á M 
Bolivia 8,,7 ÉoXí^  52o? i>CU%/ 
»mal fnO 2308 
2>S Ö08 
öa&a « 1* '•j 
Chile H„> C.R sòci •¿í-íoQ 
Î-.-2. V 
sa iialtsìà-sr • 25»ig/ 
fe&tcícale, 
Haiti 
Roafta^ a íoi 
era 
Kfisjoo tjÂ 
Nicaragua ß«S 43.5 39.9S/ 
Rsaao» •it* j2*e 
Paragasy - «<» 
Pes*tó 26«%/ 
Soaiai«® Ro.pisfaXio - <E> - «0 
ÜMguey - « 
Tfcnoswia 
5-0 >0 3«lg/ 2S.2 15.3 
s/ 1971= 
y W Î . 
/and the 
- 53 -
and the same trend was1 observable in Mexico (from nearly 28 per cent 
to 15>per cent). It dropped to a lesser extent in Venezuela and 
Chile between those years. In the rest of the countries, imported 
capital goods represented over 30 per cent of total investment in the 
whole period, a proportion which was even increasing in several small 
countries. Since the mid-1960s when investment expanded rapidly, the 
coefficient has declined in most countries except Brazil and Chile, 
where it has risen significantly. In 1973 the three major countries 
of the region had coefficients of less than 13 per cent, while of the 
12 remaining Countries for which data are available, half of them had 
coefficients of 30 per cent and over. Other factors also influenced 
this process. Those countries which faced a more severe and prolonged 
restriction of external resources were forced to give preference to 
investment involving lesser requirements in terms of imported capital 
goods, and also in the short term to sacrifice some of their imports 
of these goods in order to ensure the supply of those on which the 
maintenance of the level of domestic economic activity depended 
to a critical extenti such as raw materials and intermediate goods 
for industry. In the few countries like Brazil where the severe 
restrictions on their import capacity were followed by a substantial 
improvement in their external purchasing power and the rapid growth 
of external investment, it was possible to increase the absorption 
of capital goods at an even faster rate than the rapid growth of 
investment, as has actually occurred in recent years. 
Generally speaking, raw materials and capital goods have accounted 
for the highest percentage of imports. The relation between the 
share of these two items reflects the balance of the different 
branches of industry. For example, Argentina, which is more advanced 
in the engineering industries than in those producing basic industrial 
inputs, records proportions of over 55 per cent of its imports for 
this last item. For the average countries, intermediate goods 
represent the most important group in their imports (see table 15). 
The supply of energy resources is another of the domestic 
variables influencing the composition of the value of imports. In 
/the last 
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the last 15 years this item has represented the largest share in 
Brazil, Panama and Uruguay, where it has been consistently above 
15 per cent of total imports. The sharp increases in the price of 
fuels since 1973 significantly altered the proportions, which are 
calculated on the basis of current values. In those countries which, 
are not self-sufficient in petroleum the proportion of their external 
expenditure on these products increased significantly. In 1974, 
10 countries spent over 15 per cent of the value of their imports 
on fuels. The extreme cases were Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, 
which spent 35» 33» 25 and 24 per cent, respectively, of the value 
of their imports on this item. 
The composition of Latin America1s exports has also changed, 
in line with the development of its production structure and external 
relations. The general trend has been a greater diversification of 
the products exported, although this has not succeeded in essentially 
changing the heavy concentration on a few primary products. In 1955» 
exports of agricultural products, non-ferrous minerals, fuels and 
related products represented 97 per cent of the total exported (in 
terms of dollars at 1970' prices), while in 1973 they represented a 
little over 82 per cent. 
As will be seen in table 1.7» the relative decrease was a 
general one covering the various items, except fertilizers and crude 
minerals, being somewhat more pronounced in the case of agricultural 
raw materials. On the other hand, exports of chemicals and iron and 
steel products, which together accounted for only 1.3 per cent of the 
total exported in 1955» increased their share to nearly 5 per cent 
in 1973« A more significant change was observable in the proportion 
of machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured products, 
which rosé from nearly 2 per cent in 1955 to nearly 13 per cent in 
1973. The changes in the structure of Latin American exports have 
been more significant since 19&3» i n particular the expansion of 
exports of manufactured products which has been accentuated in recent 
years. 
/T^ble 17 . 
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Table 17 
LATI i! AMERICAN AMD CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: EVOLUTION OP EXPORTS BY GROUPS OP GOODS 
(i3.1Il«tis of dollrj-a at 1970 prices) 
1955 1965 1973 
Groups of goods in accordance Per- Per- Per-
with tho SITC nomenclature Value cent Value oent Value cent 
age age ege 
Pood (0H+22«4) 4 46.1 6 015 43.3 7 318 38.9 
Primary goods of agricultural origin (2-22-27-23) 826 8.6 1 117 8.0 3,4 
Subtotal 2 J J 2 IM. 42a! 
Crude fertilizers and crude minerals, 
metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
(27+ 28) 5^2 5.6 1 033 7.4 1839 9.8 
Minei-al fuels, lubricants and related 
materials (3) 2727 28.3 3 28.3 4 ifl9 23.5 
Non-ferrous metals (68) 736 8.2 1 053 7.6 1 287 6.8 
Subtotal 4 056 42.2 6 02P 42*4 7 549 40.1 
Chemicals (5) 81 0.8 192 1.4 659 3.5 
Iron and steel {&¡) 0.4 129 0.9 #0 1.4 
Subtotal IÍL 1.3 M. ¿ ¡ a 23. hi 
Haohinery and transport equipment (7) 21 0.2 81 0.6 801 4.3 
Miscellaneous manufactured artioles (6*8-67-68) 162 1.7 330 2.4 1 579 8.4 
Subtotal M hi 411 2s2. 2 380 12s! 




NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN THE 1970s 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the main economic policy goals, targets 
and orientations of national development plans in the 1970s. This 
summary is not intended to assess the contents and performance of the 
plans, but rather to present their characteristics as schematically 
as possible and furnish background information to shed light on 
the objectives and orientations which Latin American governments have 
set for their development policy, at least in the short and medium-
term. A study of this kind also provides valuable technical data and 
a variety of information on government positions and attitudes which 
may be very useful in the preparation and assessment of projections 
of the long-term economic development of the countries of the region. 
For this purpose the plans of 10 countries have been considered: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. These 10 countries provide a 
representative sample of the various situations and trends to be found 
in Latin America in the political, social, economic and geographic 
fields. They include large, medium and small countries with different 
endowments of natural resources and population. However, it should 
be stressed that the group does not include Cuba, a'country which 
deserves to be the subject of a special study because it has an 
economic and social system which is different from that of the other 
countries considered. 
As far as possible plans which are still in force have been 
chosen. Nevertheless, in some cases the latest plan could be included 
because it was published too recently. In other cases th^ plans have 
been completed but nevertheless constitute a useful source of 
information for the purposes of this document. 
/The generalizations 
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The generalizations mt.de on these bases are, of course, somewhat 
risky, not only because of ths possible special features of the 
countries not taken into consideration, but also because of the 
variety of objectives and policies in .the plans of the ten countries 
examined, as will be seen«, Nevertheless, it has been possible to draw 
some significant conclusions from this analysis with regard to 
technical and conceptual factors and'to identify the main trends and 
orientations of the* countrias in tackling their development problems. 
1. Global and sectoral economic growth: 
rbje.ctivee_.and targets 
(a) The relatively high growthrtargets assumed by the plans 
In the 1970s national plant! show a new attitude on the part of 
t 
the countries towards their economic development potential. The 
2.5 per cent annual growth rate of the per capita product established 
at the Punta del Este Conference (Uruguay 196l) is now considered 
conservative, and apparently even the '3«5 per cent target of the IDS 
for the developing countries as a whole is considered inadequate to 
solve the main economic a:a€, social problems of the region within a 
reasonable time» 
This new attitude haß led to global growth targets substantially 
higher than the rates achieved in the past and than the 6 per cent 
target established ir. the IDS.JL/ In general terms, annual growth rates 
of the order of 6 to 10 pe:- cent are postulated, and these are very 
high bearing in mind the fact that in the 1960s only five countries of 
the region surpassed 6 per cent. 
In all the countries there is evidence of a clear decision to 
speed up the process of industrialization. Thus, annual growth-rate 
targets are over 8 per cent, which is in line with the IDS 
recommendations and considerably above the regional average of 6.9 per 
cent achieved in the past decade.. 
1/ The quantitative analysis contained in this section is based on 




Even more drastic changes in comparison with past trends are 
proposed in the agricultural sector. All the countries fix annual 
growth-rate targets above the 4 per cent recommended by the IDS. 
Some.countries whose growth potential has changed substantially, such 
as Brazil,2/ Ecuador 3/ and Venezuela h/ set annual rates of around 
6 per cent. The significance of these figures may be grasped from 
the fact that in the past decade the average annual growth of 
agricultural production in the region was 3-6 per cent, which 
furthermore was due to the relatively higher growth of a few countries. 
Of nineteen countries recorded, only seven surpassed the annual rate 
of 4 per cent, and of these only Brazil and Venezuela are of real 
importance in the regional product. 
In the mining sector (including fuels) targets vary greatly from 
country to country for reasons which may be easily explained by the 
particular situation of each country. Countries which are beginning 
intense exploitation of their resources, such as Ecuador and the 
Dominican Republic with petroleum and nickel, set annual rates of 
4l and 28 per cent respectively for five-year periods; on the other 
hand, Venezuela, which already has high production levels and has 
decided on a resource conservation policy, has fixed an annual growth 
rate of 3.2 per cent in its fourth plan (1970-1974) and zero growth 
in its fifth plan (1975-1980). In the remaining countries the 
targets fixed are in general relatively high, particularly in 
countries whose plans include fuel prospecting and exploitation 
projects. 
The approach in the construction sector is similar to that in 
manufacturing. The targets are appreciably higher than past trends, 
and very often annual rates of growth are above 8 per cent. In this 
connexion, naturally, the projected increase in housing construction 
and the provision of basic services is of particular importance. 
2/ Second National Development Plan (1975-1979). 
Integrated Plan for Transformation and Development (1973-1977). 
4/ Fifth National Plan (1976-1980). 
/(b) Transformation 
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(b) Transformation of •^^svstem 
The different levels o:; growth plaaned for the different sectors 
of activity point towards a change in th® intersectoral structure. 
The aim is, on the one hand, to obtain a higher degree of 
industrialisation by means of closc-r links with the agricultural 
sector, so that while the latter's share in the generation of the 
product declines, its productive structure is modernized to reach a 
sufficiently high level to satisfy the raw material needs of industry, 
domestic consumption and exports«» In addition, the goal is to modify 
the structure of services, attaching particular importance to basic 
services (transportation, electricity, gas and water) and education, 
health and housing services, while reducing the relative importance 
of central government expenditure, particularly in administration 
and defence. 
These targets result in growth elasticities of the agricultural 
product with respect tc the total product ranging from a minimum of 
0.6 up to unity for the five-year periods covered by the plans. This 
represents a substantial increase in relation to the average ratio of 
0.5 for the region as a whole in the period 1965-1970. In the 
manufacturing sector the difference between such elasticities in 
national plans and in practice is smaller, particularly in those 
countries which set themselves high global growth rates, such as 
Brazil 5/ and Ecuador.6/ However, there is a clear trend towards 
fixing target ratios which are higher than the regional average of 
1.2 recorded in the past decade, ar.d this reflects the decision to 
advance more rapidly in the process of industrial development. The 
same may be said of the construction sector. 
The implicit elasticity for the basic services sector is 
generally greater than unity but less than the rate recorded in the 
1960s. The opposite is true of "other services", where elasticity is 
less than unity, particularly in the case of Government services. 
5/ Second National Development Plan, 1975-1979. 
6/ Integrated Plan for Transformation and Development, 1973-1977« 
/Given the 
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Given the short period covered by the plans (no more than 
5 years) the changes planned in the shares of the different sectors 
in the formation of the product are relatively small. The general 
trend is towards a bigger share for manufacturing and construction, 
and in some cases mining when short-term prospects suggest a 
significant increase in production, as in the case of petroleum and 
nickel in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic respectively. On the 
other hand, there is a systematic drop in the relative share of the 
agricultural sector in all the plans, and also in the share of the 
services sector, although to a less marked degree. 
The size of the changes in the intra-seetoral productive 
structure depends on the degree of development of the countries. In 
their plans the industrially more developed countries include 
programmes which attach special importance to more rapid growth of 
basic industries (fuel, petro-cheraicals, basic electronics, etc.) and 
a significant growth of production of capital goods; on the other 
hand, the less developed countries with smaller populations aim at a 
better degree of agro-industrial integration and progress in the 
production of intermediate and metal-working and engineering products. 
To attain the proposed objective, however, it is considered essential 
in all cases to diversify the production of manufactures, increase 
exports and replace imports. 
In the case of agriculture a consensus exists on attaching 
priority to the production of food in order to improve domestic 
supply and replace imports. In addition, particularly in the less 
developed countries, there is particular concern to increase 
production for export. 
In mining and energy, the objective is better integration with 
industrial development, which implies among other things the inclusion 
of a higher degree of processing in export products and faster 
development of hydro-electric power. In Argentina 7/and Brazil 8/ the 
plans provide for relatively important nuclear energy programmes. 
7/ Three-Year Plan 1974-1977. 
8/ Second National Development Plan, 1975-1979« 
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(c) Higher coefficients of investment **"'—**''' '^«flrCtegBic roareaacam-tfc etrxa mean»« 
The coefficient of investment with respect to the gross domestic 
product varies significantly from country to country. From 1970, the 
first year of many of the plans, the coefficients fluctuate betiireen 
13 per cent and 23 per cent according to the country; however, by 1975 
this difference falls to approximately 20 to 25 per cent, with the 
exception of El Salvador 9/ which sets a target of 18 per cent by 1977. 
This represents an upward trend ir, the investment coefficients, rising 
more rapidly in the countries where the coefficients were lower. 
The relation between gross national taviags and investment also 
differs appreciably among the countries» In some a clear trend is 
observable towards a high proportion of internal financing by around 
1975, as in the case of Argentina,10/ Uruguay 11/ and Venezuela,12/ 
which aim at approximate coefficients averaging about 95 per cent; in 
the other countries, however, the coefficients are around 80 per cent. 
These magnitudes apparently reflect not only the prospects of the 
external sector, as in the case o.f Venezuela, but also possible policy 
decisions which fix certain limits for the contribution of external 
financing. 
(d) Export expansionr ^ oa!s< and^ro,jcc tionsi of imports 
The expansion of export*: at high growth rates seems in most cases 
to con8titu-t-e-&—i'vjtrtdiHF."eiital baae- rci1---attaining • the quantitative goals 
formulated in the plans. With the exception of Venezuela the countries 
envisage annual growth ratec of their exports of goods and services 
fluctuating between 7 and 16 per cent. This suggests a clear decision -
9/ Economic and Social Development Plan 1973-1977« 
10/ Three-Year Plan 197^-1977-
11/ National Development Plan 1973-1977. 
12/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1980. 
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on the part of the countries to expand outwards as a means of 
accelerating their internal dynamism. What is also clear is that all 
the plans project a substantial increase in exports of manufactures» 
In this respect the largest countries set the most ambitious goals, 
such as the case of Er<wil which hopes by 1980 to include around 
60 per cent of manufactured and semimanufactured products in its exports 
of goods. The growth rate envisaged for imports shows a wide variation 
between the different countries. Annual rates ranging between 3 per 
cent and 11 per cent are envisaged, most frequently exceeding 7 per cent 
(rates of less than 5« 5 per cent are envisaged only by Venezuela in its 
Fourth and Fifth Plans and by the Dominican Republic in its 1970-1974 
Development Plan). No well-defined trends are observable in the 
relation of imports to the gross domestic product. In some countries, 
for example, elasticity is less than unity, but in most of them this 
relation is around unity (varying from 0.9 to 1.1). By way of 
illustration it may be noted that during the past decade the region 
attained an average elasticity coefficient of 0.75, which rose to 1.29 
in the period 1970-1975« If these trends are compared with the degree 
of elasticity implicit in the plans, it can be affirmed that in general 
terms these presuppose a moderate growth of imports. 
(e) Net external financing 
Net external financing in absolute and relative terms has in the 
past varied greatly among the countries, and fluctuated markedly in 
each of them. In the first half of this decade net external financing 
rose considerably. For the region as a whole, the coefficient 
measuring its relation to imports rose from 16 per cent in the past 
decade to 24 per cent in the five-year period 1971-1975; this rise was 
largely due to the increase in flows of financing to Brazil and Mexico. 
In the national plans which contain this type of information, the 
coefficients of net external financing with respect to imports of goods 
also show a broad range of variation. However, all of them except that 
of Costa Rica 13/ display in their final years a coefficient which 
13/ National Development Plan 1974-1978. 
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exceeds that recorded by the same countries in the middle of the 
pasi; decade« In the final years of the plans, falling between 
1974 and 19o0, the coefficient in question .ranges between 6 per cent 
and 35 per cent, depending on the country. It may be added that 
Brazil's plan 14/ sets a limit on net external financing equivalent 
to 20 per cent of gross domestic investment, in order "to keep the 
balance of payments current accourt deficit under-coiitroi-'H 
(f) The improvement of incotae distribution 
All the plans refer to the need to promote a better distribution 
of income« However, quantitative goals are set only for the global 
shar e proposed for the v.'age-earning sector in income distribution«. 
There is unanimous agreement on the existence of great income 
gaps between the different social strata in respect of both the 
functional and the spatial distribution of income: in the latter 
context the urban-rural relation is a subject of special concern.-
Various trends regarding the method of improving income 
distribution are to be found in tha plans. All of them consider it 
essential to increase productivity, ec-cnomic growth and thus total 
income; however, while some rely almost entirely on income 
distribution policy for this purpose, others consider that a 
redistribution policy linked with structural reforms should be 
pursued. Within the context of these two main trends there are also 
variations as regards policies and instruments, and particularly 
relating to State intervention. 
In the plans which mention, macroeconomic figures in respect of 
the share of wages in total inccme, it is estimated that a proportion 
of around 53 per cent by the enc. of the . decade would contribute to a 
substantial improvement in the distribution of the fruits of economic 
growth. 
14/ Second National Development Plan 1975-1979. 
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(g) "Critical poverty" : 
It is recognized that "critical poverty" is a problem of first 
priority, but in general no information is given in the plans on the 
dimensions of the population affected by it«. This phenomenon is 
naturally linked with income distribution, but the intention of 
approaching it in a more direct way is stated. In general the proposals 
made refer to providing this stratum of the population with a minimum 
income which would enable them to meet their basic vital and cultural 
needs. In this respect, the plan of Venezuela 15/ formulates a specific 
proposal to the effect that "the poor massas should enjoy income levels 
well above the amounts considered as a minimum for subsistence. 
(h) Employment objectives 
The expansion of employment at higher rates than those of the 
growth of the labour force, in order to reduce unemployment and 
underemployment and to provide more remunerative wages, constitutes the 
common denominator of the employment objectives formulated in the plans. 
This aspect is considered as the most suitable and dignified way of 
sharing income more equitably. 
Although concern is shown over unlimited rural-urban migration and 
its effects on employment, the projections regarding the structure of 
employment are oriented in all the plans towards a reduction in the 
proportion of agricultural employment. The size of this relative 
reduction is linked with the projections of the agricultural product but, 
in some cases, could also reflect the different policies for retaining 
the labour force in the countryside. In this respect, for example, 
countries such as Argentina and Uruguay which have slow population growth 
and the lowest coefficients of participation of agriculture in total 
employment, with an average of l8 per cent around 1975» project a moderate 
reduction of this participation (2 per cent in five years) despite the 
15/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1980. 
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fact that Argentina 16/ postulates an annual growth rate of. the 
agricultural product of over k- per cento Ecuador, by contrast, with 
a population growth rate more than double that of the two countries 
mentioned, also proposes over a five-year period to lower the 
participation of agricultural employs:<=nt (which is one of the highest 
in the region) from an average of 5^ per cent to 4-9 per cent, with 
annual growth rates of the agricultural product of the order of 6 per 
cent. The greatest employment opportunities are contemplated in 
industry and construction. In industry the increases envisaged in the 
share of employment are small and in relative terms they are lower than 
those of the contruction sector. The share of industry and 
construction in total employment in the countries considered varies 
from 20 to 30 per cent, i.e., considerably less than that of agriculture 
which would be of the order cf 17 per cent to 50 per cent by 1975» 
Employment in the services sector is scheduled to rise moderately 
in the countries with the highest income levels and at a higher rate in 
the less advanced countries? the general trend in the plans, however, 
seems to point towards a restructuring of this sector to generate more 
employment in the areas linked mainly to human development, such as 
education, health and housing. As a scarce of employment, the weighting 
of the services sector appears to be closely linked to the income 
levels of the countries» Thus, those of highest per capita income 
employ around 50 per cent of their working population in this activity, 
while in those of lesser development the proportion is around 30 per cent. 
2» Some main orientations of economic policy 
(a) Public and private participation in the economy 
In the context of the economic and social framework of the 
national plans, the degree of participation of public activity has a 
relevant, though often not clearly explained, place. A common feature 
observed in this context aims to define the role of the public sector 
16/ National Plan 1971-1975 and Three-Year Plan 197^-1977. 
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as a regulatory element of the market forces within a framework of 
increasing participation» All the countries envisage increasing the 
contribution of public investment to total investment in their plans» 
The size of the increase in the participation of public 
investment is not strictly related to the levels of activity proposed, 
but rather to global policy measure« linked with particular investment 
projects. 
In this area there is a wide range of positions.ranging from the 
concept of a State which limits itself exclusively to playing a 
complementary role to private investment, to a State which operates as 
a producer in strategic sectors. Among the first it is laid down as 
a principle, for example, that "the State .exercises its activity only 
in a complementary and subsidiary way to the individual and the 
intermediate social organizations" (Argentina) 17/ and that the role 
of the State as a producing agent must be restricted so as to avoid 
"the presence of an interventionist State" (Uruguay);l8/ among the 
second, however, an intermediate position is taken that the State 
"should participate directly in the implementation and operation of 
projects in strategic and services sectors ..»; it will also participate 
partially or totally in some projects of the production sectors which 
go beyond the scope of private capacity" (Bolivia).19/ Lastly, from 
a position which proposes greater State intervention, it is declared 
that the maintenance of the trend towards the increase of public 
investment in the total "is directed mainly towards strengthening the 
role of the State as a producer of basic goods for development" and 
that "support action should be intensified for the promotion, 
development and interlinking of basic social organizations in order to 
ensure their progressive participation in the exercise of power" 
(Peru).20/ 
17/ Programme of Recovery, Rehabilitation and Expansion (April 1976). 
18/ National Development Plan 1973-1977« 
19/ Economic and Social Development Plan 1976-1980. 
20/ National Development Plan 1975-1980. 
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These different positions with respect to the role of the State 
are obviously reflecteds to a greater or lesser degree, in changes in 
the share of public investment in tctal investment. In this respect, 
the countries which favour the biggest increase in this share are 
Ecuador,21/ Teru and Venezuela,22/ vhere the limits of variation over 
five-year periods extend from around 30 per cent of the investment to 
just over 30 per cent. In contrast, countries where the share of public 
investment in total investment is fairly small, such as Costa Rica 23/ 
and El Salvador,24/ plan only small increases, keeping the proportion 
at around 30 per cent o?er a similar period. The rest of the countries 
also envisage increases of varying magnitude in the share of public 
investment, falling somewhere between the two extremes mentioned. 
Of course, aill the countries envisage the development of public 
and private activity within a planr.ec! context. Thus, planning is 
regarded as a key instrument for attaining the proposed objectives. The 
philosophy underlying the planning exercise has varying shades according 
to the country; however, it is possible to identify some common features 
which define its general orientation» Firstly, planning is compulsory 
for the public sector and serves as a guide to the private sector. 
Secondly, planning conceived as an economic policy instrument is 
considered as a continuing and permanent process which covers all spheres 
of national activity and is expressed in terms of co-ordination between 
public bodies and the various private groups. In this area, however, 
there is an evident tendency to advocate the strengthening of public 
administration machinery directly linked with planning activities, as 
an indispensable step towards effectively consolidating a planning system 
capable of really implementing economic policy. 
21/ Integrated Change and Development Plan 1976-1980. 
22/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1980. 
23/ National Development Plan 1974-1978. 
24/ Economic and Social Development Plan 1973-1977. 
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(b) The participation of foreign capital 
With the exception of Peru,25/ which advocates "social ownership 
of the means of production as a basic system", all the countries assign 
a predominant role to the participation of national private enterprise 
and a supplementary role to foreign investment. There is a more varied 
approach to the, participation of the latter. Thus "the direct 
participation of foreign capital is considered necessary ... as long as 
the country is affected by a shortage of investment capital ..." 
(Argentina);26/ "to obtain a larger volume of external capital through 
direct private investment" (Bolivia);27/ "to strengthen the national 
enterprise" as a means of .establishing a balance with the foreign 
enterprise, which necessitates "merging and incorporation", among other 
measures, in order to form competitive large-scale enterprises, 
(Brazil);28/ "to regulate foreign investment" (El Salvador);29/ to 
encourage "higher levels of foreign investment" (Nicaragua);50/."the 
traditional position. ... of not discriminating between national and 
foreign capital is reaffirmed" (Uruguay);J1/ and, lastly, Ecuador 22/ 
and Venezuela 33/ proposed to abide by Depision 24 of the Cartagena 
Agreement, which contains specific clauses on the treatment of foreign 
capital. 
25/ National Development Plan 1975-1978. 
26/ Programme of Recovery, Rehabilitation and Expansion (Arpil 1976). 
27/ Economic and Social Development Plan 1976-19&0. 
28/ National Development Plan 1975-1979. 
29/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1980. 
¿0/ National Reconstruction and Development Plan 1975-1979« 
J51/ National Development Plan 1973-1977« 
¿2/ Integrated Change and Development Plan 1973-1977« 
33/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1980. 
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(c) Public administration reforms 
The plans» of the majority of the countries include public 
administration reforms aimed at strengthening the planning systems« 
It is recognized, in practice, that planning bodies, have generally 
been superimposed on an administrative structure which has not been 
adapted to the requirements involved in the implementation of a 
planned development policy. Thus, several countries have set up 
organization and methods offices or commissions which they have 
entrusted with the task of administrative reform. The extent of this 
reform in each country not only depends on the shortcomings observed 
in the past, but basically on the new objectives and goals established 
in the respective plans. 
Regional planning has also met vrith serious obstacles deriving 
from the inadequate administrative organization, such as the 
incompatibility between political jurisdiction and economic 
regionalization«. In many cases it is found that regions which could 
be considered as a basis for planning are made up of different 
political divisions, each with its own interests, and the action of 
provincial, state or local pressure groups has prevented progress 
towards common objectives. Brazil, because of its size, is perhaps 
the country facing the most complex problems; its plan therefore, 
stresses the ^strengthening of the ... general government departments, 
providing them with planning units and ,:the operation 
of the national planning system so as to permit joint action by 
federal and state bodies, metropolitan areas and the principal 
municipalities'1. From a different standpoint, another illustrative 
case is that of Venezuela,whose plan states that 'in the field 
of administrative regionalization the Gobernaciones of Zulia and 
Cojedes have been chosen as pilo-;; centres, to which end they have 
been provided with continuing advisory assistance and training 
facilities for their staff in accordance with the studies and plans 
in process':. 
¿j/ Fifth National Plan 1976-1$80. 
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(d) Decentralization and regional development 
In connexion with decentralization and regional development, 
but still linked with the above-mentioned question, the common points 
which may be noted relate to the reduction of regional disequilibria 
as the best way of achieving national integration and preserving the 
countries' sovereignty. This involves aims such as the need "to 
reorganize physical space" seeking "national unity1' at the physical, 
economic, social, political and institutional level (Argentina);35/ 
"to organize physical space efficiently in terms of its potentialities" 
and ''to integrate the national territory organically'1, which are both 
questions closely linked with the solution to the problem of being a 
land-locked country (Bolivia)-,¿6/ to implement a ''national integration 
strategy" (Brazil),37/ which among other objectives covers the 
development of the North-east region, Amazonia and the west central 
region of Brazil both considered as a whole and as regards their 
links with the south central region. In addition, Brazil assigns 
priority to reducing the concentration in the south-east and avoiding 
further growth of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Brazil also seeks 
the strengthening of other areas, the setting up of centres of 
growth in the interior, and urban promotion in recently populated but 
not yet consolidated areas, including the geoeconomic region of 
Brasilia. 
The rest of the countries define their decentralization and 
regional development policies within the general context of the above 
examples, but naturally with their own particular features as regards 
the geoeconomic system and the spatial distribution of the population. 
In addition, Argentina, Peru 38/ and Venezuela 39/ place emphasis 
on the development of border areas. 
¿5/ Three-Year Plan 1974-19770 
36/ Economic and Social Development Plan 1976-1980. 
37/ Second National Development Plan 1975-1979. 
38/ National Development Plan 1975-1978. 
39/ Fifth National Plan.1976-1980. 
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(e) Structural reforms 
In addition to the aforementioned reform of the public 
administration, nearly all the plans propose fiscal reforms, and five 
of them include agrarian reform. 
The general purpose oi: fiscal reform is to improve tax revenue 
and adapt its structure to development aims and the objectives of 
the plan. 
Agrarian reform, for its part, has different aims and modalities. 
It is seldom a nation-wide reform; in most cases it covers certain 
regions, particularly those defined as critical areas, and aims at 
the distribution of land or the ir.anagenent and adaptation of property 
to comply with ecological and social characteristics and the 
objectives of the plan as regards production, rural welfare and rural 
development. 
(f) Export policy 
The explicit or implicit attitude of the plans to the external 
sector of the majority of the countries is based on the premise 
that the implementation of the economic policy formulated in those 
plans is heavily dependent upon the evolution of external trade 
and financial operations.. 
There is consensus regarding the need to step up the growth 
of exports to higher rates than those reached in the past, with the 
sole exception of Venezuela, which in its Fifth Plan (1975-1980) 
proposes not to increase hydrocarbon exports and to expand its 
exports of goods and services at an annual rate of only 2.2 per cent, 
in view of its high foreign exchange earnings and its resources 
conservation policy. 
There is also a widespread desire to diversify exports. A 
notable factor in this field is the importance attached to exports 
of industrial origin, ar.d in tha Case of Peru k0/ to its eventual 
position as an oil-exporting country. 
k0/ National Development Plan 1976-197&. 
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In the relatively lèss developed and less densely populated 
countries, export agro-industry occupies a leading place- as an element 
of diversification away from the predominant agricultural or mining 
export commodities. On the other hand, in most of the more developed 
countries like Brazil,41/ the aim.is to include manufactured products 
not only with a high value added but also with a considerable 
technological content.' In both cases, however, the idea underlying 
the expansion and diversification of exports and export markets is 
to achieve a grater measure of iridependence in external relations, 
(g) Import policy 
In connexion with the foregoing, it may be observed that with 
the exception of El Salvador 42/ and Uruguay,43/ which envisage higher 
growth rates for imports than for exports, the rest of the countries 
aim on thè one hand to reduce their trade deficit by increasing their 
exports faster than their imports, and on the other hand to: stabilize 
or reduce their import coefficient with respect to their gross 
domestic product, which may be considered as a global indicator of an 
import substitution policy. ' . • 
With a few exceptions, the size of the import coefficient has 
some relatioii to the size of the economies themselves: thus, in the 
countries with a larger volume of production this coefficient.tends 
to be around 10 per cent, while in the smaller economies it is'around 
30 per cent. Among the1 exceptions, the most notable case is that of 
Uruguay,44/ whose plan proposes to use ''a growth model based on a 
dynamic export sector51 and thus provides for a 15 per cent annual 
increase in meat exports and a 10 per cent increase in total exports, 
so that the share of meat in the total for goods is planned to rise 
from 38 per cent in 1970 to 50 per cent in 1977, while the share of 
41/ Second National Development Plan 1976-1979. 
42/ Economic and Social Development Plan, 1973-1977. 
4j/ National Development Plan, 1973-1977. 
44/ National Development Plan, 1973-1977. 
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wool is scheduled to drop 3+ per cent to 18 per cent. Such 
expansion would enable imports to be increased by 15 per cent annually, 
thus leading in its turn to an increase in the import coefficient 
from 11 per cent in 1970 (the level of a large country) to 18 per 
cent in 1977-
(h) The share of external financing 
The external financing needs and the policies adopted in this 
respect are linked with the forecast of the evolution of trade and 
financial transactions with the exterior. Thus, if the balance of 
payments current account deficit is defined as the net external 
financing, we observe marked optimism among those responsible for 
formulating the plans, since when such financing is compared with the 
gross domestic investment a clear tend ¿ccy to plan for a considerable 
reduction in the external contribution to the financing of investment 
is to be observed. By the end of the decade, the ratio of external 
financing to domestic investment is expected to be less than 20 per 
cent in all the countries, whereas in 1975 only seven of the 19 countries 
were in such a position. Although Brazil cannot be taken as a model, 
because of its untypical nature, it is worth noting that in the 
development plan of that country 45/ it is considered that the upper 
limit for keeping the balance of payments current account deficit 
under control is precisely this same figure of 20 per cent of gross 
domestic investment. 
The decline in this coefficient in the majority of the countries 
is due to the planned relative reduction in the trade deficit, and 
to a lesser extent to more moderate handling of payments of interest, 
profits and amortization on foreign capital. 
45/ Second National Development Plan, 1975-1979. 
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Table II-1 










A. Rates of experji.cn (per cent per year) 
Global GDP 3.6 7 .0 3 .2 7.5. 
Agriculture 1 
Mining J 2 .2 4 .4 0 . 6 
f 6 . 5 
\ 7 . 5 
Manufacturing 4.3 8 .6 4 . 5 10.1 
Construction 5.0 7 .1 - O o 8 14.8 
Basic services b/ 6 .1 ? 8 . 5 3.0 7 . 3 
General government 1 .2 0 . 3 3.7 0 .0 
Commerce and other services 3.0 6 .7 3.9 , 6 .7 
Per capita GIF 2.1 5 . 5 1.8 6 .0 
Global consumption 3.3 5 .9 4.1 4 .8 
Per capita contraption 1.Ô ? 4 .4 ? 2 . 8 3 .3 
Private consuoioiion 3.6 .6.4 4 .2 5 .6 
Per capita private consumption 2.0 4 .8 2 .8 4.1 
Government consumption 1.0 0 . 6 3 .6 0 . 3 
Exports of real goods and services 5 .3 9 . 6 - 4 . 2 19.5 
Imports of real goods and services 2 . 5 10.5 3 .2 13.1 
B. Per capita GEP (USg at 1970 prices) 
1970 1 208 
1975 1 320 
1977 
Source: Argentina, Plan Macional de DeserroUo y Segnrj.dad, 1971-1975 and Plan grj.enal para 
la reconstrv.ccion y la liberecjon wsianal , 1974-1977« 
a / CEPAL, on the basis of off ic ia l figures» 
b/ Transport, e l e c t r i c i t y , gas and water. 
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1972-097^ 1Ç70-1975 1975-1979 
A„ . Retss of sxpansion (per cert per year) 
Global GDP 7 A 9 £ 9 .3 10.0 
Agriculture hJt 7 .5 6 .2 7 .0 
Mining 1 
Manufacturing J Bo? 11.0 
10.2 / 11.5 
1 12.2 
Construction 10.9 8»5 10.3 
Basic services 9 .3 10.0 i lol 
Other services 7 . 3 80O 9o9 
Per capita GDP 6.0 606 7 .0 
Global consumption 8 .0 8 .5 
Per capita cons-«tj:;-.tion 5.1 5=2 
Private const®p<-':>n So 2 9=2 
Per capit? privsî'.e consumption 5ol 606 
Exports of goods and servioss 10.2 . 20=3 
. B. : Per capita GEP (US$ at 1970,prices) 
1970 445 546(1973:. prices) 
1974 598 (1972 prices) 605 748(1973" prices) 
1975 612 
1920 1 121(1973 prices) 
Sources Brazil, First and Second National Davelopment Plans (summaries). 
a / CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
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. A. Rates of expansion (per cent per year) 
Global GEP 6 .4 4 .8 7 . 5 
Agriculture 5 .0 2 .1 4 .7 
Mining 
Manufacturing i 
7 . 4 ?.0 f 11=3 
L 10.6 
Construction J 9 .6 5 .4 1C.9 
Basic services b/ 10.4 3 .2 10.1 
Government 4 .3 5 .2 
Other services 3 .7 
19^-1972 
6 .9 
3=A 2.0 M 
Global consumption 5 .5 3.0 6 .2 
Per capita consumption 2 .2 0 . 2 3 .3 
Private consumption 4 .5 2 .6 6 . 4 
Per capita private consumption 1 .3 - 0 . 3 3 .5 
Government consumption 10.1 5 .3 5 .4 
Exports of pîods and services 10.7 2 .3 9 . 6 
Imports of goods and services 12.8 3.0 7 .8 




Sources Costa Rica, Presidencia de la República, Oficina de Planificación» Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo, 1974-1978. 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
b/ E lec t r ic i ty , gas and water, and transport and communications. 
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Table ïl-k 











Per capita GPP 
Global consumption 
Per capita consumption 
Private consumption 
Per capita private consumption 
Government consumption 
Exports of goods and services 
Exports of Detrolfiu-i 





Effective Plan for 
evolutionS/ transformation 
1970-1975 and Development 
1972-1977 



























































Source: Ecuador, Plan Integral. d3 Transformación y Desarrollo, 1973-1977 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. . , 
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Table II -5 









Per capita GDP 
Global consumption 
Per capita consumption 
Private consumption 
Per capita private consumption 
Public consumption 
Exports of goods and services 


























































Sources El Salvcdor, CCHAPLAN, Plan de Pestx'-ollo Econoaico y Social, 1973-1977. 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
So 
Sable ÏS-6 . 











A. Ra^es of expansion (per cent per year) 
Global GDP 4.4 4^3 6.7 
Agriculture 3.2 2.0 6.2 
Mining -4.3 -0.6 9.1 
Manufacturing 7.4 8.0 9.6 
Construction 5.6 5.0 13.5 
Services 4.0 4.0 5.2 
(government) (3.3) (3.3) (5.7) 
Per capita (GDP) 1.4 1.0 3.2 
Global consumption 4.0 4.8 4.3 
Per capita consumption 1.0 1.5 0.9 
Private consumption 4.1 4.9 4.0 
Per capita private consumption 1.1 1.7 0.6 
Public consumption 3.6 4.1 7.0 
Exports of goods and services 5.5 6;o 9.1 
Imports of goods and services 0.9 7.5 5.9 





Source; Nicaragua, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Plan Nacional de Reconstrucción y 
Desarrollo, 1975-1979» 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
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. evolution^/ ment 




A. Rates of expansion (per cent per year) 
Global GDP hi 7 . 5 5.7 M 
Agriculture 
2 .7 
r , . 2 \ 
- 0 . 1 
Fishing J 
Mining 2 .6 5 .7 * - 1 . 4 
Manufacturing 7 .4 12.4 7 . 5 
Other 5 .8 6 .6 . 6 . ? 
Per capita GDP 2.0 M 2 .2 3 .3 
Global consumption 6 .5 6 .0 7 .9 4.7 
Per capita consumption 5 .6 2 .8 4 .8 1 .6 
Private consumption (non-public) 6 . 5 8 .1 4 .7 
Per capita private consumption 5 .5 5 .0 1 .6 
Public consumption 6 .8 6 .8 4 .5 
Exports of goods and services 3 .8 4 .1 - 5 . 5 15.6 
Imports of goods and services 7 .1 12.7 5 .6 






Source» Peru, Plan del Perú, 1971-1975, and Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 1975-1978. 
a / OPAL, on the basis of off ic ial figures. 
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Talle II-B 












A. Rates of expansion (per cent per year) 
Global GDP hi 6.7 10.6 
Agriculture (including sugar) 0.2 5.4 3.7 
Mining, energy, fuels and lubricants 5.1 23.0 41.6 
Manufacturing 4.6 7.7 13.3 
Construction 10.2 7.9 ».5 
Government 3o0 -0.1 1.7 
Other services 3.4 6.8 llo3 
Per capita GDP 0 £ 3.7 7.2 
Global consumption 3.6 4.5 9.0 
Per capita consumption 0.3 1.6 5.6 
Private consumption 4.0 5ol 10.2 
Per capita private consumption 0.7 2.1 6.8 
Public consumption 2.5 0.9 0.0 
Exports of goods and services -0.6 12.8 10.6 
Imports of goods and services 4.9 2.9 13.1 





Sources Dominican Republic, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Primer Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo (macroeconomic and public sector projections). 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis oí officisl figures. 
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Agriculture (including hunting 
and fishing) 
Manufacturing (including mining 
and quarrying) 
Construction 
Basic services b/ 
Government 
Other services 
Per capita GEP 
Global consumption 
Per capita consumption 
Private consumption 
Per capita private consumption 
Government consumption 
• Total exports 
Total imports 
A. Rates of expansion (per cent per year) 
3.0 4 .8 0 . 4 
3 .0 4 .1 - 1 . 2 
1 .6 6 .0 1 .4 
- 2 . 0 9 .4 2 . 5 
0 . 9 6 . 4 1 .2 
3 .0 1 .5 - 1 . 6 
1 .7 4 .6 0 . 2 
3 . 5 - 0 . 6 2 .6 
3.7 0 . 4 3.1 
2 .4 - 0 . 6 1 .9 
4 .1 0 . 8 
2 .8 - 0 . 2 
0 . 7 - 1 . 5 
8 .1 0 . 8 10.1 
6 .6 - 1 . 5 14.9 






Source: Uruguay (CIDE), Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social, 1965-1974 
(Compendio, Kontevideo, 1966) and (cámara de Representantes), Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo, 1973-1977 (Anexos I y I I I al Repartido fifi 471, May 1973) 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of off ic ial figures. 
b/ E lec t r ic i ty , gas and water, and transport and communications. 
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Table II-1C 
GOVS OF NAIIOLC DEVELOPSEBT PUBS 
mEZ'MU 
Fourth . Fifth Effective 
Evolution national , . ./ National evolution^ ./ 
1960-1970 PI® ^ 0 - ^ 7 5 P a M 
1970-1974 1975-1960 
A. Raites of expansion (per cent per year) 
Global GDP 5.0 6.3 4=7 8.2 
• '•'.. Agriculture 4 . 6 6.2 4.7 9.6 
Mining and hydrocarbons 2.5 3.2 -6.4 0.0 
Manufacturing 8.5 9.6 8.4 13.0 
Construction 5.5 8.4 11.0 14.0 
Basic services b/ 7.9 . 7.9 . 9.4 8.9 
Government 4.4 4.1 8.2 ] 
Commerce and other services 4.4 6.0 6.5 J oo ? 
Per capita GDP 1.4 2.5 1.7 4;3 
Global consumption 5.8 8.0 7.4 
Per capita consumption 2.0 , M 3.6 
Private consumption (exclc Gov») 6.0 7.7 7.7 
Per capita private consumption 2.2 4.8 3.9 
Public consumption (Gov.) 4.3 9.0 6.4 
Exports of goods and services 4.1 .-6.5 2.2 
Imports of goods and services 3.5 9.4 2.2 






Source: Venezuela, IV y V Plan de la Kacâon, 1970-1974 and 1976-1980= 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of officiel figures, 
b/ Energy, transport and communications. 
Table 11-11 
TARGETS OP NATIONAL DEVELOPÎElfT PLANS 
Elasticities of growth In relation io the GtP 
(Relationship between annual ^ rot.th rates) 
eon-
Invcstnerrt as c, percentage of GDP 
0 tr !» V ct-fl> 1 
M 
Argentina 










Effective evolution a/ 
Plan 
Ecuador 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan ~ 
El Salvador 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan ~ 
Nicaragua 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan ~ 
Peru 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan ~ 
Dominican Republic 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan 
Uruguay 
Effective evolution a/ 
Plan ~ 
Venezuela 





























0.188b/ ... 1.406 -0.250 
0.629b/ ... 1.229 1.014 
0.222 0.315 1.037 Oc 556 
0.948 1.117 1.273 1.052 
O066? ... 1.097b/ 1.108 
0.833 ... 1.222b/ 0.944 
0,438 ... 1.458b/ 1,125 
0.627 1.507 1.413*" 1.455 
0.275 6.388d/ 1.200 1.100 
(0„535)(0.970)e/ 4.172*" 1.000 1.131 
0.711 -0=335 1.200 0.844 
0.716 1,075 1.522 1.597 
0.465 -0.140 1.860 1.163 
0.925 1.358 1.433 2.015 
-0.018 -0.246 1.316 ... 






3-925 1.255 1.934 
4.179 1.149 1.179 
3.500b/ 6.250 
0 0 0 e o o 
-1.362d/ 1.787 2.340 
0.508 1.524 1,353 
20.4 21.4 22.1 20.9 21.7 19.3 
22.6 22.9 ... 24.3 26.0 26.5 
15.6 14=9 13.9 16.8 18.8 21.8 





20.5 24.1 20.2 22.5 23.4 24.9 
000 090 26o? 00© 00 j 000 
20.3 26.2 21.9 23.6 26.4 28.4 
J/ 
13.2 15.5 12.8 14.3 16.6 14.5 
14.7 so 000 OOO 
17.3 16.9 12.5 21.5 26.6 17.9 
000 900 000 oop 21o 3 900 
12.2 14.0 13.2 13.5 16.3 18.1 
12.8 
19.1 20.1 22.6 24.0 26.5 26.7 
23.3 17.6 
11.4 12.9 11.2 10.7 10.3 9.9 
l4.8h/ 000 009 000 20.6 











18.9 19.9 19.9 
a/ CEPAL, on the basis of official data, b/ Including mining, c/ Coefficient of gross fixed investment, d/ Including petroleum. 




PRELIMINARY LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS ON POPULATION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Introduction 
In 1976, the secretariat of CEPAL initiated studies in connexion 
with the analysis of Latin America's long-term economic development 
prospects referred to in Part II of the research project entitled 
"Latin American Development; Its Appraisal and Long-Term Prospects"« 
The objectives and programme of work of this project may be found 
in the annex to this document. 
These activities are being carried out in the context of the 
General Assembly resolutions on a new international economic order 
(3201 (S-VI) and 3362 (S-VII)) and, in particular, in accordance 
with resolution 3508 (XXX) on regional development trends and 
projections. 
Preliminary research is currently being carried out on economic 
projections for the individual countries in the next decade and the 
year 2000, on the basis of a set of interrelated sub-models, with a 
view to constructing, when the progress of.work so justifies, an 
integrated model which can be used to analyse with suitable cohesion 
the scenarios that have been proposed, and any other approaches 
considered desirable. 
These sub-models concern specific aspects of the development 
process and cover the fields of population, global macroeconomics, 
sectoral macroeconomics, international trade, development styles and 
employment. In each case the aim is to determine orders of magnitude 
for objectives, resources,-problems and factors influencing the 
corresponding field of development. The purpose of obtaining these 
global preliminary results is to possess more information in order 
/to design 
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to design the research programme in greater detail and promote 
discussion with governments to learn their points of view in connexion 
with our work. 
Despite the inevitably provisional nature of the present 
projections, it is felt that it might be useful to anticipate, even 
if only in a global manner, some conclusions stemming from part of 
the programme of work under way, in order to illustrate the discussion 
on questions of the utmost importance in the development process» 
Chapter III presents quite detailed demographic projections, and global 
macroeconomic projections for the non-oil-exporting countries, on 
a preliminary basis» Finally, there are some brief comments on 
employment and the rate of economic growth» 
The demographic projections show the growth of the population 
for the period 1975-2000 and its effects on the active population and 
the labour force according to a "medium hypothesis" recommended by 
CELADE» They show that the growth, rate will continue to be high in 
the remainder of this century, and that the decline which will become 
more pronounced after 1980 will, only reduce the present rate of 2.8 per 
cent to 2.4 per cent by the period 1995-2000.a/ Thus, in the next 
25 years the population of Latin America will double once again. The 
demographic map of the region will continue to change, with the share 
of the countries of the "southern cone" and Cuba continuing to fall, 
while two countries (Brazil and Mexico) will alone have more than half 
the total population. Rural-urban migration itfill continue, especially 
in the many countries where the percentage of rural population is still 
high, and the pressure on the services and physical space of the urban 
agglomerations will be intensified. 
The break-down of the population by age will change, with an 
appreciable increase in the proportion of persons of active age. 
The average annual growth rate between 1975 and 2000 is estimated at 
a/ According to the "low hypothesis", the annual rate of population 
growth would be 1.9 per cent by the end of the century. 
/ 2 . 9 per 
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2.9 per cent, a higher figure than that of total population.b/ This 
represents a population explosion in those age groups which will 
immediately affect the labour force. Furthermore, with a rise in the 
rates of participation, particularly of women, the total economically 
active population would grow still further, at an average of about 
3 per cent per year according to one of the hypothesis considered. 
The global macroeconomic projections presented in this chapter 
correspond to the non-oil-exporting countries. The study of each of 
these countries is of particular interest, above all because of the 
heavy external debt they have accumulated in recent years, whose 
service seriously threatens their balance of payments for a long 
period, not to mention the remittances of profits of foreign private 
investment. The situation and outlook vary significantly from 
country to country, with most of the debt and balance-of-payments 
deficits concentrated in a few large and also some medium-size 
countries. Taken together these quantitative results are of general 
application to shed light on the nature and size of the external 
problems in the acceleration of the economic growth of the non-oil-
exporting countries. 
The projections show that if those countries proposed to reduce, 
over the next fifteen years, the ratio between net external financing 
and the gross domestic product, which was exceptionally high in 1975 
at 4.6 per cent, they would have to expand and diversify greatly their 
exports, if they attempt to accelerate and even maintain a certain rate 
of economic growth, avoiding the adoption of internal policies which 
would worsen the problems of unemployment and the bad distribution of 
income, with a high social cost. In the most favourable hypothesis, 
that the terms of trade remain at 1976 levels (lower than in 1970), 
until 1990, the exports of these countries as a whole would have to 
grow at a higher rate than imports and even than the gross domestic 
product. 
b/ According to the "low hypothesis", the increase would be 
2.8 per cent. 
/The chances 
» 90 » 
The chances of reaching this objective, even in part, depend 
on the swift recovery of the growth rate of the industrial countries 
which account for thrèe-quar-ters of Latin American exports, and greater 
access to their markets for commodities and particularly manufactures 
and semimanufactures. At the same time, it will particularly depend 
on the growth of trade among Latin American countries and with other 
non-traditional areas, to such an extent that the various forms of 
economic integration and co-operation and the regional level will have 
to play a more important role than in the past. 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that in the large 
countries and some medium-sized countries there is a relatively wide 
margin for progress in a new phaee of substitution of imports of 
essential intermediate products and capital goods. This could now be 
done more efficiently because of the bigger size and diversification of 
the domestic markets of the Latin American économies, which will become 
even greater if their economic and social growth can be accelerated. 
The CEPAL work programme attaches particular importance to the 
study of long-term projections of sectoral growth, productivity and 
employment. The aim is, firstly, to determine the rates and changes 
which will occur, according to different hypotheses, in the development 
of thé economic sectors and i n the structure of global production. 
Secondly, the objective is to appraise the prospects of the 
modernization process, changes in factor endowment in economic 
activities and the incorporation of technological progress, so as 
ultimately to establish projections on the growth of sectoràl and 
global productivity. Thus the analysis will go on to determine the 
needs and demands for labour stemming from the different growth 
hypotheses so as to draw the corresponding comparisons with the 
economically active population and the underemployment situation. 
Although this work is still in a preliminary stage, some conclusions 
can be anticipated which are of fundamental importance for the styles 
and strategies of development. It may be said that it will not be 
easy to increase the demand for employment and occupation, even in the 
long term considered (1975-2000)» to the necessary extent to absorb the 
/potential labour 
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potential labour force stemming from the high population rates described 
above. This stems from the trends of increasing productivity at the 
sectoral level and in the economy as a whole, which will tend to grow 
stronger with the acceleration of the growth rate, particularly if the 
economic and technological structure follows the patterns of the more 
advanced industrial countries. 
These projections show that if the economic growth rate trends 
are maintained, in the above-mentioned context, the problems of open 
unemployment, underemployment, unequal income distribution and 
situations of critical poverty will grow worse. Broadly speaking, it 
would appear that the achievement of an employment demand target equal 
to or greater than the growth of the labour force in the long term 
will depend on strong economic growth which, according to the 
projections, could be quantified at a target growth of about 8 per cent, 
again in the context of the economic and technological process 
characterized by the prevailing trends of Latin American development. 
In every case, these projections correspond to specific 
hypotheses and extremely simplified models whose conclusions are 
formulated in global terms for groups of countries which have 
different situations and prospects for the future. However, despite 
these and other shortcomings, it is clear that these overall 
assessments shed light on the internal and external factors which 
the future Latin American development strategy will have to take 
into account, as well as the institutional and structural changes 
linked with the necessary transformation of the prevailing style of 
development to orient the process towards the human and social 
development targets and goals set forth in the International Development 
Strategy. Indeed, to deepen the discussion and analysis of future 
Latin American development in relation to the problems which have just 
been outlined and other economic and social questions is the main 
concern of the on-going CEPAL work programme. 
/I. Population 
„ g a -
io Population trenos and .projections n — 111 mi ii min 11 win ii »mi «il • "•in» w ii ii l'i «ii pub n w ii*TiiMiiwirnMnr»rnTT~« tfT~~r~~r 
(a) Latin America, the region with' the fastest population growth 
Latin America considerect as a region presents demographic 
charactéristics which distinguish it from both developing and developed 
areas. ' Demographic indicators place it in an intermediate position, 
which is in any case its rightful place in the systematic ordering of 
regional economic and social indexes. 
The total fertility rate 1/ is 5*3, which is higher than that 
of the developed areas but lower than that récorded in Africa and 
southern Asia. Life expectancy at birth (62 years) is far greater than 
that of the developing areaé, but is Still 10 years less than in the 
United States and Europe. The rate of natural population growth (2.8 per 
cent) is one of the highest in the world: three times that of the 
developed areas and even higher than that of Africa, wheré the population 
growth has accelerated in the last few years (see table 1). 
Since 1950, in a period of only 25 years, the population of Latin 
America doubled, while the world population increased by about 60 per 
cent and that of the developed regions by only about 30 per cent (see 
table 2). Thus, Latin America increased its share' in the world 
population from 6.6 per cent in 1950 to 8.2'per cent in 1975» 
This rapid population growth which has characterized Laitin America's 
development in comparison with that of the industrial countries -has 
particular implications for the growth of the product and per eapita: 
income;, While overall economic growth in Latin America is greater than in 
the developed areas, the same cannot be said for the per capita gross 
product Which generally increases at à lower rate. Thus the income gap 
between Latin America and the industrial countries is widening. This will 
be accentuated in thè future, particularly if Latin America fails to step 
up its rate of economic growth and maintain higher rates than those 
recorded, on average,, in the past 25 years. 
1/ The total fertility rate for a given year is the average number 
of children which would be born to a woman by the end of her 
reproductive life, if during that period - i.e., between 15 and 
50 years of age - she were subject to the age-specific fertility 
rates recorded for that year. 
/Table 1 
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World total 55.2 4 .4 18.7 
¡tore developed regions 7Ì.-1 2 .5 8 .0 
Less developed regions 52.2 5c 5 23.2 
Africa 45.0 6 . 3 26.5 
Latin America 61.4 5*3 27.7 
North America 71.4 2 .2 7 . 2 
Eastern Asia 62 .5 3 .6 16 .5 
Southern Asia 48.5 6 .0 25.2 
Europe ' ? i . 2 2 .3 5.7 
Oceania 65.8 3 .4 15 .5 ; 
Soviet Union • , 70 .4 2 .4 • 9 .9 
Sources Selected World Demographic Indicators by Countries, 1950-2000» 
(ESA/P/WPo 55, 28 Kay 1975). 
/Table I I I - 2 
„ yk „ 
"able m » 2 
WORLD POPULATION BY R3GIQ2S, A M PROJECTIONS, 1930-2000 
(^llio.is) 
Region 1950 1975 1990 2000 
World total 2 501 3 968 5 260 6 254 
Kbre developed regions 857 1 132 1 277 1 360 
Less developed regions 1 644 2 836 4 003 4 894 
Africa 219 401 6l4 814 
Latin America 164 324 486 620 
North America 166 237 275 296 
Eastern Asia 675 1 006 1 233 1 370 
Southern Asia 693 1 250 1 836 2 267 
Europe 392 473 514 539 
Oceania 13 21 28 33 
Soviet Union 180 255 294 315 
Source» Population by sex and age for regions and countries, 1950-2000, as assessed in 1973» Redima 
Varient ESA/P/WP.60, 25 February 1976, pp. 1, 2 , 3, 4, 60, 95, 98, 107, 143, 175 and 187. 
Note» Because the figures have been rotmded-off 'ite sum of the regions does not coincide with the 
world total in seme years. 
/(b) Changes 
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(b) Changes in the demographic map of the region • •i i mi'.'i IIJI'K-II m—l, inii 'ni.i ji, ••In—ii i i;r man iinnir* inrwn 
In the last 25 years, as stated above, the region's total 
population doubled, rising from iGh to 526 million inhabitants if the 
Caribbean countries are included. 
At the country level, the trend, fair 'from being "uniform,* presents 
marked contrasts» The countries in the southern cone of the continent, 
Cuba and other countries of the Caribbean showed a relatively slow growth, 
while in many countries the population more than doubled- Among these 
are.Brazil and Mexico, which in 1950 already accounted for the highest 
proportions of the regional population (see tables 3 and k). Therefore, 
considerable changes in the distribution of the regional population 
have taken place» The three countries in the southern cone today 
represent 12 per cent of the total population, compared with nearly 
16 per cent in 1950« Colombia, which in 1950 had a much smaller 
population than Argentina, today has 26 million inhabitants, thus 
exceeding the population of the latter country.. Venezuela presents 
a similar trend in comparison with Chile. Brazil and Mexico already have 
more than half of the region's population. 
These changes in the geographical distribution of the population 
have also made themselves felt at the economic level. In the past 25 
years the countries of the southern cone have recorded a slower economic 
growth than the other countries considered. The difference is fairly 
striking if compared with the growth rates of Brazil and Mexico. In 
this respect, it is interesting to see the following figures for the 
annual growth of the gross domestic product and the population between 
1950 and 1975: 
Gross domestic „ , .. Per capita , . Population , product product 
Countries of the southern 
cone 3.3 1.7 1.6 
Brazil and Mexico 6.7 3.1 3-5 
Other countries 5.5 3.0 2.4 
Total 5.5 ' " 2.8 2.6 
/Table 10 
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Table I i ; - 3 
TOTAL POPULATION OP TH2 REGION BY COUNTRIES, I95O-2OOO 
( l a tjicrqa'ad -^^ at rid year) 
Country jo jo 1575 I99Ö 2000 
Argentina 17 150 ¿5 ß k 30189 323861 t 
Bolivia 3 Ol? 5 410 7 97^ 10 267 
Brasil 52 901 109 730 165 757 212 507 
Colombia 11 089 25 890 40 32U 51464 
Chile 6 0 9 1 10 253 13 553 15 850 
Ecuador " 3 224 7 090 11 2 51 ^ 773 
Paraguay 1 371 2 64? 4 074 5 271» 
Peru 7 832 15 68? 24 425 . 32 3 ^ 
Uruguay : 2 194 ' 3 111 3 ^ 7 - .' 3 5*5 
Venezuela 5 1^5 12 213 l8 7°6 23 552 
Costa Rica 866 1 99"+ 2 95** 3 695 
Cuba •. .. >:. 5 752 9 48l 12 855 15 267 
El Salvador 1 940 4 IU3 6 1184 8 708 
Guatemala 3 054 6 082 9 201 11 991 
Haiti . • 3 380 5 888 8 525 10.742 
Honduras 1 390 3 037 1+ 997 6 881 
Mexioo , z6 606 59 204 97 585 132 244 
Nicaragua, 1 209 2 3-8 3 778 5 
Panama . 809 1 676 2 525 3 2X8 
Dominican Republic ..., 2 323 5 1Ì8 8 495 - 11 ^ 
Total twenty oountriee Ì S L M 1 I L M ^ 269 612 508 
Bahamas 79 204 279 330 
Barbadoa 211 245 269 285 
G i t a n a 4 2 3 • ' ' 7 9 1 1 0 8 0 , 1 2 5 6 
Jamaica 1 403 2 029 2 464 2 726 
Surinam 215 422 688 , 904 
Trinidad and Tobago 632 1 009 1 172 1 280 
Others 3 372 4 724 5 691 . . 6 217 
Total other countries 
and territories £ j 2 l 1 M 11 64? 12 ??8 
Regional total 164 170 325 782 488 912 625 506 




LATIN AMERICAS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION 
BY COUNTRIES, 1950-2000 
Country 1950 1975 2000 
Argentina -•10.5 : 7.8 5.3 
Bolivia 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Brazil 32.2•' 33.7 -, 34.0 
Colombia 7.1 7.9 8.2 
Chile 3.7 3.1 • - 2.5 
Ecuador 2.0 ' 2.2 2.^ 
Paraguay 0.8 0.8 . 0.8 
Peru • 4.8 4.8 5.2 
Uruguay 1.3 , ' '1.0 0.6 
Venezuela 3.1 3.7 3.8 
Costa Rica 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Cuba 3.5 2.9 • 2.4 
El Salvador 1.2 1.3 •••• 1,4 
Guatemala 1.9 . 1.9 1=9 
Haiti 2.1 1.8 1.7 
Honduras 0.8 0.9 1.1 
Mexico 16.2 18.2 a . 2 
Nicaragua 0.7 0 , 7 • 0.8 
Panama 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Dominican Republic 1.4 1.6 . 1.9 
Other Caribbean countries 
and territories 3.9 2.9 2.1 
Regional total 100.0 ' 
• 1 0 0 ° ° '•
 1 0 0 
Source; CELADE demographic projections» Recommended medium hipótesis« 
/(c) Classification 
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(c ) Classification of the Latj.n_ Araerican countries according to the 
components of demograph.:Lc__chapgo. Their prospects 
The countries of Latin America are at differing stages of the 
process of demographic change which with some variations has taken place 
earlier or is currently taking place in other parts of the world. It is 
a period of transition from situations with high and fairly stable 
mortality and fertility rates to others with low mortality rates and low 
but fluctuating fertility rates, where direct human control is exercised 
over these variables. 
This process of transition is known to be interrelated with or 
accompanied by evident changes in other economic and social variables, 
as has been happening in Latin America. It is not easy, however, to 
establish an analytical model with practical aims because of the complex 
interrelationships existing between the variables. 
In order to facilitate the analysis and, in particular, to examine 
the prospects for growth up to the year 2000, the Latin American countries 
have been classified according to their fertility and mortality rates 
in three broad groups. 
In adopting this essentially demographic criterion for placing 
the countries in these three groups^ the analysis has been extended in 
scope, recording economic and social statistical indexes showing 
the stage of economic development of the various countries and, 
in particular, the degree of urbanisation, and levels of education 
and nutrition. Of course, all these indexes reflect the average levels 
for each country, with respect to which the internal distribution varies 
considerably. The follovring indicators were selected: (i) domestic product, 
manufacturing product and active population in the agricultural sector; 
(ii) degree of urbanization? (iii) indexes of education in terms of 
literacy, primary enrolment and number of teachers; and Civ) nutrition 
and electric energy consumption« 
The relevant information is shown in table 5» The following are 
the predominant characteristics of each group of countries: 
/Group A: 
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Group A; Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba 
These countries had already experienced a considerable decline 
in their fertility and mortality before 1950, and in-the period 
1970-1975 they reached total fertility ratés of less than and 
a life expectancy at birth of more than 68 years. 
In 1975, these countries had over 6k per cent of their 
population living in localities of 20,000 inhabitants and over, 
and recorded the highest economic, education and nutrition 
indexes in the region and the lowest proportion of persons 
engaged in agriculture. 
In this group of countries there is still an appreciable margin 
for the fertility and mortality to decline, especially as 
far as certain socio-economic groups are concerned. The crude 
mortality rates will drop slowly, however, and are even likely 
to increase, as may occur in Argentina and Uruguay because the 
effect of the increased life expectancy at birth will be offset 
by the greater ageing of the population. 
Consequently, the total population will continué to grow, 
though increasingly slowly in nearly all the countries of this 
group. The proportion of the population under 15 years of age 
will continue to diminish and that of persons of active age will 
remain at the present high levels or will increase. The course 
of urbanization may also be expected to continue, but at slower 
rates than in the past and, lastly, the size of the rural 
population will probably shrink in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. 
Group B: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela 
In these countries, fertility has begun to fall significantly 
in recent years. With the exception of Colombia, their total 
fertility rates had already fallen to below 5°3 in the period 
1970-1975, and life expectancy at birth is over 60 years. 
Urbanization in these countries is more recent than in the 
group A countries, but it has been very intensive in the past 
25 years. The proportion of urban population ranges from kj> to 
6k per cent, except in Costa Rica where it is somewhat less. They 




Except in Venezuela, the indexes cf economic development are 
generally lower than in the group A countries and in Mexico, 
which because of its demographic characteristics has been 
classified in group C„ The education indexes also place these 
countries in an intermediate position, except for the cases 
shown in table 5° 
The decline in fertility recorded by this group of countries 
in recent years is expected to continue in the future, and its 
effects on the population growth rate will not be compensated for 
by the fall in the mortality rate. Thus the rate of natural 
population growth will decrease substantially by the year 2000, 
while still remaining at relatively high levels, i.e., 2 to 2.5,per 
cent, according to the country. 
The average age of the population will therefore be higher, but 
the age structure, will continue to be. markedly different from 
that currently found in Argentina and Uruguay. The decrease in 
the proportion of the population aged less than 15 years and the 
expansion of. the population cf active age will, however, be 
especially significant. 
The degree of urbanization of these countries varies considerably 
and it is estimated that the process will continue more rapidly in 
those countries which today have the lowest urbanization indexes. 
By the year 2000 the degree.of urbanization may be comparable with 
and in some countries superior to that recorded by group A 
in 1975» 
The rates of growth of the urban population, which in the last 
few years have fluctuated around 5 per cent with certain differences 
between the countries, will gradually slow down, in the same way 
as the growth rate of the rural population which at present is 
just under 1.5 per cent. 
Group C includes the rest of the Latin American countries, as shovrn in 
table 5. So far these countries have shown no significant decline 
in their fertility rates. The total fertility rates for the past 
five-year period were over 5-8 or, in the majority of cases, 
/Table 12 
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Group C 
Indicators 





Group C (3) 
Bolivia 
Haiti 
Total Fertility Rate (I570-I975 )*/ 
Life expectancy at birth (1970-1975) b/ 
ila (5.9) and Haiti (5.8) 
52 to 54 years 46 to 48 years 
Per capita Gross Donostie Product (i960) . 
Per oaplta Gross Bwnestio Product (1975) 5 
¡Per oapita Gross Domestic Industrial Product (l96t 
iPer capita Gross Domestio Industrial Product (1975; 
j Percentage^of to||lgEjonomioally Aotive Population 
~ , . w — - ,, cAViepu rci-u v22) and Mexico (24) 
• 20 000 inhabitants, or more (1950) 
Percentage of the population residing in localities lt) except Peru (45) 
.20 000 inhabitants or more (1975) 
Percentage of the population residing in cities of ,t except Paraguay, Mexico and Ecuador (15) 
100 000 inhabitants or more (1950) 
Percentage of the population residing in cities of • except Peru (35) 
100 000 inhabitants or more (1975) 
Consumption of electricity (1960) iabo except Mexico (295) and Peru (260) 
Consumption of electricity (1974) ,abo except ^ ^ ( 7 1 1) ^ P e r u (477) 
Percentage of the total population with electric ligh, except Mexico (60)) 
Daily protein consumption per capita (1971-1974) ,xcept Paraguay (81), Nicaragua (74) and Mexico (66) 
Daily calorie consumption per capita (1971-1973) ies, except Paraguay (2 842), Mexico (2 732) and 
Percentage of literate persons in the population ageci 
15 or more (circa 1960) 
percentage of children aged between 7 and 13 years enaraguay (90) and the Dominican Republic (86) 
| in primary education (196O) 
¡Teachers per 10 000 inhabitants aged between 7 and 2U Paraguay (210) and Peru (205) 
Sources: The total fertility rate, life expectancy itlnates of the Economically Active Population 
employed In agriculture were taken from \s in the population aged 15 years-or more was 
taken from Rolando Franco, "Tipologia domomio and Sooial Development In latin America", 
E/CEPAL/H21, 18 Koventeer 197«. 
The figures for the Gross Domestic Predui 
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even over 6» This group may be divided into three sub-groups 
according to the mortality level: the first would include Mexico, 
Paraguay^ Ecuador, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, all of 
which have a-life expectancy of over 57 years; the second would 
comprise Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru, where this index 
ranges from 52 to 5^ years; and the third group would consist of 
Bolivia and Haiti, which have the highest mortality in 
the region with a life expectancy at birth of less than years» 
Urbanization started later in the countries of this group, 
although it accelerated over the past 25 years» Except in Peru, 
the proportion of urban population is less than kO per cent, or 
below that recorded in group B. 
Their economic indexes are the lowest in the region, with the 
significant exceptions of Peru and Mexico which in some respects 
show higher indexes than those recorded by the two previous groups» 
The education indexes are also the lowest, although here too 
there are some exceptions, as may be seen in table 5« 
As noted earlier, fertility in this group of countries has not 
shown any significant decrease. It may therefore be expected 
that the decline will gain momentum in the next few years and 
will start first in the first two sub-groups and later in 
Bolivia and Haiti. Of course, various factors could change this 
order, at least for some countries, as for example the successful 
implementation of private and government family planning programmes. 
In any case, the total fertility rate of these countries will 
probably fall, by the year 2000, to the levels currently recorded 
by group B, i.e., somewhere between k and 5« 
Moreover, the mortality rates are still very high in these 
countries, particularly in the second and third sub-group. 
Consequently, there is plently of margin for a decline. The rate 
of natural population growth will fall more* rapidly in the 
countries of the first sub-group. Nevertheless, all the countries 
of group C will have population growth rates of over 2.5 per cent 
/annually by 
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annually by the year 20000 Thsy will also have a fairly young 
age structure, but in comparison with that existing today it will 
reflect the results of an incipient process of ageing which will 
be most striking in the countries of the first sub-group. 
To sum up, the classification adopted arranges the countries in 
three broad groups which have clearly differentiated demographic 
features, and which at the same time, although vrith some important 
exceptions, have similar economic ar.d social characteristics. 
Group A includes the countries at an advanced stage of demographic 
transition, and with the highest economic and social indexes in the 
region; the second group comprises the countries which have recently 
initiated a clearly-defined stage of transition towards a decline in 
fertility, and which occupy intermediate positions in relation to the 
other indicators,and group C includes all the other countries in which 
fertility has not yet declined appreciably and which at the same time, 
with the significant exceptions of Peru and Mexico., record the lov/est 
economic and social indexes. 
(d) Population will continue to increase at relatively high rates 
over the next 25 years 
Taking the region as a whole5 it can be seen that the actual 
growth rate of the population reached its peak around the beginning 
of the 1960s and then showed signs of decreasing although the rate of 
decrease is still very sloii. This trend is likely to become sharper 
towards the end of the century, when the annual rate is expected to 
be 2.4 per cent. This would mean that on average the growth rate of 
the Latin American population is likely to be approximately 2.6 per 
cent per year over the next 25 years. 
These are the results of the studies of projections carried out 
by CELADE in collaboration with government demographers and experts 
and correspond to the so-called "xiedium hypothesis". This "medium 
hypothesis" is the one used by the CEPAL secretariat and is the basis 
of all the analyses contained in this chapter. 
/Latin America 
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Latin America would, therefore, continue to increase its share 
of the world population to approximately 10 per cent around the 
year 2000. Its growth rate will be exceeded towards the next decade 
by Africa, the continent which is experiencing similar trends to those 
recorded in Latin America so far (see table 2). 
According to this "medium hypothesis" Latin America would have, 
around the year 2000, more than 600 million inhabitants. Its 
population would be twice that of the United States and Canada together, 
and would exceed that of Europe, which in 1975 was considerably larger 
than that of Latin America. 
The population of the region as a whole would again increase over 
the next 25 years by approximately 9^ per cent, an increase slightly 
smaller than that recorded since 1950. The countries of the southern 
cone and Cuba would continue to record lower than average growth rates, 
and would see their share of the region's population fall from 12 per 
cent in 1975 to less than 9 per cent towards the end of the century. 
Brazil would have a population of more than 210 million inhabitants, 
3^ per cent of the population of the region; Mexico one of more than 
130 million inhabitants, more than one-fifth of the total population, 
thus, these two countries alone would account for 55 per cent of the 
region's population (see tables 3 and 4). The population of Argentina 
which was 7»8 per cent of the total population in 1975 would continue 
to fall in relative terms to just over 5 per cent around the year 2000. 
These projections assume that for the region as a whole the. 
total fertility rate will fall from 5.32 in 1970-1975 to 3.97 towards 
the five-year period 1995-2000, a drop of more than ?5 per cent, which 
implies a much sharper contraction than that recorded in the last 
25 years. This "medium hypothesis" also assumes that life expectancy 
at birth will increase from 61 to 70 years. 
The effect of these hypotheses on the other demographic variables 
and the rate of natural increase of the population can be inferred 
from the following figures which represent the demographic variables 
for the region as a whole. 
/1950-1955 
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1950-1955 1970-1975 1975-1980 1995-2000 
Women of child bearing 
age (per thousand 
inhabitants) 235o06 228.82 231.04 224.08 
Total fertility rate a/ 5«70 5»32 5.10 3»97 
Life expectancy a.t birth 
(one year) 52.55 Si. 49 63»51 70.04 
Crude birth rate 
(per thousand) 41.50 37.41 36.56 30.22 
Crude death rate 
(per thousand) 14.54 9.43 8.50 5.85 
Rate of natural increase 
(per thousand) 26.96 27,98 28.06 24.37 
a/ According to the "low hypothesis", the rates for the five--year 
periods 1975-1980 and 1995-2000 would be 4.75 and 3=13, 
respectively« 
Crude birth rates will fall a little less than fertility rates, 
due to among other factors, the changes which will occur in the 
population age structure. These changes will lead to an increase of 
some importance in the proportion of women of child-bearing age, and 
this will mitigate the effect the drop in the fertility rate might 
be expected to have on the crude birth rates. Furthermore, the 
decrease in fertility and birth rates will be offset partly, as in 
the past, by the continuing reduction in the crude death rates. It 
is calculated that this will fall from 9.4 to 5.9 per thousand. 
For the region as a whole, international migration is of 
relatively little importance. The region's migratory balances were 
positive in the 1950s and negative since then. These projections 
assume a net emigration of apprcKiraate.ly 70,000 persons a year for 
the entire period. 
The most significant development which is being observed at 
present, and one which will no doubt continue in the future, is the 
increase in migratory movements between neighbouring countries. 
/However, no 
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However, no forecasts were included on this aspect in the national 
population projections, since it is not easy to formulate reasonable 
working hypotheses in the conditions which prevail in Latin America« 
The hypotheses adopted, and their effect on the demographic 
variables, for each of the .20 countries studied, are grouped 
systematically in table 6« The main features of the trends by 
countries can be summarized as follows,, 
(i) It is assumed that all the countries would go through a 
process of transition towards lower fertility rates* Towards the 
year 2000 there will be no country with a crude birth rate higher than 
per thousand« The highest rates, between 35 and bO per thousand, 
will be those of Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic« Approximately half of the countries will have 
crude .birth rates.lower than 30 per thousand; 
(ii) Total fertility rates will continue to fall, as if tending 
to converge, towards a level approximating the replacement rate after 
the year 2000« In the last five-year period of this century no country 
will have a rate higher than 6, and approximately half of the countries 
will have rates lower than 
(iii) There will be a general tendency towards higher rates of life 
expectancy at birth; and the lower the present rates, the higher the 
increases will be« In 8 countries, 'comprising almost all those with the 
highest death rates, the expected gains showed in the projections is 
higher than nine years. In contrast, the k countries,.with the lowest 
death rates (Argentina, Uruguay,' Costa Rica, and Cuba) will experience, 
as is to be expected, lower increases in rates of life expectancy at 
birth, and 
(iv) These changes in life expectancy will be reflected in a 
downward trend in crude cleath rates in the large majority of the 
countries, and the higher the present death rate the more rapidly will 
this occur. In Argentina and Uruguay the death rates will increase as a 
result of the ageing of their populations which will prove a continuing 
process. This factor is already playing a part in reducing the drop in 
the death ratie in Chile and Cuba and more recently in Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, and Panama. 
/Table 12 
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Tails )1X»Ö 
LATIN AMERICA (TWENTY C0Ufl,'HIES)s '..(ili: DEMOGRAPHIC RATHS ACCORDINO TO THE RECOMMENDED 
MEDIUM HWOTKESSS OP THE Ci IL AC E PROJECTIONS, 1950-2000 
J.S5&- 1 9 / 0 - 1975- I995-
1955 I575 1980 2000 
Gl'oup A 
Argentina 
Women-of ohlld-bearlng age (per thcueand lEfca'al'Sants) 259«90 246.J1 243.43 248.96 
Total fertility rate , ' ,2,18 ,2e?| 2»3f 
Life expectancy at birth 62,72 68,|9 70.71 
Crude birth rate :>5°3§ 21.«Q 2 1 1 7 
Crude mortali^ rate 9.1,(5 S-7& 6.«9 ? 
Maturai.rate of growth lé»22 13«u4 12o54 7 
Chile 
Women of ohild-bearing age (per thousand ìràabltan^s) 2-0.57 245,09 . .. 253*92 £60.63 
Total fertility rate 4.80 3^5 '3 «47 2.74 
Life expectancy at birth 54.1? °2.§6 64.40 70.^9 
Crude birth rate 
Natural rate of growth 
3 5 4 Ì 2 7 . 8 7 2 7 . 6 4 2 1 . 7 
Crude mortality* rate 9-16 8.61 6.92 
21.58 18.71 19*03 14*87 
Cuba 
fertility rate < — •- . . . 
Life expeotanoy at birth, 58.82 66.53 67.86 72.37 
Crude birth rata 40.« 36.08 35.32 29.20 
Crude mortality rat© 12*42 
Natural 
Women of ohild-bearing &se (per thousand Inhabitants) 223*87 221.10 23O.78 253»47 
Total fertility rate 6.54 5.28 4.88 3 .28 
Life expeotanoy at birth 54.20 64.74 66 M 72.26 
Crude birth rate - 46.46 . 36 .06 35.64 26.41 
Crude mortality rate I 3 . 3 8 7 . 0 1 6.48 4.06 
Natural rate of growth 33*08 29.05 : 29*16 21»55 
ni 
¥omen of child-bearing age (per thousand tahebltanlis) 243.32 225.07 229.85 248.53 
Total fertility i«te 4.10 4.03 3«?0 2.87 
Life expeotanoy at birth 38 „81 69,75 70,40 • 72.95 
Crude birth rate 50,26 29-13 27-76 22.75 
Crude mortality rate 10„52 6.60 6.74 6.42 
Natural rate of growth 19*/4 22.53 21.02 16.33 
Opugusy 
' Women of oh lid-bearing ag© (per thousand inhabitants) 257*40 241.48 238.36 244.25 
Totel fertility rate 2 .89 2.95 2.85 2.44 
Life expeottrov at birth 66.29 69.78 70*24 71*97 
Crude birth rate 23.16 20.63 20.13 17-99 
Crude mortalivy rate 9*§4 9.26 9.49 9.74 
Natural rate of growth I3 .62 11*37 1°*°4 8*25 
Group B_ 
Brazil 
Women of ohild-bearing aga (per thousand Inhabitants} 235*19 234.02 235*62 247.88 
Total fertility rate <?.70 5*15 ,4.89 3 .83 
Life expectanoy at birth 54.15 61.39 63.64 71*14 
Crude birch rate 41,42 37*12 36.04 29.44 
Cruda mortality rate 2,2.16 8.77 7.82 5.25 
Natural rate of growth 29*26 28.35 20.22 24.19 
Colombia' 
Women of ohild-bearing age (per t.houaaac. in'.iabltents) 226.06 223*53 227-83 253*77 
Total fertility rate ¿.56 ,5-88 5.36 3*28 
Life enneatanoy at birth 5Q.21 60.91 63 .36 73*?1 
Crude birth rats 46.44 40-61 30.33 26.87 
Crude mortality rate 16.31 7*4? 3*8? 
Natural rate of growth 30.13 31*82 30.84 22.9» 
women of ohild-bearing age (pep thoueasci lahabitf.nta). 222.49 228.68 242.04 258.40 
Total fertility rate 6.77 4.6| 4.0| 3*22 
Life expectancy at birth 58*24 68.18 70 .23 73*78 
Crude birth rate - 47.56 33*44 32.38 26.36 
Crude mortality rate 11.8? 5*89 5»lg 4.43 
Natural rate of growth 35.67 27.55 27.28 2l»93 
Panama 
Women of child-bearing age (par thoueonc. inhebitanbs) 221.02 218.12 223.67 239»72 
Total 5*61 5-06 4.80 3»7p 
. 9 7.14 6.61 5.19 
rate of growth 27*86 28.94 28.71 24.01 
/ T a b l e 10 ( c o n c l u d e d ) 
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(pop thousand Inhabitants) 
(per thousand Inhabitants) 
Group C (1) 
Ecuador 
Women of child-bearing age (per -thousand inhabitants) 
Total fertility rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
El Salvador 
"Woman of child-bearing age (per thousand inhabitants) 
Total fertility rate 
Life expec-ianoy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
Mexloo 
""Women of child-bearing age (per thousand inhabitants) 
Total fertility rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Crude birth tata 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
Paraguay 
Women of child-bearing age (per thousand inhabitants) 
Total fertility rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
Dominican Repnbl?o 
Women of ohi3Shearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Crude birth t-i-e Crude mortality rate 
MsLtural rate of growth 
Group C (2) 
• Honduras 
Women of child-bearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life exps3t=n<iy at birth 
Crude birch rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Katural rate of growth 
Gta.tame.la 
Icaen of child-bearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life expoo+ancy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
Nicaragua 
Women of child-bearing ago 
Total fertility rate 
Life expsotanoy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of grovrth 
Peru 
Tfoiaen of ohild-bearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
Natural rate of growth 
Group C (3) 
Bolivia 
Women of ohild-bearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life expeotanoy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
fiatural rate of growth 
Haiti 
Women of ohild-bearing age 
Total fertility rate 
Life expeotanoy at birth 
Crude birth rate 
Crude mortality rate 
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(e) Projections on the urban and rural population 
The process of urbanization of the population in Latin America 
was very intense in terses of the large numbers which changed their 
area of residence, and ia comparison with that recorded in other 
developing areas» 
Localities of 20 thousand and nore inhabitants saw their 
populations increase from slightly more than kO million in 1950 to 
lk2 million in 1975, thereby absorbing 65 per cent of the total 
population growth of the region during that period. See tables 7,8 and 9« 
The annual growth rate of the urban population was higher than 
5 per cent in 13 countries. Only in Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba was 
the urban growth rate relatively low, approximately 3 per cent per year 
or less. These rates snow a downward trend for the region as a whole 
and for most of the countries, and these trends are likely to continue 
in the future. Only in a few countries, those which show a relatively 
low degree of urbanizations are there signs that the growth rate of the 
urban population is on the increase. 
Between 1950 and 1975 the rv.ral population of Latin America 
increased at an average annual rate of 1.6 per cent. This increase 
was very high, more than 2»5 per cent per year in Costa Rica, El Salvador 
Guatemala and Honduras» In 9 other countries the rate was lower but 
was more than 1.5 per cent; in the 7 remaining countries the growth 
rate was markedly low or the absolute levels of the rural population 
fell as in Argentina, and mora recently in Chile and Venezuela. In 
sum, the general tendency is that this rate tends to fall. 
As a result of these trends, the proportion of the population 
residing in benefits of 20 thousand or aore inhabitants has been 
increasing in all countries. For the region as a whole, the degree 
of urbanization increased from aproximately 26 per cent in 1950 to 
45 per cent in 1975« Table 8 shows the wide variety of situations 
and trends common to the countries under study. 
/ T a b l e 7 
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Table IX1-7 
LATIN AMERICA (TWENTY COUNTRIES)! ESTIMATES OF TOTAL, URBAKS/ 
AND RURAL POPULATION, I95O AND 1975 





Urban population Most 
Country Year Total 20 000- 100 000 populated 
99 999 or more cHy 
Argentina 1950 17 150 8 I63 8 987 1 438 7 5'+9 5 ^91 
1575 25 3$4 7 666 17 718 3 012 14 706 9 391 
Bolivia 1950 3 019 2 433 586 287 299 299 
1975 5 410 3 819 1 591 286 1 305 842 
Brasil 1950 52 901 42 162 10 739 3 69^ 7 045 k 353*/ 
1975 109 730 60 351 49 379 13 777 35 602 11 247b/ 
Colombia 1950 11 689 9 106 2 583 870 1 713 695 
1975 25 890 13 515 12 375 2 760 9 615 3 ^ 53 
Chile 1950 6 091 3 600 2 491 815 1 676 1 345 
1975 10 253 3 »+76 6 777 1 972 4 805 3 422 
Eouador 1950 3 224 2 650 574 105 469 4690/ 
I975 7 090 ^ 5^5 2 5^5 873 1 672 1 555c/ 
Paraguay 1950 1 371 1 163 208 208 208 
1975 2 647 2 033 614 179 435 435 
Peru 1950 7 832 6 l4o • 1 692 633 1 059 936 
1975 15 689 8 C92 6 997 1 434 5 563 3 666 
Uruguay 1950 2 194 1 029 1 165 280 885 885 
1975 3 111 1 098 2 013 628 1 385 1 385 
Venezuela 1950 5 145 3 550 1 595 74o 855 506 
1975 12 213 4 433 7 780 2 116 5 664 1 105 
Costa Risa 1950 866 713 153 153 153 
1975 1 994 1 444 550 163 387 387 
Cuba 1950 5 752 3 727 2 025 686 1 339 1 073 
1975 9 481 5 167 4 314 1 087 3 227 1 997 
El Salvador 1950 1 940 1 688 252 82 170 170 
1975 4 143 3 248 895 519 376 376 
Guatemala 1950 3 054 2 712 342 30 312 312 
1975 6 082 5 091 991 163 828 828 
ifelti 195« 3 380 3 208 172 26 146 146 
1975 5 888 5 034 854 168 686 686 
Honduras 1950 1 390 1 295 95 95 72 
1975 3 037 2 396 641 2V5 496 319 
Mexico 1950 26 606 20 327 6 279 2 242 4 037 2 953 
1975 59 204 36 292 22 912 7 401 15 511 11 039 
Nicaragua 1950 1 109 94 0 169 115 115 
1975 2 318 1 502 816 263 553 553 
Panama 1950 809 628 181 52 129 129 
1975 1 676 957 719 165 554 554 
Bominloan 
Republic 1950 2 313 2 056 257 61 196 196 
1975 5 118 3 229 1 889 555 1 334 948 
Total (twenty 
countries) 1950 - 157 835 117 290 4o 545 12 190 28 355 30 506 1975 316 358 173 988 142 370 37 666 lo4 704 54 188 
a/ The urban population Is defined as that of agglomerations with 20 000 inhabitans or- more, 
b/ Río de Janeiro plus SSo Paulo» 
e/ fluito plus Guayaquil. /Table 8 
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Paole 
LATIN AMEBICA (TWENTY COUNTRIES)« IMDIC3S 0? OTAECZMIOJi AUD UfoBAN CONCENTOATIOH, 1950 AND 1975 
Country ïear 
Percentage of -he total peculation 
rasldiag te diJT&rîïï'^crtegoriea-of 
erbai exeas 
Percentage of the urban 
population residing in 

















Argentina 1950 52.4 44.0 32.0 e 4.0 6 1 . 1 
1975 &9.8 57.9 37.0 83.0 53.0 
Bolivia 1950 19.4 9.9 51.0 51.0 1975 29.it 24.1 15.6 62.0 52.9 
Brazil 1950 20.3 13.3 8.2a / 65.6 40.5a/ 
1975 45.C 32.5 10.35/ 72.1 22.85/ 
Colombia 1950 22.* I4i7 6 . 0 " 66.3 2 6 . 9 " 
1975 47.3 37.1 13.3 77.7 27.9 
Chile 1950 to. 9 27.5 2 2 . 1 67.3 54.0 
1975 66.' 46=9 33.4 70.9 50.5 
Ecuador 1950 17oQ 14.6 14.6b/ 81.7 81.7b/ 
1975 35.9 23.6 2 1 . 9 b / ' 65.7 6 1 . 1 b / 
Paraguay 1950 15.2 15.2 15.2 100.0 100.0 
1975 23.2 1&.4 16.4 70.9 70.8 
Peru 1950 21.5 13.5 1 2 . 0 62.6 55.3 
1975 A4. 5 35.5 23.4 79.5 52.4 
Uruguay 1950 53.1 40.3 40.3 76.0 76.0 
1975 64.7 44.5 44.5 66.8 68.8 
Venezuela 1950 31 oO 1'o«6 9.6 53.6 31.7 
1975 63.7 46.4 9.1 72.8 14.2 
Costa Kica 1950 17.7 17.7 17.7 100.0 100.0 
1975 2 7 o 6 19.4 19.4 70. k 70.4 
Cuba 1950 35-2 23.3 18.7 660I 53.0 
1975 45.5 34.0 21.1 74.8 46.3 
El Salvador 1950 13.0 8.8 8.8 67.5 67.5 
1975 21o6 9.1 9.1 42.0 42.0 
Guatemala 1950 11.2 10.2 10.2 91.2 91.2 
\ 1975 1&.3 13.6 13.6 83.6 83.6 
Haiti 1950 5.1 4.S 4.3 84„9 84.9 
1975 14. 5 11.7 11.7 80.3 80.3 
Honduras 1950 6.8 « 5.2 - 75.8 
1975 21.1 1t».3 10.5 77.4 49.8 
Mexico 1950 2 3 . 6 15=3 1 1 . 1 64.3 47.0 
1975 36.7 2 6 . 2 18.7 67.7 48.2 
Nicaragua 1950 15.2 10.4 10.4 68.1 68.1 
1975 35.2 23.9 23.9 67.8 67.8 
Panama 1950 2 2 . ' + 16.0 1 6.O 71.3 71.3 
1975 42.9 33.1 33.1 77.1 77.1 
Dominican Republic 1950 11.1 8.5 8.5 76,2 76.2 
1975 36.9 2 6 o 1 18.5 70.6 50.2 
Total (twenty countries) 1950 2 5 . 7 I80O 13.0 69.9 50.6 
1975 4 5 . C 33.1 17.1 73.6 38.1 
Source; Table III-?» 
a/ Rio de Janeiro plus Sâo Paulo» 
b/ Quito plus Guayaquil* 
/Table 12 
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Table III-9 
LATIN AMERICA (TWENTY COUNTRIES): GROWTH RATES OP TOTAL, 
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In all Latin American courtriea cities of 100 thousand or more 
inhabitants have groivn rapidly, and a growing proportion of the total 
population is concentrated in them» It is estimated that in 1975» 
lk countries had more than 20 per cant of their population residing in 
such urban agglomerations and that i:a 9 of them that proportion was 
higher than 30 per cent» Moreover, in most countries, between 70 and 
80 per cent of the urban population resides.in such cities. 
It is not easy to formulate projections on trends in the urban 
and rural population in Latin American countries. The necessary 
information is lacking. Knowledge ca the interrelations among 
demographic and socio-economic variables is scarce and the interrelations 
are much too complex to be translated into working hypotheses for 
establishing meaningful and reasonable assumptions. Nevertheless, in 
order.to satisfy the main aim of providing a few approximations on the 
distribution of the population and migratory flows several projections 
were made. Table 10 groups ths preliminary results of one of those 
projections which it seemed worthwhile to prepare in advance for the 
limited purposes mentioned above. 
In these analyses the definition cf the urban population adopted 
is the one most frequently used fcr censuses in the countries. In 
general terms this definition corresponds to localities of 2,000 or 
more inhabitants. 
According to these projections, for the twenty countries studied 
as a whole, the urban population would increase from 19*+ million 
inhabitants in 1975 to more than ;v60 million around the year 2000. 
At the same time, the rural population is expected to increase very 
little, by approximately 25 per cent. Therefore, the urban areas would 
absorb approximately 90 per cent of the total growth of the population. 
Migration flows would play a very important role in this process. 
During the next 25 years about 86 million persons of rural origin are 
likely to become urban residents and, if their children are also 
counted, the total effect of rural migration could be estimated at some 




UTIN AMERICA "(TWENTY COUNTRIES): HIOJECTIOTS OF URBAN AND 
RURAL POPULATION. BY COUNTRIES, 1J75 AND 2000 . 
(Thousands) 
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Table IIX-10 (concluded) 
Country 15'75 2000 
Haiti 
Total 5 638 . 10 742 
Urban 1 331 3 799 
Rural 4.557 , 6 943 
Urban percentage 22.6 35.4 
Honduras 
Total 3 037 6 681 
Urban I 117 3 607 
Rural 1 ?20 3 274 
Urban percentage 36.8 52.4 
Mexico 
Total ;59 m 
T( l'0§ Urban 105 544 
Rural 22 078 29 319 
Urban percentage 62.9 78.3 
Nicaragua 
2 342 5 343 Total 
Urban 1 205 3 665 
Rural 3. -37 1 678 
Urban percentage 51.4 68,6 
Panama 
Total - 3 312 Urban 366 2 199 Rural S19 1 113 
Urban percentage 51.5 66.4 
Dominican Repiblic 
Total 5 175 12 205 
Urban 2 268 7 534 
Rural 2 907 4 671 
Urban percentage 43.8 61.7 
Total (twenty countries) 
Total 316 989 616 793 
Urban »53 833 463 009 
Rural :,23 156 153 784 
Urban percentage 61.1, 75.1 
Mote Is The urban population Is the populati.cn so defined in each country. Broad-
ly speaking,tha results a?e very similar to those which would be obtained 
by defining the urban population as comprizing the residents of 
localities of 2 000 israabitants or more. 
Note 2; The figures im, this ta.bla differ Bli^rtly from those of total population 
in table 3 because here international migration was assumed to be nil 
after 1970. They also differ slightly ;rron) the projections of urban and 
rural population in fee Bolstin Demografioo del CELADE, ano IX, M° 18, 
booauEie, in addition to ths at so.option of no international migration, 
they were produced by the components method, ^ rith hypothesis about levels 
and rates of urban and rural fertility and rural-urban migration vhioh 
led to results similar," to thone of the projections in the Boletln M° 18» 
/This intense 
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This intense process of urbanization would operate in all the 
countries, along with a declining trend in the rates of rural growth« 
In this respect it should be noted that the absolute levels of rural 
population are already falling in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and 
that the same will occur in Venezuela towards the end of the next 
decade and in Colombia before the end of the century, 
(f) The extraordinary increase in the population of active age 
As a .result of the high rates of fertility and the rapid decline 
in mortality the proportion of the population aged under 15 was tending 
to rise by 1970, and at the same time the proportion of the population 
of between 15 and 6^1- years of age was declining to some extent. The 
latter group represented 56 per cent of the total population in 1950» 
and now constitutes 5^ per cent. 
These trends will change markedly over the next 25 years; the 
population of active age will increase, and the proportion of young 
people will decline. The first group-will increase from 5*+ per cent 
to 58 per cent of the total by the end of the century, and the under-15 
age group will decline from ^2.1 per cent in 1975 to 38 per cent at 
the end of the same period. 
These changes in the age structure of the population will be 
recorded in nearly all the countries as is shown by the figures in 
table 11; this will have immediate consequences in the form of an 
extraordinary increase in the population of active age. 
For the group of 20 countries considered the population of active 
age groups will increase from 171 million to over 353 million inhabitants 
during the next 25 years. This means that it will increase at an average 
rate of 2.9 per cent a year, with greater dynamism than in the past and 
also greater intensity than the total population. 
This demographic explosion in the active age groups depends 
mainly on the age structure of the current population and the fall in 
the rate of mortality, and to a lesser extent on the changes which may 
occur in the hypotheses on the decline of fertility which have been 
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Various projections of the economically active population have 
been formulated» The rates of participation of the population in 
economic activity have been established on the basis of information 
derived from censuses in accordance with various hypotheses«. In these 
the following aspects are noteworthy because of their particular 
influence on the results of the projection: (i) that the rates of 
participation of the urban population by age groups were projected 
in a linear manner assuming that by the year 2020 these rates will 
reach the corresponding amounts recorded in thé United States in I960 
and (ii) that the rates of participation of the rural population in 
the year 2000 will be similar to those currently recorded in the urban 
population. Other alternatives have also been used, of course, but we 
have preferred here to present the projections corresponding to the 
hypotheses mentioned because they illustrate more clearly the magnitude 
and nature of the changes which may occur in the economically active 
population. 
According to these projections, which are assembled in tables 
12 and 13, the economically active population of the group of 20 countries 
studied will increase by more than 100 per cent between 1975 and the 
year 2000, which represents an average rate of more than. 3 per cent a 
year, so that the economically active population would have much 
greater dynamism than the total population. 
The evolution would vary considerably from one country to another. 
Thus while in Mexico and Nicaragua the economically active population 
would increase by around l60 per cent, in Argentina and Uruguay it 
would increase by barely 35 per cent (see table 13). 
It should be noted that the assumptions made concerning the 
increase in the rate of participation by women have a special influence 
on these results. The projections show that while the male economically 
active population will increase at an average rate of 2.8 per cent a 
year in the group of 20 countries studied, the female population would 
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Source» Projections prepared taking into account the total, urban and rural population of table III-10 broken down by 
age and sex» Rates of participation in economic activity by age and sex were estimated for the urban and 
rural population in 1970® Urban rates were projected linearly, assuming that in 2020 then would reach 
the corresponding age and box rats® cf tha Unit 3d States in i960. The rural rates wore projected 
linearly to reach in the year 2Û00 the levels reoopdeâ in urban areas In I970. 
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Table 111-13 
LATIN AMERICA (TWENTY COUNTRIES)s RELATIVE GROWTH OF THE TOTAL, URBAN AMD RURAL 
POPULATION AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1975-2000 
Population Economically active population Country • . . • , -
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Men Women 
Argentina 28.56 41.56 -26.02 35.58 49.07 -24.02 28.79 55.80 
Bolivia 93.25 151.47 58.74 96.12 156.36 55° 87 85.02 140.96 
Brazil 93.66 146.28 14.30 118.91 178.69 20.95 101.27 178«74 
Colombia 98.78 148.70 12.37 138.97 197.99 35.00 124.02 187.11 
Chile 54=84 76.09 -21.67 80.6? 105.74 -12.09 68.53 119.89 
Ecuador 108.36 168.89 64.08 142.68 223.26 83.38 116.05 269.42 
Paraguay 109.01 181.35 59.39 137.70 195.52 88. 32 110.72 237.91 
Peru 106.19 155.69 25.92 132.30 185.88 35.89 113.73 199»13 
Uruguay 27.28 37.50 -31.44 35.69 49.21 -33.72 28.45 57.61 
Venezuela 92.84 124.02 -3.83 138.86 173.49 19.64 123.03 190.75 
Costa Rica 85.34 148.30 38.91 119.40 184.38 65.93 92.67 238.47 
Cuba 60.88 90.32 11.77 97.60 129 <=10 36.65 78..14 181.01 
El Salvador 115.27 186.21 61.22 118.76 191-84 60.64 109.53 140.94 
Guatemala 97.17 159.95 61.05 121.54 186.74 79°?5 90.96 301.64 
Haiti 82.43 185.41 52.35 101.87 207.93 70.17 77.54 234.36 
Honduras 126.57 222.98 70.49 144.83 232.40 90.01 121.26 245.37 
Mexico 126.72 182.17 32.79 161.46 220.51 51.21 139»78 244.87 
Nicaragua 128.13 204.24 47.52 165.57 254.86 66.95 136.62 267.05 
Panama 96.52 153.85 35.88 114.71 162.50 56.29 98.47 . 158.32 
Dominican 
Republic 135.84 232.16 60.69 144.01 246.81 64.70 133.40 175.11 
Total (twenty 




2„ Overall macreeeonctiic projections for the 
noa-oll-exporting countries 
(a) Background and objectives of macroeqonomic projections 
ihe balance of payments and external indebtedness position 
recorded by the non-oil-exporting countries in the mid-1970s compelled 
them to introduce some adjustment3 in their policies which abruptly 
slowed the growth rate in 1975 and permitted only a moderate recovery 
in 1976. The external variables which had stimulated growth at the 
beginning of the 1970s, and particularly in the two years 1972-1973, 
once again became a curb on growth* With the purpose of illustrating 
the relationship between imports, exports and external finance and 
long-term economic growth, two exercises in projections for the non-
oil -exporting countries covering the pariod 1976-1990 have been 
prepared« 
Statistical figures and projections have been prepared for 
each of the 13 countries considered.2/ Obviously, the situation and 
prospects differ from country to country, but the majority are 
affected in differing degrees by similar balance of payments and 
external indebtedness problems. The results are presented for the 
whole group of countries ia aggregate form in tables 14 and 15. 
Owing to the difference in economic and demographic size between 
them, the absolute figures and coefficients are strongly influenced 
by the larger countries, particularly Brazil. 
These projections cannot but give special attention to the 
present situation, since the effects of cumulative indebtedness will 
make themselves felt for a long time. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the balance-of-payments position of these countries in 1975, 
which is noted for the following features: 
2/ Argentina, Brazil, Central America, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay and Peru. 
/Table 10 
Table 111-14 
NON-OIL-EXPORTIMG COUNTRIES (13 COUNTRIES)^: GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 






































Values in millions of dollars at 1970 prices 
1950 46 212 7 718 39 086 5 668 6 260 1 571 979 661 -318 8 036 47 783 
1970 132 971 26 584 106 945 13 395 13 953 - -558 1 866 2 424 24 610 132 971 
1975 179 111 41 054 142 237 16 272 20 452 -694 -4 874 3 459 8 333 32 721 178 41? 
1980 238 024 47 432 191 318 22 131 22 857 -1 208 -1 934 4 979 6 913 40 519 236 816 
1990 424 355 85 945 335 311 44 672" 41 573 -2 268 831 8 397 7 566 78 378 422 08? 
Coeficients with respect to the gross domestic product, per cent 
1950 100.0 16.7 84.6 12.3 13.6 3.4 2.1 1.4 -0.7 17=4 103=4 
1970 100.0 20o0 80.4 10.1 10.5 - - -0.4 1.4 1.8 18=2 100.0 
1975 100.0 22.9 79»4 9.1 11,4 -0.4 -2.7 1=9 4.6 18.3 99»6 
1980 100.0 19=9 80.4 9.3 9.6 -0.5 -0.8 2.1 2=9 17.0 99=5 
1990 100.0 20.3 79.0 10=5 9=8 -0.5 0.2 2.0 1=8 18.5 99-5 
Annual growth rates, per cent 
1950-1970 5.4 6.4 5=2 4.4 4.1 - - 5=3 - 5.7 5=3 
1970-1975 6=1 9.1 6.0 2.5 8.0 - - 13.1 - . 6.3 6=1 
1975-1980 5.9 2.9 6.1 6.3 2=3 - - 7=6 - 4.4 5.8 
1980-1990 6.0 6.1 5.8 7.3 6=2 - - 5.4 - 6.8 5«9 
1975-1990 5o9 5.0 5.9 7=0 4.8 - - 6.1 - 6.0 5=9 
Source: CEPAL» 
a/ Argentina, Brazil, Central America, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. 
^ Jb/ Including private transfer payments« 
hB ~ S» or-M <D 
H vn 
Table 111-15 
N® =OIL-£X3PORTIN(J COUNTRIES (13 COUNTRIES ) S / j ffiOWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OP THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Hypothesis: Moderate acceleration of growth of the gross domestic produot 
Net 
Total 
Exports Imports payments 
Net Gross Gross AP rmnfl B „ , Terms-A^  #vA rt/1 O <PlM|4 A of Gross Gross 





and „_ t 
1 rune 
balance profits external national domestio 
produot Investment tion services 
effect 
services - and • financing saving income 
interest 
V 
Values in millions of dollars at 1970 prices 
.1950 46 212 7 718 39 086 5 668 6 260 1 571 979 661 -313 8 036 47 783 
1970 132 97! 26 584 106 945 13 395 13 953 -558 1 866 2 424 24 160 132 971 
1975 179 an >£. 054 2,42 237 16 272 20 452 «694 - 4 874 3 459 8 333 32 721 178 4l7 
1980 240 187 52 378 108 536 22 592 23 319 252 -1 980 4 915 6 895 
C!\ co iC 1 238 935 
1990 504 070 121 3 / 4 3u2 217 50 476 49 997 -3 46i -2 982 9 078 12 060 109 314 500 609 
Coefi'ioienis wiiii ¿-ospcot to the 
1950 100,0 16.7 84.6 12.3 13.6 3 ,4 0 .-«A 1 , 4 - 0 . 7 1 7 . 4 103 s4 
1970 100,0 20.0 80.4 10.1 10.5 ; - 0 , 4 1 .4 1 . 8 l8»2 IOOoO 
1975 100.0 22,9 79.4 9-1 1.1 «4 >0,4 - 2 «7 1 .9 4 .6 18,3 99.6 
1980 100.0 21,8 76.5 9 . 4 3#7 - 0 . 5 -0.8 2,0 2,9 l8«9 99S 
I990 100.0 24.1 75.8 10.0 9.9 - 0 . 7 -0,6 1 , 8 2 . 4 a .7 99.3 
- Annual growth rates, per cent 
1950-1970 5 .4 6 . 4 5 .2 4 .4 4.1 - 5.3 - 5.7 5 .3 
1970-1975 6,1 9.1 6,0 2.5 8,0 - 13.1 - 6 .3 6,1 
1975-1980 6.0 5.0 5.8 6 . 8 2.7 - 7 . 3 - 6 ,8 6.0 
1980-1990 7 .7 8 .8 7.3 8 .4 7.9 6 .3 - 9.2 7.7 
1975-1990 7.1 7 .5 6 . 8 7 .8 5.2 - 6,6 - 8 ,4 7 .1 
Source: CEPAL, 
a / Argentina, Brazil, Central America, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru* 
b / Including net private transfer payments. 
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(i) Indebtedness had reached a high level for most countries, 
and totalled 67,000 million dollars, which was over 20 per cent of 
the gross domestic product (both valued in dollars at 1970 prices) 
and more than doubled the purchasing power of exports. Both these 
proportions are substantially higher than those recorded in 1970; 
(ii) Debt servicing in 1975 absorbed MD per cent of the 
purchasing power of exports of goods and services, which is much 
more than in 1970 (30 per cent) and seriously jeopardized this group 
of countries' capacity to import. 
(iii) The 1970s showed, on average, two trends which gradually 
affected the long-term stability of the balance of payments. On the 
one hand, imports showed extraordinary dynamism, increasing at much 
higher rates than the product (8 per cent and 6.1 per cent, 
respectively). On the other hand, the volume of exports rose at 
relatively low rates, except in the years 1972-1973- When the terms 
of trade deteriorated towards the mid-1970s, the trade balance became 
distinctly negative, and in 1975 it absorbed about ^0 per cent of 
the value of exports. 
(iv) Net external financing needs increased at an accelerated 
pace as a result of the trade and indebtedness trends. In 1975 these 
requirements represented 5k per cent of the purchasing power of 
exports and per cent of the product, which can be more fully 
appreciated if it is recalled that in 1970 the respective proportions 
had been 18 and 1.8 per cent. 
The ultimate consequences of a process of this kind are clear. 
In the first place, current export earnings will be seriously 
committed for a long time by service payments on the external debt, 
and substantial financing will be required to assure certain import 
levels, quite apart from the fact that in many cases it will also 
be necessary to raise international monetary reserves. Secondly, 
such an unhealthy external position may impede the inflow of 
external financing and make it more difficult to solve the balance-
of-payments problem, even though imports may decline and economic 
growth may be slow, thus dangerously aggravating the social tensions 
that dominate the Latin American scene. 
/It may 
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It may therefore be asked under what conditions could the non-
oil-exporting countries recover their lo.ag-term economic dynamism 
and continue with a fairly open structure in their relations with 
other countries, while persisting in the course that has 
characterized their development si ace the end of the last decade; 
also what kind of adjustments should they introduce in the medium 
term to solve their balance-of-payments problems, while at the same 
time maintaining a certain rate of economic growth» The projects 
that have been prepared are intended to analyse these aspects and 
to illustrate alternative or complementary solutions which might 
be considered in very general terms. It is stressed that the 
figures for the period 1975-1980 must be considered within the 
context of the projections exerciue and are by no means in the 
nature of predictions or forecasts. 
(b) Basic assumptions and preliminary results 
The main characteristics of these projections are resumed 
below. 
In the circumstances described above, it was decided to evaluate, 
for two hypotheses of growth of the product, what the export 
requirements would be if it were desired to make a substantial 
reduction in the relative magnitude of debt servicing and net 
external financing, in such a way that the situation in this respect 
ia 1990 would be more like tfcat of 1970 than that of 1975-
Goals for the growth of the gross product in relation to the 
two alternatives were established for each of the countries. In the 
first it is proposed that the trend recorded over the last 25 years 
is maintained, which means an average annual rate of 6 per cent for 
the group of non-petroleum exporting countries. This rate is somewhat 
higher than the past rate becausa of the above-average values 
recorded in various countries, basically in Brazil which has 
increased and will continue to increase its share in the regional 
product. In the second alternative a moderate acceleration in the 
growth rates is established. It is; assumed that during the rest of 
/the decade 
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the decade the past growth rate would be recovered, overcoming the 
decline of 1975' and the slow recovery of 1976. During the 1980s 
the rate would accelerate to more than 7 per cent. Thus in the 
period 1975-1990 there would be an average rate of 7.1 per cent a . 
year (see tables Ik and 15). 
The projections on the evolution of import prices have been 
made on the assumption of a certain degree of deceleration in world . 
inflation. In these exercises it.is postulated that the average 
index of import prices will at first rise to 6 per cent a year, and 
then fall to 5 per Cent and'k per cent. It is also assumed.that 
the terms bf trade \irill remain approximately at the 1976 levelj 
which means that throughout the period they vrould be below the ratio, 
recorded in 1970. That is why the projections continue to record' 
a negative balance of the terms of trade. • . ' 
Imports were generally projected as a function of demand:, • 
distinguishing bëtween imports of capital goods, which are determined 
through invfestmeht, and other imports, which are made to depend, oñ 
the product. In some cases adjustments were made, especially for 
the period 1975-1980, in order to take into account national 
programmes already decided on or in progress relating to 
industrialization and imports substitution and other aspects which < 
would justify an alteration in the past ratios. The projections > . 
show a reduction in thé imports coefficient compared to the gross 
domestic product of 11. if'per cent in 1975 at values close to 10 per 
cent in 1990 in the two alternatives of growth, assuming in both 
cases that the efforts of reduction would materialize during the 
period 1975-1980. The investment needed if the economic growth 
postulâted is to materialize depends on the increases of the product. 
The product-capital coèfficient has been estimated for each of the 
countries on the basis of past information on the growth rate of 
the product and investment coefficient,-and a functional relation 
has been established to determiné the capital requirements on the 
basis of the growth- rates postulated.' ' . : 
/The financing 
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The financing conditions havs been fixed taking into account 
the experience of recent years. The assumptions made mean that 
approximately 85 per cent:of gross inflows of capital will be 
constituted by loans ard 15 per cent by direct investment of foreign 
capital. The amortization aad interest of the loans are adjusted 
on general lines to the amortisation programmes envisaged for the 
current debt of each country. An amortization term of eight years 
with 7 per cent annual interest it! taken as a rough average. The 
rate of profit on foreign capital was fixed at 10 per cent. 
It was attempted to establish the levels of net external 
financing so that in both alternatives its coefficient in respect to 
the product of under boS per cent in 1975 was reduced. In the 
projection of trends it is reduced to 1.8 per cent in 1990 - i.e., 
to the 1970 level - and in that of the acceleration of the growth 
rates to 2*b per cent. 
The ratio for around 1980 is 2.9 per cent in both cases. The 
smaller reduction suggested in the second case is based t>n the idea 
that exaggerated export gross rates should not be used. Accordingly, 
the relative size of the debt compared with the product at the end 
of the period under study raflects levels similar to those of 1970, r 
and the ratios of debt servicing to the current value of exports 
follow a somewhat similar patterr. 
On the basis of the hypotheses outlined above a series of 
results is obtained which show the tread of the main blance-of-
payment figures and the need for national action. 
Export needs are rather high. la the alternative based on past 
trends they would have to be expanded at an average annual rate of 
7 per cent if the targets set ara to be achieved. The moderate 
upswing in the growth of the product would mean raising this rate 
to 7.8 per cent. In both cases the growth rate of exports increases 
gradually and in the 1980s the- respective rates are 7*3 and 8.b per 
cent per year. (See tablea lb and 15.) 
Apart from this, it should be pointed out that these rates 
could be even higher if tfc.3 terms of trade were to deteriorate compared 
with 1976, and were not constant as assumed in both cases. 
/The high 
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The high export needs are explained by the needs to pay for 
services which stem largely from present debt levels- In these . 
circumstances the relative reduction in net external financing 
assumed is translated into the need to reduce the deficit in the 
trade balance. Thus, in the alternative based on past trends the 
trade deficit is considerably smaller in 1980, and there is a 
positive balance in 1990. In the other alternative it also falls 
gradually, but shows no surplus in 1990. 
As regards national efforts to finance capital accumulation, 
the levels required in both exercises seem attainable without too 
great an effort. In fact, the gross national savings ratio is 
constant at present levels in the alternative trend. In contrast, 
in the second alternative it increases from 18.3 per cent in 1975 
to 18.9 in 1980 and to 21.7 per cent in 1990. 
(c) Some conclusions on the problems of the balance of payments 
The evaluation of the balance-of-payments problems and the 
projection exercises call for some conclusions which must necessarily 
be general ones in view of the degree of abstraction, for reasons 
of simplification, of the analysis. Inter alia, attention should 
be drawn to the following aspects: 
(i) The high level of already accumulated external debt and 
the burden of debt servicing, which will increase considerably, 
constitute on their own a serious problem on account of their 
impact on the balance of payments in the short-term and medium-term 
and long-term, and because of the extremely risky and vulnerable 
situation in which it places the Latin American countries. There 
is, therefore, urgent need for international co-operation in finding 
appropriate solutions. In this connexion several proposals have 
been made, but they have not yet received the unanimous support 
of either the developed or the developing countries. The CEPAL 
secretariat has also formulated some proposals at regional and 
international level in this connexion. In particular, Latin American 
countries need to have greater access to international long-term 
/financial markets, 
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financial markets,' and to change the composition of their financing, 
by increasing borrowings from official sources and reducing the share 
of private lending agencies and banks» 
(ii) As explained abo^/e, the rapid increase in export income 
represents a key variable ia the management of balance-of-payments 
problems and in increasing the rate of economic growth. And it is 
obvious that the countries must cake an effort to bring about, as 
soon as possible, a reduction in the trade-balance deficit, leading 
towards equilibrium. And this fcr several reasons: in order to 
ensure the prompt reduction of the actual levels of net external 
financing so as to avoid the long-term effect of the debt to increase 
external purchasing powerr to build up adequate monetary reserves and 
reduce the degree of external vulnerability in order to promote a 
climate of confidence and facilitate the management of the debt and 
its servicing. 
The short- and medium-term growth of export will depend on the 
recovery of the economic growth rate of the industrialized countries 
and the possibilities of access to their markets, as well as, in the 
final analysis, on the adoption of the policies and measures proposed 
by the developing countries regarding the various aspects of the trade 
in and prices of basic commodities. There is particular concern about 
the trend of the terms of trade, which run the risk of deteriorating 
still further either because of the continual rise in the prices of 
imports from the industrialized countries or because of the decline 
and instability of commodity prices, as is already happening in some 
cases. 
(iii) The high elasticity of imports and their high coefficient 
with respect to the product will have to be reduced, since the 
maintenance of the trends observed in the first half of the 1970s 
would make the balance-of-payments position untenable. This can be 
achieved by reducing or eliminating imports of items which are not 
essential for the countries' economic growth or expenditures which 
are unjustified not only in the light of the balance-of-payments 
problems but also of the prevailing economic and social conditions. 
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Moreover, the countries - particularly the large ones - have 
decided to adopt or are already applying industrialization programmes 
which will permit the substitution of imports in important areas of 
the intermediate and capital goods sectors. 
(iv) This analysis of projections once again brings out the 
important medium- and long-term role to be played in Latin American 
development by regional co-operation and the expansion of intra-
regional trade.- This will facilitate a more flexible growth 
structure for the national économies and there will tend to be a 
reduction in the marked dependency on the central countries at present 
observed as regards supplies of capital goods and basic industrial 
inputs. 
(v) Finally, it is worth noting:that the solutions and policies 
adopted with regard to balance-of-payments problems naturally call 
for complementary measures of an internal nature which'must be in 
keeping with the economic and social objectives of the national 
development strategies. 
3° Some comments on the projections of 
sectoral and employment trends ' 
The long-tèrm prospects regarding sectoral trends and economic 
changes, as well as the evolution of productivity and employment, are 
being given particular attention in the prospective studies of the 
CEPAL secretariat. 
This field of its research consists mainly in: (!) defining 
various settings which are not exactly the same as those used in 
the prospective studies of other aspects of development; 
(ii) determining the rate of growth and changes in the production 
structure; (iii) obtaining projections on the evolution of productivity 
by specific sectors; (iv) determining the employment requirements; 
(v) making a comparative analysis on the basis of the demographic 
projections on population of active age and the economically active 
population; and (vi) evaluating employment prospects at a sectoral 
and overall level, taking into account unemployment and under-employment 
in the initial period of the projections. 
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The functions projecting sectoral growth and the rate of 
productivity have been dete.rrair.ed mainly on the basis of the 
domestic product and total and-par capita income, taking into account 
the historical statistical data of Latin American countries and of 
some of the more advanced industrial countries. In other words, in 
one way or another it is assumed that at different rates of growth 
the dynamism of the economic and technological structure will 
develop following the same patterns as those prevailing in Latin 
America and, with the increase in psr capita income, tending to absorb 
the characteristics of the more developed economies. 
In its current work programme the secretariat aims to project 
over the next 25 years the variables of economic growth and occupation 
given in table 16, while also, naturally„ carrying out the corresponding 
basic and complementary studies, euch as those connected with the 
distribution of the product and occupation by sectors. 
The secretariat is advancing in this project with some difficulty, 
due to the shortage of data and the need to examine scrupulously the 
complex iterrelations between the variables under consideration. 
Full information is not yet available. However, some conclusions 
can be drawn which, although general and provisional, are of great 
importance in this prospective appraisal of Latin American development. 
These conclusions concern two projection exercises corresponding 
to two working hypotheses. In the first, the growth rate of the 
product in each of a selected group of countries is assumed to be 
the same as in the past ten or twenty years, as the case may be; 
and in the second, a sharp rise in the growth rate is postulated, 
in order to assess the orders of magnitude of the "growth and level 
of economic activity necessary tc meet specific employment objectives. 
The fundamental assumption which characterizes the two hypotheses 
is that in both cases the process of economic and technological 
transformation typifying the Latin American economies will continue, 
evolving along lines similar to those of the industrial countries 
as the domestic product and incone grow. 
/Table 16 
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The projections .based on the first hypothesis give a global 
economic growth raté,of 6 per eent for the group of countries 
considered. This is somewhat higher than the past rate due to the 
fact that the countries which have grown most vigorously, such as 
Brazil, will increase in importance and weight in the. nèxt 25 years. 
The results indicate that with this growth target total occupation in 
this group of countries will rise by about 2.2 per cent annuallyP 
If this rate is compared with that of the economically active 
i e 41 ' r • . i - . • » ~ • 
population, about 3 per cent annually according to the population 
projections,, it is clear that thera would be a worsening of the ; 
problems of unemploymentunderemployment and income distribution 
which accompany this scenario. 
Consequently, the second analysis scenario was selected with 
the aim of estimating the, amount and rate of economic activity required 
in order to promote an increase in employment somewhat greater than 
the growth rate of 3 per cent, so as to absorb the increase in the . 
labour force ' and recjuçe tfre. underemployment noted ,at present, especially 
in agriculture and in urban services. The projection exercises show 
that for the countries taken together, in the postulated economic and 
technological conditions,. tfcis. g],obal ra.te, would haye. to be ,substantially 
higher than that actually recorded in recent years in Latin Amèrica, 
since it is estimated that it would need to be around 8 per cent "per 
year. . , ' . .' •-„; " 
There -is' no doubt that these exercises of projections confirm 
and reinforoe, this time quite dramatically because of the: magnitude 
of the problems expected, the deep concern felt about the strategies 
which should orient the future development of Latin America. This 
concern is all the more intense in the light of the objectives of 
human development laid down in the International Development Strategy. 
It is essential to carry out mors detailed study of the processes 
r; 




external economic goals and the essentially social nature which should 
characterize the development process. It is also necessary to adopt 
a more direct and clearer approach than up to now to the problems of 
employment, income distribution and of overcoming the situations of 
extreme poverty which prevail in the region. This would naturally 
lead to the need to consider alternative strategies and the 
institutional and structural changes which have a «lear relation to 
the development styles. In sum these are the central themes which are 
to be studied in the draft project of the Secretariat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the secretariat has carried out two biennial 
appraisals of Latin American development in connexion with the 
application and implementation of the International Development 
Strategy (IDS) at the regional level. These studies led to the 
Quito and Chaguaramas Appraisals, which represented a valuable 
contribution to the work of the United Nations and were of particular 
importance in shaping a Latin American position covering matters 
with political connotations, in respect of which it is not easy 
to reach agreement. 
However, when these and other similar studies are considered 
in the light of the irreluctable responsibilities of ECLA, the 
evolution of the ideas which the secretariat has been formulating for 
some time, the transformations and changes which have been taking 
place in Latin America, and those now developing at the international 
level, the feeling grows that the. time is ripe and there is now a 
need for the secretariat to devote its efforts to more ambitious 
studies of greater organic importance. Such studies should be aimed 
at ;irethinking;i the realities of the economic and social process in 
Latin America; highlighting both its common features and the special 
characteristics shown by the broad panorama of the countries of the 
region; studying the prospects and options offered for the development 
of our countries in the long term and within the framework of the 
new international conditions which the future holds out, and 
contributing ideas or suggesting strategies and policies which put 
the institutional and structural changes that need to be promoted 
in a clearer light. 
These objectives have led the secretariat to propose a project 
which could be drawn up around three central themes, namely: 
(a) The appraisal of the economic and social process during 
the postwar period; 




(c) The study of the long-tern:, economic growth prospects at the 
national, regional and international levels, on the basis 
of various development scenarios. 
The very nature of the preoccupations which underlie the 
project reveals two of its methodological aspects. On the one hand, 
it will be concerned with the long ^erm, since the factors influencing 
the matters of greatest interest only undergo significant change 
over long periods. On the other, it must cover social, economic arid 
political aspects, so that it will have to adopt an integrated approach. 
In addition to covering matters of long-standing concern to ECLA, 
the project offers the opportunity of making progress in directions ' 
which fully coincide with the recommendations of the General Assembly. 
Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 3362 (S-VII) 
on Development and International Economic Co-operation, 3^09; (XXX) on 
the Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, and 
350S (XXX) on the Examination of Long-Term Trends in the Economic 
Development of the Regions of the World. In these resolutions stress 
is placed on the tasks which the secretariats of the regional 
commissions should discharge in the integrated analysis of long-term 
development, and they reaffirm the responsibilities incumbent on 
the ECLA secretariat in the execution of studies on development 
problems. 
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PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OUTLINE 
LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: ITS APPRAISAL 
AND LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 
PART I 
Appraisal of the economic and social process 
over the period 1950-1975 
Development and social change 
A. Social stratification,. Its evolution since 1950«. Emergence 
of new strata« 
B. Urbanization. Magnitude of the phenomenon. Cultural and 
consumption patterns. 
C. The rural situation. Systems of exploitation. Agrarian 
reforms. Migration from rural areas to the cities. 
Political and social participation. 
D. Distribution of income and of social services. Critical 
poverty. Evolution of educational systems. 
Eo Population growth. Geographical redistribution. Evolution 
of trends. 
F= Challenges to existing national societies. Tendencies 
towards social development. Emergence of an alternative 
model. 
Growth and economic change 
A. Fundamental changes during the period 1950-1975« 
B. The dynamics of the process. Domestic and external factors. 
C. State participation. The role of public enterprises. 
D. Foreign trade, external financing and transnational 
corporations. 
E. Income distribution and critical poverty. 
F. Spatial distribution of economic activity. Appraisal of the 
heterogeneity of countries or groups of countries. 
/ I I I . International 
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III. International economic relations 
w ^ ^ w w — — i i i 'iiwwMi' Hi ill i Nil mini » !«• m m«E»a«tnw 
A. Latin America in the content of the changes which occurred 
in the world economy between 195° a n d 1975» The main 
changes which have taken place in the structure of Latin 
America's foreign trade and external financing. 
B. International trade. Economic development and the balance 
of payments. Basic commodities. The trade in manufactures 
and semi-manufactures» The relationship between imports 
and stages of the development process. 
C. External financing.« The elements determining its composition 
and magnitude. Evolution of external indebtedness. 
D. Latin America's economic relations with other areas. The 
industrialized market economy countries and the socialist 
countries. 
E. Co-operation between the developing countries. 
IV. The economic integra 
The establishment 
;ion of Latin America 
c of the regional and sub-regional integration 
schemes. The initial impulse. The present crisis. 
B." Integration and national development. Stages in the 
integration processes and in the economic growth models 
of the countries. 
C. Appraisal of trade in the various integration schemes. 
Latin American trade outside the integration schemes. 
Relations between the schemes. 
Sectorial changes 
A. Agricultural development. 
1. The agricultural sector in the context of the national 
economies. Relationship with the external sector. 
2. The agrarian economy. Basic institutional aspects. 
5° The dynamics of agricultural production. Changes and 
heterogeneity« Domestic and external demand. 
ko Agriculture and the problem of nutrition. 
/•B. Industrial 
B. Industrial development 
1. Evolution of the industrial sector. Principal 
characteristics. Appraisal at the world level. 
Its role in the development of the countries of 
the region. 
2« Factors in industrial development. Industrial 
development scenarios and patterns. 
3« The role of government in industrialization. 
C. Energy 
1. The energy sector in the context of the national 
economies. 
2. Appraisal of energy supply and demand in the period 
1950-1975. 
3. The Latin American energy situation in the world 
context. 
D. Mining 
1. The relative importance of the sector at the regional 
and national level. 
2. Evolution of demand and production in the period 1950-1975« 
3. The Latin American mining sector in the world context. 
E. Transport and communications 
1. Sea transport. National merchant fleets. Multinational 
endeavours. Foreign fleets. New technologies. 





The prospects for. latin American, development: Evolution 
and change^ in tjse n?xt 25 years 
VI. Basic resources. Availability and the requirements of 
economic growth 
A. The population and '.auman resources. Demographic prospects 
and the labour fere3. 
B. Agricultural resources. Expansion of the agricultural 
frontier and changes in productivity. 
C. Mineral and energy resources. Reserves, and the technical 
and economic factors affecting their exploitation. 
D. The capacity of accumulation. 
VII. Definition and ar.alysi.3 of various Latin American development 
scenarios^ Quantitative analysis schemes 
A. Scenario based on the projection of the prevailing general 
trends and features of the Latin American economic and social 
process. Analysis of the degree of stability, contradictions 
and problems likely to arise .from these trends and lines of 
development. 
1. Economic growth: the significance that the projection 
of past trends and of the targets of the IDS would have 
at the nationalj regional and international levels. 
Evolution at the end of trae present decade and in the 
longer term. Effects on employment, income distribution, 
and the solution of the problem of critical poverty. 
2. Capital formation. National saving and external 
financing. 
3. Social evolution. Urbanization, education, life styles, 
social stratification. Outside influences. 
4. International economic relations. Foreign trade and 
external financing. Evolution of dependency on 
industrialized countries. The role of transnational 
corporations. The process of regional integration. 
/5' Sectorial 
- 7 -
5° Sectorial evolution. Production, productivity and 
employment. Agriculture, nutrition and foreign trade. 
Industrial production and patterns of industrialization. 
.' Energy. Mining. 
6. Heterogeneity and similarity of national development at 
the regional level. Changes in the relative positions 
of countries. 
B. Scenario based on the assumption of increasing regional 
integration changes in the international economic order and 
acceleration of the rate of growth. Social orientation of 
development. 
1. Economic growth: acceleration of growth and less unequal 
tendencies in the distribution of production and income 
at the world and regional levels. Increase in employment. 
Changes in income distribution and special attention to 
the problem of critical poverty. Changes in structure 
of domestic demand. 
2. Capital formation: volume and sectorial allocation. 
Increase in national saving and share of external 
financing. 
3. Social evolution. Greater social and political 
participation. Changes in social stratification in 
keeping with, economic and social changes. Educational 
policy. 
If. International economic relations. Lower rate of growth 
of the industrialized market economy countries. New 
structure of external trade relations. Changes in degree 
of dependence on industrialized countries. Trade flows 
and their composition. Terms of trade. External 
financing. Increase in trade between the developing 
countries. 
Regional integration. Increase in regional and trade and 
changes in its composition. Relations between the 
integration schemes. Financial co-operation. Sectorial 
economic effects of integration, at the national level. 
Relative evolution of the integration schemes. 
/ 6 . Sector ia l 
Sectorial evolution and change. Production, productivity 
and employment « 
Agricultural production: production requirements and 
availability ox basic resources. External trade. 
Industrial production.:! increase in rate of growth5 
trade between the countries of the region and with other 
areas; social needs, structure of demand, and patterns 
of industrialization. 
Energy: domestic denand, production and primary sources; 
structural changes; external supplies and regional 
balance. 
Mining: domestic demand, production and foreign trade. 
